On 5/17/2011 5:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 May 2011, at 19:40, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/16/2011 7:13 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
[SPK]
I was trying to be sure that I took that involves the possibility
that the OMs are computationally disjoint into account. This covers
your example, I think...
I am wondering how they are "strung together", to use the analogy
of putting beads on a string. My point is that we cannot appeal to a
separate "dimension of time" to act as the sequencer of the OMs. So
how do they get sequenced? How does the information (if I am allowed
that term) of one OM get related to that of another?
Onward!
Stephen
I think they must be strung together by overlapping, since as
computations I don't think they correspond to atomic states of the
digital machine but rather to large sequences of computation (and in
Bruno's theory to equivalence classes of sequences).
It is just that if you believe that your consciousness (first person
experience) is manifested through a digitalisable machine, you have to
distinguish the 1-OMs from the 3-OMs.
Intuitively (cf UDA) and computer science theoretically (cf AUDA).
The other theory that Stathis is explicating takes OM's to be atomic
and discrete.
I think Stathis and me share the same theory (a brain can be
substituted by a (material) digital mechanism). The OMs Stathis is
referring to are the 3-OMs. By digitalness they can be considered as
atomic and discrete. If we start from addition and multiplication (of
non negative integers) as initial universal base, the 3-OMs are
numbers. Now, and here perhaps Stathis might disagree, a sequence of
numbers is only a computation when it is defined relatively to a
universal number, to begin by one self.
The 1-OM arises from the first person indeterminacy. Our actual
consciousness depends on the topology and relative measure on all
"equivalent states" reached by all (universal) numbers.
This is a non trivial structure whose mathematics can be derived from
the self-reference logics + the classical theory of knowledge.
As I try to explain, this gives a conceptual explanation of quanta and
qualia, and, accepting also the classical theory of knowledge
(Timaeus, Theaetetus) a mathematical theory of quanta and qualia.
In that case they would have to be strung together by some internal
reference, one to another.
Stathis has the correct picture, I think. I mean "correct" relatively
to the mechanist assumption. The internal reference is given by the
logic of the self-reference. But pure internal reference makes no
sense, we need both globally and locally refer to "other" universal
number (other that oneself) to make sense of the notion of
computation. But it is the self which "create" the past and the
continuation by maintaining enough self-consistency. Stathis might
just study a bit more the math of computer science, perhaps.
I don't think that's a viable theory since in order to make them
atomic, they must have only small amounts of information -
Computational states (3-OM) are as atomic as natural numbers. Some
contains HUGE amount of information.
when I have a thought it doesn't necessarily include any memory of or
reference to previous thoughts.
That is how meditation and dissociative drug can help you to remind
the consciousness of the "blanche machine", the consciousness of the
virgin Löbian machine. Memories only differentiate consciousness.
Are you claiming that every thought includes a memory? A memory of
what? The immediately preceding thought?
Brains only change their probability of manifestation relatively to
probable relative universal numbers. Consciousness is a 'natural'
property of universal numbers relatively to probable others universal
numbers. Those relations define an information differentiating flux in
arithmetical truth.
It is also difficult to see how the empirical experience of time can
be accounted for in this theory.
If you accept mechanism, many times emerges. Many 1-times (feeling of
duration), and 3-times (clock). Their logic is provably given by the
variant of self-reference, which each structured the numbers in
different way. Actually 1-times is given by S4Grz1 and X1*, and
3-times is given by Z1*, or slight variant if you nuance the theory of
knowledge (this is the toy theology of the ideally correct Löbian
number).
If you reject mechanism, tell me what is your theory of mind and your
theory of matter.
You misunderstand. I'm objecting to the idea that a "thought" = "a
single state of a digital computation". It seems to me that "observer
moment", OM, is used equivocally to refer to both as though they were
the same thing. If my brain or some part thereof were replaced by
digital computer I think its states would be a level far below those of
my thoughts (1_OM?) - just as the computational state of my neurons is
below the level of my consciousness. Those states (are those what you
are calling 3-OM?) would contain far more information than that
contained in the conscious part. They would have a much shorter
duration than a thought and so a thought would not be atomic, but would
have parts that could overlap and hence provide the experience of time.
Brent
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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