On 5/18/2011 10:30 AM, Rex Allen wrote:
On Wed, May 18, 2011 at 11:38 AM, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net>  wrote:
On 5/18/2011 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

That is how meditation and dissociative drug can help you to remind the
consciousness of the "blanche machine", the consciousness of the virgin
Löbian machine. Memories only differentiate consciousness.

Are you claiming that every thought includes a memory?  A memory of what?
The immediately preceding thought?

You lost me. I was pretending the contrary. I was with you on this. It is
*because* a thought (a conscious thought) does not necessarily include a
memory or a reference to previous thoughts that you can remain conscious
when taking a drug which disconnect you from all memories.

Ok.  I mistook your point.  I agree that memory is not necessary for
consciousness - though I think it is necessary for self-consciousness.
I tend to disagree.  What is memory?  Just representation in some
material substrate?  When you “recall” a memory into the present is it
still a memory or part of the present?   What about false memories?

Isn’t the experience of reflecting on a memory just another kind of
experience, no different really than day-dreaming about something that
never happened?


I don't see that we're in disagreement. Except possibly when you say memory is *just* another experience. It is an experience *of remembering* and so differs from experiences that are not memories; it is qualitatively different. Of course that is separate from the question of whether it is veridical, whether it has causal connection and similarity to some earlier experience. I think "earlier" can be defined in terms of the underlying computation. How that sequence relates to the sequence of experience seems to be part of the difficult question of how to recover physics from computation. I can see that earlier experiences must be encoded in the states of computation in order for them to be experienced as memories. My point was only that an experience must correspond to a sequence of computational states, not just to one (a moment) and that its information content must be very small compared to that of the underlying states. So a moment (computational state) is to short to constitute an observation (an experience). And an observation is to small (not enough information) to constitute a moment (a computational state). So "observer moment" seems like an incoherent and confusing term. I guess that's why Bruno resorts to 1-OM and 3-OM; but that seems to imply there a such a thing as an OM that is just looked at from two different viewpoints.


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