On 01 Jul 2011, at 14:47, B Soroud wrote:

well honestly, this is a extremely foreign view then the one I'm use to....

You mean that you believe we are not Turing emulable. That is quite sci. fi. But why not. Then what is your theory of mind?


very sci fi seeming

I am not sure what is sc. fi. Mechanism is virtually believed by all scientists (more or less explicitly so). Then it is a matter of understanding a reasoning to see that it leads to a platonic conception of reality.
The proof is constructive.

I use the thought experiment of teleportation to ease the thing. At the step seven and eight the practicalness of teleportation is entirely eliminated.

So there is no 'speculation' (just a theory). If there is no flaw in the reasoning, then we have to learn to live with that. Like we have to accept that there is no numbers such that their ratio is the square- root of 2.

Is it so extraordinary to find a flaw in Aristotle conception of matter? Is not such conception an obvious extrapolation from local observation? As far as I know, nobody has given an evidence that fundamental (primitive matter) does exist. So what?

I am not sure you have tried to study the proof or argument. You must dispute the validity of the reasoning, only. I mean if you have an interest in fundamental question.

Bruno




.... but interesting and worthy of exploration none the less.

On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 4:10 AM, Bruno Marchal <tmarc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 01 Jul 2011, at 12:10, Constantine Pseudonymous wrote:

Bruno, can you go a little deeper into what you mean by this prime
matter that you're skeptical of.

It is the idea that there is a fundamental reality made of some stuff having some fundamental ontology. It is mainly the primary matter as introduced by Aristotle. This has led to materialism/ naturalism/physicalism, which is the idea that physics is the fundamental science, and matter-spece-time-energy the fundamental existant. For the platonists, what we see and observe might be the shadow of a deeper, non necessarily physical, reality, so that physics would not be a fundamental science, but could be retrieved from a simpler theory. Indeed with comp, physics can be retrieved from addition and multiplication (and since Gödel, we know that addition and multiplication are not that easy).

I might refer you to my sane04 paper(*) where I explain in english, and rather shortly, why, once we assume mechanism (digital mechanism) then it has to be necessarily like that (some use of Occam, or some nuances can be added, 'course). The physical science are given by what is invariant in all possible universal number's observation. This can already be shown to lead to quantum logic. In fact most of the quantum weirdness are simple consequence of the digital mechanist hypothesis, but the math shows that the whole of quantum mechanics (including relativity) has to be retrieved from computer science/number theory.

If you are interested, ask any question. By construction, the argument is accessible to any Löbian numbers, (as explained in the second part of the sane04 paper). Even if comp is false, I can explain that *you* are at least a Löbian number (comp is basically the statement that you are not MORE than a Löbian number). Basically, a Löbian number is a code of a universal machine which knows (in a weak technical sense) that she is a universal machine. The theory "Peano Arithmetic" is already a Löbian number.

I have gone a little deeper, here, but I can go much more deeper. Obviously it is hard to sum this difficult subject with few words. Computationalism makes possible to use computer science in the cognitive fundamental science/philosophy.

Bruno


(*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html



On Jul 1, 2:38 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 01 Jul 2011, at 09:27, B Soroud wrote:

Bruno,

"It is simpler to assume that we do have a relation with reality. If
not you fall in solipsism."

This doesn't work for me, we can go into this more deeply point by
point, but suffice it to say that reality is not something separate
from us.... people always make this mistake.... we are reality, we
are a part of reality, and our experiences are perception dependent,
in some naive and rudimentary sense, and our experience is
physiologically, environmentally and conceptually conditioned,
always...

That is coherent with what I said.

reality is a word that is losing much meaning for me nowadays....

But this does not follow.



and as in response to the "we".... it is in the old Augustinean
sense.... where you know what it is and paradoxically you don't know
what it is....

That is the 1-person (even the singular 1-person). It is not really a
we. For a we, you need to already bet on a reality with other people.



final quesiton.... has anyone here studied Hegel indepthly... I am
starting to think that that is important to do.... and I'm getting
ready to take it up.

