*"But it also entails that The World of Warcraft and what I dreamed last
Of course! they exist as "themselves" - not in context of 'QM or the Bible,
or anything else'. Anything we think of "exists" - at least in our thought
(at that time?) when it occurred. There is no sure way to distinguish
between 'existence' in diverse aspects of our figments (human thoughts).
Brent also mentions "proof" and "axioms":
*"...1.Incompleteness is the non-existence of some proofs.*
2,*That some functions are not-computable only implies their existence in
the sense that they are implied by some axioms."*
1.- Thanks, Brent, although I would not use for some 'nonexisting' the
word "proof". Proof is tricky: it refers to thinking within the 'model' with
justification 'within' as well. Leading to "in-model" TRUTH. In my
agnosticism (incomplete knowledge?) 'proof'' (truth?) is questionable.
2.- In my vocabulary axioms are human inventions to make 'sciemtific'
concepts feasible, not vice versa. One way to look beyond the conventional
may be to disregard axioms and find different relations from the
'accepted'. Such method - in the agnostic thinking - may lead to
*NEW*findings in addition to the 'registered' (scientific?)
I am willing to assign as "anticipatory" - a domain (Robert Rosen) I would
love to understand.
(Are we restricted here to mathematical 'functions'? I like to expand my
Problem: Bruno's retort:
*"And this entails (and explains) the appearance of the physical universe,
but in a derived and most sophisticated higher order (epistemological)
sense, not in the arithmetical sense (indeed the physical universe become a
non trivial and non computable object, obeying partially computable laws,
Assuming (what "I" do not) that a so called arithmetical sense is a 'higher
order' - not the one invented within the bounds of our human logical
churning. Indeed: the 'existence' of the physical universe (a figment we
live by) is non-trivial, with one caveat of mine:
*Nothing OBEYS our (partially computable, or any other 'physical'?) LAWS, *this
is the wrong expression. We derived (mostly within a debatable statistical
method) the habits we so far observed, deduced their (mostly mathematically
quantized behavior) and call them "laws". Those "laws" are valid as long as
the borders of our statistical considerations hold in THAT respect.
Conventional sciences are mostly built and exercised within such
On Wed, May 11, 2011 at 1:28 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 5/11/2011 1:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 10 May 2011, at 20:11, meekerdb wrote:
> On 5/10/2011 9:01 AM, David Nyman wrote:
> On 10 May 2011 13:21, Bruno Marchal<marc...@ulb.ac.be> <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
> What does it mean for numbers to understand?
> Suppose I can answer this in a way that you understand. Then it means the
> same things for the numbers.
> This seems to me to be a very central point. Chalmers gives very
> convincing arguments why an "Aristotelian machine's" expressed
> behaviour (including its "thoughts" and "beliefs") are
> indistinguishable from a conscious person's - excepting only that it
> is not IN FACT conscious (!).
> How does he establish that it is not conscious?
> This alone should be enough (as indeed
> he argues) to demonstrate the inadequacy of such a metaphysics of
> matter, unless consciousness itself is to be denied (which, as Deutsch
> argues in his most recent book, is just bad explanation). It seems as
> if, starting from an Aristotelian perspective, there is no way this
> puzzle can be resolved even with the addition of various ad hoc
> assumptions (such as Chalmers himself attempts, unsuccessfully IMO);
> the assumed primacy of "material processes" inevitably ends in the
> vitiation of "mental" explanation, in this view of the matter. To
> resolve the puzzle it seems that "material processes" and "mental
> processes" (or, one might say, material and mental explanations) must
> emerge as deeply correlated aspects of a single narrative. Hence, if
> computationalism is to be the explanation for the mental, it must
> likewise suffice as that of the material.
> The problem with computationalism is that "exists => is computed" does not
> entail "computed => exists" and if you hypothesize the latter it explains
> too much.
> But comp precisely prevents the possibility that "exists => is computed".
> For example comp entails the existence of many non computable functions,
> incompleteness, etc. That is what theoretical computer science illustrates
> (usually by diagonalization).
> Incompleteness is the *non-existence* of some proofs. That some functions
> are not-computable only implies their existence in the sense that they are
> implied by some axioms.
> Now, the reverse, that is, "computed => exists", is trivially true, with
> "exists" used in the usual arithmetical sense, like in "prime numbers
> But it also entails that The World of Warcraft and what I dreamed last
> night exist.
> And this entails (and explains) the appearance of the physical universe,
> but in a derived and most sophisticated higher order (epistemological)
> sense, not in the arithmetical sense (indeed the physical universe become a
> non trivial and non computable object, obeying partially computable laws,
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to email@example.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> For more options, visit this group at
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at