On Mon, May 16, 2011 at 1:40 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 5/16/2011 7:13 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>> I was trying to be sure that I took that involves the possibility that
>> the OMs are computationally disjoint into account. This covers your example,
>> I think...
>> I am wondering how they are "strung together", to use the analogy of
>> putting beads on a string. My point is that we cannot appeal to a separate
>> "dimension of time" to act as the sequencer of the OMs. So how do they get
>> sequenced? How does the information (if I am allowed that term) of one OM
>> get related to that of another?
> I think they must be strung together by overlapping, since as computations I
> don't think they correspond to atomic states of the digital machine but
> rather to large sequences of computation (and in Bruno's theory to
> equivalence classes of sequences).
> The other theory that Stathis is explicating takes OM's to be atomic and
> discrete. In that case they would have to be strung together by some
> internal reference, one to another. I don't think that's a viable theory
> since in order to make them atomic, they must have only small amounts of
> information - when I have a thought it doesn't necessarily include any
> memory of or reference to previous thoughts. It is also difficult to see
> how the empirical experience of time can be accounted for in this theory.
It seems to me that the time that we experience can’t be “real” time.
I don’t see how we could have direct access to time any more than we
have direct access to anything else “in the world”.
The time that we know must be an artifact of how we represent the
world...an artifact of our model of the world...an aspect of our
I’m not a materialist, but if I were I would take a
computationalist/representationalist view of the mind. In this view,
our experience of the world would be “represented” in some information
storage medium, and then changes to that representation would result
in changes to our experience.
What would be the mapping from the representation to any particular
experience? Well, for any *change* in experience, there would have to
be a change in the representation. But you can’t notice anything,
can’t experience anything, *unless* there is a change in the
underlying representation that would represent “noticing it” or
So your awareness of time would have to be within the “bits” of
information representing your experience...it could not be anywhere
Not every change in the bits would *necessarily* equate to a change in
experience - but no change in experience could occur without a change
in the underlying representation.
And of course "change" wouldn't necessarily have to happen "in time".
The X value of a line on a 2D graph "changes" with respect to the Y
value...but this is not a change in time.
So time would exist within experience, not external to or independent of it.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at