On 20 May 2011, at 22:44, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Hi Brent and Bruno,
Sent: Friday, May 20, 2011 1:44 PM
Subject: Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 5/20/2011 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 18 May 2011, at 18:54, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/18/2011 9:21 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Interesting! If we follow this idea, that memory is not
necessary for consciousness, then consciousness does not require
a persistent structure to supervene upon. No?
I don't see how that follows.
Me too. Consciousness requires logically the entire arithmetical
reality, for example (with mechanism). Without 2+2=4, there is no
consciousness, nor computation, nor matter.
"Require" in what sense: logical, nomological,...? We know that a
blow to the head can interrupt consciousness
We don't know that. With comp nothing interrupt consciousness.
I have experienced it, a gap in my consciousness. Of course you may
say it is only a gap in my memory of consciousness, but a loss of
memory can be induced in by drugs that do not cause one to be
unresponsive at the time which is not remembered. This tells me
that being unconscious is more that just not remembering.
and erase memories.
That can indeed happens locally and relatively. And that can give
the feeling of having been unconscious.
But consciousness is a matter of having feelings. Why credit
feelings of being conscious but not those of having been
uncouscious. This goes back to the question of the role of memories
and whether memory is essential to consciousness. You may
hypothesize that nothing interrupts consciousness, or make it true
by a definition that denies physical (3rd person) time. But this
strikes me as trying to save a theory by redefining words.
Let me be clear, if we say that X supervenes on Y then the
existence of X is dependent on the existence of Y, right?
Consciousness, stripped of the notions of self-awareness, is
what I was considering. This corresponds, crudely stated, the idea
of some kind of correlation between the content of any given
individual 1p and that which is the same for many 1p or even
invariant over transformations from one 1p to any other in the
equivalence class of 1p.
1p can be seen as or related to (roughly speaking) equivalence classes
of 3p. I am not sure what you mean by equivalence class of 1p.
In that sense, if consciousness does not necessitate memory – any
form of correlation with representations of prior events – then why
does consciousness require any persistent structure at all to exist?
What motivation does persistence of structure have in any
discussion? This disallows for Last Thursdaysm, I realize, and that
is kind of the point that I was trying to make. It seems to me that
self-awareness requires memory but bare consciousness does not.
This seems consistent with the notion of an OM as have been
considered by Russell and Bruno, but it makes my confusion about how
OMs are sequenced even more profound!
3-OMs are sequenced by the computations they "belongs" too. 1-OM are
structured by the topology on those computations derived from the
application of Theaetetus' theory of knowledge.
We may posit that 2+2=4 is what undergirds reality,
We have too if we say yes to the doctor.
but what the heck does “feelings” have to do with 2+2=4?
Bp & Dt & p are arithmetical propositions, divided into the true and
non provable, the provable, etc.
There is no alternative to 2+2=4 except for falsehood; but
“feelings” seems to be a nonsense term without the notion of some
form of comparison between, for example, “I experience a qualia that
is incompatible with nothing other than having been unconscious
yesterday.” How is the truth of this statement evaluated? To put
such statements in the same domain as 2+2=4 seems to be a massive
"2+2=4" was just a generic form for any theorem of Robinson Arithmetic
Feeling something requires a comparative process and a process that
requires persistence in time (or over many separate and irreducible
computations) so that the content of consciousness is not identical
to some stochastic variable (giving rise to the White Rabbit
problem). To bring propositions like 2+2=4, which are universal true
statements and even tautologies,
Not really. I guess you extend the usual meaning of "tautologies".
as support for the idea that consciousness supervenes from
Arithmetic Realism (implicit in the 2+2=4) then is to reduce
consciousness to a trivial mapping, like the identity 0 – 0 = 0.
I have tried to ask Bruno if the logical propositions that he is
considering include 1p statements such as this one and, more
generally, statements about the local state of affairs as seen from
some place and time so that I can better understand if there is a
place for an OM in his result, but I get the feeling that there is
no answer yet to this question. I am trying to advance the discussion.
Read the paper, Stephen. This is thoroughly explained in it. It is not
simple, because the subject is not simple, but I have no clue about
what is missing, except the derivation of the mass of the electron and
things like that. But for that we need to solve a bunch of very hard
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at