On 18 May 2011, at 02:46, meekerdb wrote:

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On 5/17/2011 5:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 16 May 2011, at 19:40, meekerdb wrote:On 5/16/2011 7:13 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:[SPK]I was trying to be sure that I took that involves thepossibility that the OMs are computationally disjoint intoaccount. This covers your example, I think...I am wondering how they are "strung together", to use theanalogy of putting beads on a string. My point is that we cannotappeal to a separate "dimension of time" to act as the sequencerof the OMs. So how do they get sequenced? How does theinformation (if I am allowed that term) of one OM get related tothat of another?Onward! StephenI think they must be strung together by overlapping, since ascomputations I don't think they correspond to atomic states of thedigital machine but rather to large sequences of computation (andin Bruno's theory to equivalence classes of sequences).It is just that if you believe that your consciousness (firstperson experience) is manifested through a digitalisable machine,you have to distinguish the 1-OMs from the 3-OMs.Intuitively (cf UDA) and computer science theoretically (cf AUDA).The other theory that Stathis is explicating takes OM's to beatomic and discrete.I think Stathis and me share the same theory (a brain can besubstituted by a (material) digital mechanism). The OMs Stathis isreferring to are the 3-OMs. By digitalness they can be consideredas atomic and discrete. If we start from addition andmultiplication (of non negative integers) as initial universalbase, the 3-OMs are numbers. Now, and here perhaps Stathis mightdisagree, a sequence of numbers is only a computation when it isdefined relatively to a universal number, to begin by one self.The 1-OM arises from the first person indeterminacy. Our actualconsciousness depends on the topology and relative measure on all"equivalent states" reached by all (universal) numbers.This is a non trivial structure whose mathematics can be derivedfrom the self-reference logics + the classical theory of knowledge.As I try to explain, this gives a conceptual explanation of quantaand qualia, and, accepting also the classical theory of knowledge(Timaeus, Theaetetus) a mathematical theory of quanta and qualia.In that case they would have to be strung together by someinternal reference, one to another.Stathis has the correct picture, I think. I mean "correct"relatively to the mechanist assumption. The internal reference isgiven by the logic of the self-reference. But pure internalreference makes no sense, we need both globally and locally referto "other" universal number (other that oneself) to make sense ofthe notion of computation. But it is the self which "create" thepast and the continuation by maintaining enough self-consistency.Stathis might just study a bit more the math of computer science,perhaps.I don't think that's a viable theory since in order to make thematomic, they must have only small amounts of information -Computational states (3-OM) are as atomic as natural numbers. Somecontains HUGE amount of information.when I have a thought it doesn't necessarily include any memory ofor reference to previous thoughts.That is how meditation and dissociative drug can help you to remindthe consciousness of the "blanche machine", the consciousness ofthe virgin Löbian machine. Memories only differentiate consciousness.Are you claiming that every thought includes a memory? A memory ofwhat? The immediately preceding thought?

`You lost me. I was pretending the contrary. I was with you on this. It`

`is *because* a thought (a conscious thought) does not necessarily`

`include a memory or a reference to previous thoughts that you can`

`remain conscious when taking a drug which disconnect you from all`

`memories.`

Brains only change their probability of manifestation relatively toprobable relative universal numbers. Consciousness is a 'natural'property of universal numbers relatively to probable othersuniversal numbers. Those relations define an informationdifferentiating flux in arithmetical truth.It is also difficult to see how the empirical experience of timecan be accounted for in this theory.If you accept mechanism, many times emerges. Many 1-times (feelingof duration), and 3-times (clock). Their logic is provably given bythe variant of self-reference, which each structured the numbers indifferent way. Actually 1-times is given by S4Grz1 and X1*, and 3-times is given by Z1*, or slight variant if you nuance the theoryof knowledge (this is the toy theology of the ideally correctLöbian number).If you reject mechanism, tell me what is your theory of mind andyour theory of matter.You misunderstand. I'm objecting to the idea that a "thought" = "asingle state of a digital computation". It seems to me that"observer moment", OM, is used equivocally to refer to both asthough they were the same thing.

`Yes, I agree. That is a very usual confusion. That is why I suggest`

`people to always distinguish clearly the 3-OMs (computational states`

`belonging to 3-describable computations) and the 1-OMs (which are`

`typically NOT describable, except by reference to a notion of truth,`

`which is itself not describable). Eventually the 3-OMs are handled by`

`the self-reference logic G (and G*), and the 1-OMs are described by`

`the self-reference logic S4Grz1 and X1*. It is the difference between`

`Bp, Bp & p, and Bp & Dt & p. The additions of "& p", " Dt" and "Dt &`

`p" change the logical and topological structures bearing on the OMs.`

`I use the notion of OM because people here use that vocabulary, but it`

`is a bit misleading. Given that there is 8 hypostases, we should`

`distinguish the 1-OM, 2-OM, 3-OM, ... 8-OM, and even more due to the`

`others possible arithmetical nuances entailed by the incompleteness`

`phenomenon.`

If my brain or some part thereof were replaced by digital computerI think its states would be a level far below those of my thoughts(1_OM?) - just as the computational state of my neurons is below thelevel of my consciousness.

`You are right. And this is why physics is eventually transformed into`

`a statistics on (relative) computations. Whatever is below my`

`substitution level is multiplied into infinities, because no machine`

`can singularize itself on "one" computation. "We" are spread across`

`the whole universal dovetailing, or on the whole sigma_1 arithmetical`

`truth.`

Those states (are those what you are calling 3-OM?) would containfar more information than that contained in the conscious part.

`Indeed, a "real" physical instantiation of a 3-OM is an infinite`

`mathematical object (if we are machine).`

They would have a much shorter duration than a thought and so athought would not be atomic, but would have parts that could overlapand hence provide the experience of time.

`I agree. The "overlap" is what is managed by the modalities`

`distinguishing the points of views.`

Bruno

BrentBruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/--You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

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