lol, Bruno, your fictional Platonic Academy is sublimated Sun worshiping. On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> > On 04 Jul 2011, at 06:37, Constantine Pseudonymous wrote: > > I just realized that for some reason only half of these posts show up >> in my e-mail… >> Bruno, you speak of self-consciousness… do you mean body-image? Or do >> you mean abstract self-recognition? Or the tendency towards false >> identification? Or body relation/identification in a combative >> framework? >> > > I never need to define consciousness in the reasoning. I just suppose that > you understand enough of it to ponder of the consequence of the assumption > that you might survive with a computer in place of your brain, like you can > survive with a pump in place of your heart. Precisely, I assume that there > is a level of description of the brain which is Turing emulable. Then I > show that the brain-mind identity breaks down, and that consciousness is > related to infinities of computations, and that physics emerges from a > competition between infinities of universal machines/numbers. Using results > by Gödel, Löb, Solovay, I can use the logic of self-reference in arithmetic > to translate the mind body problem into a body problem, expressible in > arithmetic. > > I am a computer scientist, and by making clear all the assumption and the > definition, I show that the comp mind body problem is a mathematical > problem. Scientist understand, but don't really care, and philosophers are > often nervous and hot on this (like always when philosophy is made into > science, which is what is possible for the comp philosophy. > > But I don't need to define consciousness. I bet you know enough to follow > the reasoning. Eventually you can understand why consciousness is indeed not > definable. > > > > > It seems like your notion of self-acceleration or self-speeding is >> what some people call psycho-active or psychedelic …. >> > > I have no clue what you are talking about. Self-speeding is a property of > theories (in the mathematical technical sense) or of universal machine > (idem). > > > > > Or what others >> call meditative metamorphoses through concentration. Concentration or >> the will to power in the Spinoza and Nietzschean sense as self- >> speeding. The lack of this concentration of the will or self- >> intensification/force equated to what Kierkegaard called >> spiritlessness… a symptom of modernity. >> > > > Modernity has disappeared in Occident since the roman closed Plato academy. > But let us say I am just provoking here. > > Bruno > > > > > >> >> On Jul 2, 4:27 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> >>> On 01 Jul 2011, at 13:23, selva kumar wrote: >>> >>> Is consciousness causally effective ? >>>> >>> >>> I found this question in previous threads,but I didn't find a answer. >>>> >>> >>> Was it in the FOR list (on the book Fabric of reality by David >>> Deutsch) ? I thought I did answer this question, which is a very >>> imprtant and fundamental question. >>> >>> It is also a tricky question, which is very similar or related to the >>> question of free-will, and it can lead to vocabulary issue. I often >>> defend the idea that consciousness is effective. Indeed the role I >>> usually defend for consciousness is a relative self-speeding up >>> ability. Yet the question is tricky, especially due to the presence of >>> the "causally", which is harder to grasp or define than >>> "consciousness" itself. >>> >>> Let me try to explain. For this I need some definition, and I hope for >>> some understanding of the UDA and a bit of AUDA. Ask precision if >>> needed. >>> >>> The main ingredient for the explanation are three theorems due to Gödel: >>> >>> - the Gödel completeness theorem (available for machine talking first >>> order logic or a sufficiently effective higher order logic). The >>> theorem says that a theory or machine is consistent (syntactical >>> notion, = ~Bf) iff the theory has a model (a mathematical structure in >>> which it makes sense to say that a proposition is true). I will >>> rephrase this by saying that a machine is consistent if and only if >>> the machine's beliefs make sense in some reality. >>> >>> - the Gödel second incompleteness theorem ~Bf -> ~B(~Bf): if the >>> machine is consistent, then this is not provable by the machine. So if >>> the beliefs are real in some reality, the machine cannot prove the >>> existence of that reality. This is used in some strict way, because we >>> don't assume the machine can prove its completeness (despite this has >>> shown to be the case by Orey). This entails that eventually, the >>> machine can add as new axiom its own consistency, but this leads to a >>> new machine, for which a novel notion of consistency appears, and the >>> 'new' machine can still not prove the existence of a reality >>> "satisfying its beliefs. yet that machine can easily prove the >>> consistency of the machine she was. This can be reitered as many times >>> as their are (constructive) ordinals, and this is what I describe as a >>> climbing from G