On 09 Jun 2011, at 17:00, Rex Allen wrote:

On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 5:58 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 09 Jun 2011, at 07:14, Rex Allen wrote:

On Tue, Jun 7, 2011 at 5:42 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 07 Jun 2011, at 00:52, Rex Allen wrote:

On Mon, Jun 6, 2011 at 6:13 PM, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au >

It is not that hard to get, so would be worth your
while trying to understand.

I think I understand this already.  The whole teleporting
moscow-washington thing, right?

In Platonia, there are many computational paths that branch out from
the current state that represents "me".

Each of these paths looks like a "possible future" from my subjective

But, they're not possible, they're actual.  In Platonia, they all
exist. And they do so timelessly...so they're not "futures" they're a
series of "nows".

So, subjectively, I have the "illusion" of an undetermined "future".

But...really, it's determined.  Every one of those paths is
objectively actualized.

So how does this prove what I said false? All those static "futures"
are mine.  They're all determined.  I'm still on rails...it's just
that the rails split in a rather unintuitive way.

Even if we say that what constitutes "me" is a single unbranched
path...this still doesn't make what I said false. I'm one of those paths, I just don't know which. But ignorance of the future is not
indeterminism.  Ignorance of the future is ignorance of the (fully

This is an argument against any determinist theory, or any block- universe theory. It is an argument again compatibilist theory of free will, and an argument against science in general, not just the mechanist hypothesis.

Hard determinism is incompatible with science in general?

? On the contrary. It was your argument against determinism which I took as
incompatible with science or scientific attitude.

I'm not arguing against determinism.  I'm fine with determinism and
it's consequences.

But third person determinism does not entails first person
determinism, nor do determinism in general prevents genuine free will.

Determinism doesn't prevent your "redefined" version of "free will",
which of course isn't free will at all -

Of course? You talk like if you have some complete theory of universal machine, but they can already defeat them all. We don't know what they are able to do or not.

but rather a psychological
coping mechanism disguised as a reasonable position.

I don't disguise anything. I put straight the hypotheses on the table. I reason in that frame without any pretending any truth.

BUT...I didn't say third person determinism.  I said "hard
determinism"...the alternative to the soft determinism of

Please elaborate on the distinction between hard and soft determinism.

remember also that assuming comp, the physical and the physical notion of cause is already based on the first person indeterminacy, and that it is much plausible that the physical is only partially determined. We know very few things there. The determinism of comp is just the determinism of arithmetical propositions.

People believing that determinism per se
makes free will impossible confuse themselves with God.

No, people who believe that determinism is incompatible with free will
have a firm understanding of the meaning of both determinism and free

They confuse free-will with unpredictability by God, when free-will is just unpredictibility by me or by machines of similar complexity.

But now I am no more sure what you are saying. Are you OK with hard
determinism? Are you OK with block-multiverse, or block-mindscape?

I'm fine with "hard determinism".  I am a "hard determinist"...which
is the position that determinism is incompatible with free will.

What a bad name. I could have understand that you are an hard free willing person. determinism is just the belief, roughly speaking, that time and cause are higher order emerging notions. But then i show that they originate quickly, in the logical way, from the numbers. Even "before" matter.


I'm also fine with block-multiverse.  And with a block-mindscape.

Neither of which allow for free will.  Since both of which are static,
unchanging, and unchangeable - making it impossible that anyone "could
have done otherwise" than they actually did.  No one can be free of
that fact - and therefore no one has free will.

You throw the baby with the bath water. Free will, like consciousness, feeling etc. does exist and has a causal physical role, with comp. Indeed, at some level the entire physical reality can be described as a consequence of a sort of arithmetical placebo phenomenon. So consciousness is very fundamental. It might be the most fundamental things in the physical universe, perhaps the only operative force, due to the "potential difference" between G and G*, between words/numbers and truth.

Full determinism appears only in God's eye, or in the arithmetical truth. But comp justifies that this is just inaccessible for us, so we can only scratch the truth, and locally we have to take moral decision, be responsible with respect to others, etc. There exists universal values like respect of others and of all unknown (and all universal numbers are really quite *unknown*).

Now, I have never understood why some people want a non compatibilist theory of free will. It explains only "less free-will", by adding a random element which adds nothing, imo.

You do with free-will what the atheist does with "God". Find a ridiculous (even if historically first) definition, and then evacuate the questions behind the concept. I do have a precise theory, (not in my thesis, though) and free-will begins with Löbianity. From this I infer that very plausibly, worms and ants (and perhaps communists) have no free-will, but that spiders, octopus, mice, dogs and humans have it. I thought only homeotermic animals were self-conscious free animals. They can dream and can have empathy, but since recently I accumulate evidence that Löbianity occurs already with many invertebrates. Notably the spider:




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