On Sun, Jun 26, 2011 at 8:24 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales
<cgha...@unimelb.edu.au> wrote:
> Can I recalibrate this a little so that you can scientifically handle
> consciousness?
>
> 1) science is based on observation.
>
> 2) scientific 'observation' is 100% implemented by the consciousness of
> scientists.
>
> 3) regularity (say Statements T) captured by (1) predicts the _contents_ of
> the consciousness of a scientific observer.
>
> 2a) Therefore the kind of science done by (1) can never account for the
> existence/nature of the observer (circular)/tautologous.
>
> 4) Scientific EVIDENCE is more than just the _contents_ of consciousness of
> scientists.
>
> 5) Scientific evidence of consciousness is the fact of an ability to do
> science.
>
> 6) The mere existence of consciousness (as witnessed in the outcomes T),
> therefore, justifies systems of regularity that serve to predict the
> existence and outward appearance of an observer.
>
> 7) The statements of regularity of (6)  (say T') are NOT the same statements
> as (3).
>
> 8) statements T' are just as justified as T because they predict an observer
> that sees the world according to T.
>
>
>
> The problem we have is that we label T' as metaphysics before considering
> what science _itself_ delivers as evidence over and above the mere outcomes
> of scientific behaviour.


So if there are predictions that can be made or useful concepts
formulated in T' that aren't possible in T, then sure, why not.  T'
all the way.

Though this still doesn't get you from instrumentalism to metaphysical
realism.  It's just trading up from one empirically adequate
calculational framework to another which is, in some sense, "better".

Rex

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