On 20 May 2011, at 22:44, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Hi Brent and Bruno,

From: meekerdb
Sent: Friday, May 20, 2011 1:44 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 5/20/2011 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 18 May 2011, at 18:54, meekerdb wrote:

On 5/18/2011 9:21 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Hi Brent,

Interesting! If we follow this idea, that memory is not necessary for consciousness, then consciousness does not require a persistent structure to supervene upon. No?



I don't see how that follows.

Me too. Consciousness requires logically the entire arithmetical reality, for example (with mechanism). Without 2+2=4, there is no consciousness, nor computation, nor matter.

"Require" in what sense: logical, nomological,...? We know that a blow to the head can interrupt consciousness

We don't know that. With comp nothing interrupt consciousness.

I have experienced it, a gap in my consciousness. Of course you may say it is only a gap in my memory of consciousness, but a loss of memory can be induced in by drugs that do not cause one to be unresponsive at the time which is not remembered. This tells me that being unconscious is more that just not remembering.

and erase memories.

That can indeed happens locally and relatively. And that can give the feeling of having been unconscious.


But consciousness is a matter of having feelings. Why credit feelings of being conscious but not those of having been uncouscious. This goes back to the question of the role of memories and whether memory is essential to consciousness. You may hypothesize that nothing interrupts consciousness, or make it true by a definition that denies physical (3rd person) time. But this strikes me as trying to save a theory by redefining words.



Let me be clear, if we say that X supervenes on Y then the existence of X is dependent on the existence of Y, right?


Consciousness, stripped of the notions of self-awareness, is what I was considering. This corresponds, crudely stated, the idea of some kind of correlation between the content of any given individual 1p and that which is the same for many 1p or even invariant over transformations from one 1p to any other in the equivalence class of 1p.

1p can be seen as or related to (roughly speaking) equivalence classes of 3p. I am not sure what you mean by equivalence class of 1p.

In that sense, if consciousness does not necessitate memory – any form of correlation with representations of prior events – then why does consciousness require any persistent structure at all to exist? What motivation does persistence of structure have in any discussion? This disallows for Last Thursdaysm, I realize, and that is kind of the point that I was trying to make. It seems to me that self-awareness requires memory but bare consciousness does not.

Hmm... OK.

This seems consistent with the notion of an OM as have been considered by Russell and Bruno, but it makes my confusion about how OMs are sequenced even more profound!

3-OMs are sequenced by the computations they "belongs" too. 1-OM are structured by the topology on those computations derived from the application of Theaetetus' theory of knowledge.

    We may posit that 2+2=4 is what undergirds reality,

We have too if we say yes to the doctor.

but what the heck does “feelings” have to do with 2+2=4?

Bp & Dt & p are arithmetical propositions, divided into the true and non provable, the provable, etc.

There is no alternative to 2+2=4 except for falsehood; but “feelings” seems to be a nonsense term without the notion of some form of comparison between, for example, “I experience a qualia that is incompatible with nothing other than having been unconscious yesterday.” How is the truth of this statement evaluated? To put such statements in the same domain as 2+2=4 seems to be a massive error.

"2+2=4" was just a generic form for any theorem of Robinson Arithmetic (say).

Feeling something requires a comparative process and a process that requires persistence in time (or over many separate and irreducible computations) so that the content of consciousness is not identical to some stochastic variable (giving rise to the White Rabbit problem). To bring propositions like 2+2=4, which are universal true statements and even tautologies,

Not really. I guess you extend the usual meaning of "tautologies".

as support for the idea that consciousness supervenes from Arithmetic Realism (implicit in the 2+2=4) then is to reduce consciousness to a trivial mapping, like the identity 0 – 0 = 0.


I have tried to ask Bruno if the logical propositions that he is considering include 1p statements such as this one and, more generally, statements about the local state of affairs as seen from some place and time so that I can better understand if there is a place for an OM in his result, but I get the feeling that there is no answer yet to this question. I am trying to advance the discussion.

Read the paper, Stephen. This is thoroughly explained in it. It is not simple, because the subject is not simple, but I have no clue about what is missing, except the derivation of the mass of the electron and things like that. But for that we need to solve a bunch of very hard arithmetical problem.



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