to G*. The modal logic of self-reference remains >>> unchanged, but the arithmetical interpretation of it expands. An >>> infinity of previously undecidable propositions become decidable, >>> and ... another phenomenon occurs: >>> >>> - Gödel length of proof theorem. Once a machine adds an undecidable >>> proposition, like its own consistency, as a new axiom/belief, not only >>> an infinity of (arithmetical) propositions become decidable, but an >>> infinity of already provable propositions get shorter proofs. Indeed, >>> and amazingly enough, for any number x, we can find a proposition >>> which proofs will be x times shorter than its shorter proof in the >>> beliefs system without the undecidable proposition. A similar, but not >>> entirely equivalent theorem is true for universal computation ability, >>> showing in particular that there is no bound to the rapidity of >>> computers, and this just by change of the software (alas, with finite >>> numbers of exceptions in the *effective* self-speeding up: but >>> evolution of species needs not to be effective or programmable in >>> advance). >>> >>> Now I suggest to (re)define consciousness as a machine (instinctive, >>> preprogrammed) ability to bet on a reality. This is equivalent >>> (stricto sensu: the machine does not need to know this) to an ability >>> of betting its own consistency (excluding that very new axiom to avoid >>> inconsistency). As a universal system, this will speed-up the machine >>> relatively to the probable local universal system(s) and will in that >>> way augment its freedom degree. If two machines play ping-pong, the >>> machine which is quicker has a greater range of possible moves/ >>> strategy than its opponent. >>> >>> So the answer to the question "is consciousness effective" would be >>> yes, if you accept such definition. >>> >>> Is that consciousness *causally* effective? That is the tricky part >>> related to free will. If you accept the definition of free will that I >>> often suggested, then the answer is yes. Causality will have its >>> normal "physical definition", except that with comp such physicalness >>> is given by an arithmetical quantization (based on the material >>> hypostase defined by Bp & Dp): p physically causes q, iff something >>> like BD(BDp -> BDq). I recall Dp = ~B ~p. But of course, in God eyes, >>> there is only true (and false) number relations. The löbian phenomenon >>> then shows that the consciousness self-speeding up is coupled with the >>> building of the reality that the machine bet on. At that level, it is >>> like if consciousness is the main force, perhaps the only original >>> one, in the physical universe! This needs still more work to make >>> precise enough. There is a complex tradeoff in between the "causally" >>> and the "effective" at play, I think. >>> >>> I hope this was not too technical. The work of Gödel plays a >>> fundamental role. This explanation is detailed in "Conscience et >>> Mécanisme", and related more precisely to the inference inductive frame. >>> >>> To sum up: machine consciousness, in the theory, confers self-speeding >>> up abilities to the machine with respect to the most probable >>> continuation/universal-**machine. It is obviously something useful for >>> self-moving creature: to make them able to anticipate and avoid >>> obstacles, which would explain why the self-moving creatures have >>> developed self-reflexive brains, and become Löbian (self-conscious). >>> Note that here the role is attributed to self-consciousness, and not >>> really to consciousness. But you need consciousness to have self- >>> consciousness. Consciousness per se has no role, like in pure >>> contemplation, but once reflected in the Löbian way, it might be the >>> stronger causally effective force operating in the 'arithmetical >>> truth', the very origin of the (self) acceleration/force. >>> >>> Note that the Gödel speed-up theorem is not hard to prove. There is a >>> simple proof of it in the excellent book by Torkel Franzen "Gödel's >>> theorem An Incomplete Guide To Its Use and Abuse" which I recommend >>> the reading (despite it is more on the abuses than the uses). The >>> original paper is in the book by Davis: the undecidable (republished >>> in Dover), and which I consider as a bible for "machine's theology". >>> >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/<http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to >> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<everything-list@googlegroups.com> >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> >> . >> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >> . >> >> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to > everything-list@googlegroups.**com<everything-list@googlegroups.com> > . > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ > **googlegroups.com <everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** > group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> > . > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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