You might try to make a summary. I find it rather obscure, but
frequently some people find the universal numlber's discourse rather
Hegelian. I am not sure because he seems to believe in a phenomenology
of mind where I think we need a phenomenology of matter.

Bruno











On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:

On 01 Jul 2011, at 08:15, Constantine Pseudonymous wrote:

"but I prefer to think of physics as a collection of models, models
that map the territory, but are never the territory itself. "

who's to say that there even is a territory or what it is?

We assume this. Science start from theories, that is assumption.

It seems to me that we are all presupposing some vague notion of
"reality" to begin with, a notion as ambiguous, hypothetical, elusive,
and complex as "god".

I appreciate this. That is why science is the best tool of the
serious theologian.

we presuppose and pre-define a "reality" that we are trying to catch
an adequate glimpse of.

we project a pre-conceived notion of a goal and then go for it.

As Nietzsche pointed out, perhaps there is no such thing as truth and
reality, and even if there was, perhaps they are not only in some
sense presupposed and implicitly pre-defined, but that they may even
be highly overvalued.

What I try to explain is that if we assume that we are machine, then
we don't need more than (N, + *), ontologically.
In science we are always modest, and never know-for-sure if our
theories are true. We can only hope to be refuted.

Science is not the truth per se. Science is doubt.

If reality is conceived of like a Kantian "thing-in-itself" that is
essentially Other then you and inaccessible, but you are trying to
infer a conception of it..... what kind of conceptually conditioned
"reality" is that?

It is simpler to assume that we do have a relation with reality. If
not you fall in solipsism.

I'm only thinking of reality here as in some "fundamental" and
"systematic" sense.

Before we think of science or physics as the royal road to reality,

If we are machine, physics is not the royal road. But consciousness
and numbers (or finite things) are, and then it can be shown how the
physical realm emerge from the number, and this in a way which makes
it testable. Science does not exist, but some human can develop a
scientific attitude, which is a modest doubting skeptical ability
which departs from the authoritative arguments.
Given than the most fundamental science (theology) is still in the
hands of "authorities", and has still not yet come back in academy,
we can say that science has not yet really begun. We have not yet
the right to doubt in theology (be it the atheist theology, or the
conventional theologies).

we
have to recognize that we are the ones presupposing and preconceiving
and predefining notions of reality to begin with.

What do you mean by "we"? Is the term "we" used for the universal
numbers, or we the mammals, or we the homeotherm animals, the
creature of earth?, etc.

If we don't make theories, we cannot be shown wrong, and we cannot
progress. Science is a path from doubts to even more doubts.

Bruno

On Jun 11, 7:51 am, Rex Allen <rexallen31...@gmail.com> wrote:
Instrumentalism, anyone?

http://www.americanscientist.org/issues/id.12395,y.2011,no.
3,content....

The range of phenomena physics has explained is more than impressive;
it underlies the whole of modern civilization. Nevertheless, as a
physicist travels along his (in this case) career, the hairline cracks
in the edifice become more apparent, as does the dirt swept under the
rug, the fudges and the wholesale swindles, with the disconcerting
result that the totality occasionally appears more like Bruegel’s
Tower of Babel as dreamt by a modern slumlord, a ramshackle structure
of compartmentalized models soldered together into a skewed heap of
explanations as the whole jury-rigged monstrosity tumbles skyward.

[...]

Such examples abound throughout physics. Rather than pretending that
they don’t exist, physics educators would do well to acknowledge when
they invoke the Wizard working the levers from behind the curtain.
Even towards the end of the twentieth century, physics was regarded as
received Truth, a revelation of the face of God. Some physicists may
still believe that, but I prefer to think of physics as a collection
of models, models that map the territory, but are never the territory
itself. That may smack of defeatism to many, but ultimate answers are
not to be grasped by mortals. Physicists have indeed gone further than
other scientists in describing the natural world; they should not
confuse description with understanding.

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