On 16 May 2011, at 19:40, meekerdb wrote:

On 5/16/2011 7:13 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
I was trying to be sure that I took that involves the possibility that the OMs are computationally disjoint into account. This covers your example, I think...

I am wondering how they are "strung together", to use the analogy of putting beads on a string. My point is that we cannot appeal to a separate "dimension of time" to act as the sequencer of the OMs. So how do they get sequenced? How does the information (if I am allowed that term) of one OM get related to that of another?



I think they must be strung together by overlapping, since as computations I don't think they correspond to atomic states of the digital machine but rather to large sequences of computation (and in Bruno's theory to equivalence classes of sequences).

It is just that if you believe that your consciousness (first person experience) is manifested through a digitalisable machine, you have to distinguish the 1-OMs from the 3-OMs.

Intuitively (cf UDA) and computer science theoretically (cf AUDA).

The other theory that Stathis is explicating takes OM's to be atomic and discrete.

I think Stathis and me share the same theory (a brain can be substituted by a (material) digital mechanism). The OMs Stathis is referring to are the 3-OMs. By digitalness they can be considered as atomic and discrete. If we start from addition and multiplication (of non negative integers) as initial universal base, the 3-OMs are numbers. Now, and here perhaps Stathis might disagree, a sequence of numbers is only a computation when it is defined relatively to a universal number, to begin by one self. The 1-OM arises from the first person indeterminacy. Our actual consciousness depends on the topology and relative measure on all "equivalent states" reached by all (universal) numbers. This is a non trivial structure whose mathematics can be derived from the self-reference logics + the classical theory of knowledge. As I try to explain, this gives a conceptual explanation of quanta and qualia, and, accepting also the classical theory of knowledge (Timaeus, Theaetetus) a mathematical theory of quanta and qualia.

In that case they would have to be strung together by some internal reference, one to another.

Stathis has the correct picture, I think. I mean "correct" relatively to the mechanist assumption. The internal reference is given by the logic of the self-reference. But pure internal reference makes no sense, we need both globally and locally refer to "other" universal number (other that oneself) to make sense of the notion of computation. But it is the self which "create" the past and the continuation by maintaining enough self-consistency. Stathis might just study a bit more the math of computer science, perhaps.

I don't think that's a viable theory since in order to make them atomic, they must have only small amounts of information -

Computational states (3-OM) are as atomic as natural numbers. Some contains HUGE amount of information.

when I have a thought it doesn't necessarily include any memory of or reference to previous thoughts.

That is how meditation and dissociative drug can help you to remind the consciousness of the "blanche machine", the consciousness of the virgin Löbian machine. Memories only differentiate consciousness. Brains only change their probability of manifestation relatively to probable relative universal numbers. Consciousness is a 'natural' property of universal numbers relatively to probable others universal numbers. Those relations define an information differentiating flux in arithmetical truth.

It is also difficult to see how the empirical experience of time can be accounted for in this theory.

If you accept mechanism, many times emerges. Many 1-times (feeling of duration), and 3-times (clock). Their logic is provably given by the variant of self-reference, which each structured the numbers in different way. Actually 1-times is given by S4Grz1 and X1*, and 3- times is given by Z1*, or slight variant if you nuance the theory of knowledge (this is the toy theology of the ideally correct Löbian number).

If you reject mechanism, tell me what is your theory of mind and your theory of matter.



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