lol, Bruno, your fictional Platonic Academy is sublimated Sun worshiping.

On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal <> wrote:

> On 04 Jul 2011, at 06:37, Constantine Pseudonymous wrote:
>  I just realized that for some reason only half of these posts show up
>> in my e-mail…
>> Bruno, you speak of self-consciousness… do you mean body-image? Or do
>> you mean abstract self-recognition? Or the tendency towards false
>> identification?  Or body relation/identification in a combative
>> framework?
> I never need to define consciousness in the reasoning. I just suppose that
> you understand enough of it to ponder of the consequence of the assumption
> that you might survive with a computer in place of your brain, like you can
> survive with a pump in place of your heart. Precisely, I assume that there
> is a level of description of the brain which is  Turing emulable. Then I
> show that the brain-mind identity breaks down, and that consciousness is
> related to infinities of computations, and that physics emerges from a
> competition between infinities of universal machines/numbers. Using results
> by Gödel, Löb, Solovay, I can use the logic of self-reference in arithmetic
> to translate the mind body problem into a body problem, expressible in
> arithmetic.
> I am a computer scientist, and by making clear all the assumption and the
> definition, I show that the comp mind body problem is a mathematical
> problem. Scientist understand, but don't really care, and philosophers are
> often nervous and hot on this (like always when philosophy is made into
> science, which is what is possible for the comp philosophy.
> But I don't need to define consciousness. I bet you know enough to follow
> the reasoning. Eventually you can understand why consciousness is indeed not
> definable.
>  It seems like your notion of self-acceleration or self-speeding is
>> what some people call psycho-active or psychedelic ….
> I have no clue what you are talking about. Self-speeding is a property of
> theories (in the mathematical technical sense) or of universal machine
> (idem).
>  Or what others
>> call meditative metamorphoses through concentration. Concentration or
>> the will to power in the Spinoza and Nietzschean sense as self-
>> speeding. The lack of this concentration of the will or self-
>> intensification/force equated to what Kierkegaard called
>> spiritlessness… a symptom of modernity.
> Modernity has disappeared in Occident since the roman closed Plato academy.
> But let us say I am just provoking here.
> Bruno
>> On Jul 2, 4:27 am, Bruno Marchal <> wrote:
>>> On 01 Jul 2011, at 13:23, selva kumar wrote:
>>>  Is consciousness causally effective ?
>>>  I found this question in previous threads,but I didn't find a answer.
>>> Was it in the FOR list (on the book Fabric of reality by David
>>> Deutsch) ? I thought I did answer this question, which is a very
>>> imprtant and fundamental question.
>>> It is also a tricky question, which is very similar or related to the
>>> question of free-will, and it can lead to vocabulary issue. I often
>>> defend the idea that consciousness is effective. Indeed the role I
>>> usually defend for consciousness is a relative self-speeding up
>>> ability. Yet the question is tricky, especially due to the presence of
>>> the "causally", which is harder to grasp or define than
>>> "consciousness" itself.
>>> Let me try to explain. For this I need some definition, and I hope for
>>> some understanding of the UDA and a bit of AUDA. Ask precision if
>>> needed.
>>> The main ingredient for the explanation are three theorems due to Gödel:
>>> - the Gödel completeness theorem (available for machine talking first
>>> order logic or a sufficiently effective higher order logic). The
>>> theorem says that a theory or machine is consistent (syntactical
>>> notion, = ~Bf) iff the theory has a model (a mathematical structure in
>>> which it makes sense to say that a proposition is true). I will
>>> rephrase this by saying that a machine is consistent if and only if
>>> the machine's beliefs make sense in some reality.
>>> - the Gödel second incompleteness theorem ~Bf -> ~B(~Bf): if the
>>> machine is consistent, then this is not provable by the machine. So if
>>> the beliefs are real in some reality, the machine cannot prove the
>>> existence of that reality. This is used in some strict way, because we
>>> don't assume the machine can prove its completeness (despite this has
>>> shown to be the case by Orey). This entails that eventually, the
>>> machine can add as new axiom its own consistency, but this leads to a
>>> new machine, for which a novel notion of consistency appears, and the
>>> 'new' machine can still not prove the existence of a reality
>>> "satisfying its beliefs. yet that machine can easily prove the
>>> consistency of the machine she was. This can be reitered as many times
>>> as their are (constructive) ordinals, and this is what I describe as a
>>> climbing from G to G*. The modal logic of self-reference remains
>>> unchanged, but the arithmetical interpretation of it expands. An
>>> infinity of previously undecidable propositions become decidable,
>>> and ... another phenomenon occurs:
>>> - Gödel length of proof theorem. Once a machine adds an undecidable
>>> proposition, like its own consistency, as a new axiom/belief, not only
>>> an infinity of (arithmetical) propositions become decidable, but an
>>> infinity of already provable propositions get shorter proofs. Indeed,
>>> and amazingly enough, for any number x, we can find a proposition
>>> which proofs will be x times shorter than its shorter proof in the
>>> beliefs system without the undecidable proposition. A similar, but not
>>> entirely equivalent theorem is true for universal computation ability,
>>> showing in particular that there is no bound to the rapidity of
>>> computers, and this just by change of the software (alas, with finite
>>> numbers of exceptions in the *effective* self-speeding up: but
>>> evolution of species needs not to be effective or programmable in
>>> advance).
>>> Now I suggest to (re)define consciousness as a machine (instinctive,
>>> preprogrammed) ability to bet on a reality. This is equivalent
>>> (stricto sensu: the machine does not need to know this) to an ability
>>> of betting its own consistency (excluding that very new axiom to avoid
>>> inconsistency). As a universal system, this will speed-up the machine
>>> relatively to the probable local universal system(s) and will in that
>>> way augment its freedom degree. If two machines play ping-pong, the
>>> machine which is quicker has a greater range of possible moves/
>>> strategy than its opponent.
>>> So the answer to the question "is consciousness effective" would be
>>> yes, if you accept such definition.
>>> Is that consciousness *causally* effective? That is the tricky part
>>> related to free will. If you accept the definition of free will that I
>>> often suggested, then the answer is yes. Causality will have its
>>> normal "physical definition", except that with comp such physicalness
>>> is given by an arithmetical quantization (based on the material
>>> hypostase defined by Bp & Dp): p physically causes q, iff something
>>> like BD(BDp -> BDq). I recall Dp = ~B ~p. But of course, in God eyes,
>>> there is only true (and false) number relations. The löbian phenomenon
>>> then shows that the consciousness self-speeding up is coupled with the
>>> building of the reality that the machine bet on. At that level, it is
>>> like if consciousness is the main force, perhaps the only original
>>> one, in the physical universe! This needs still more work to make
>>> precise enough. There is a complex tradeoff in between the "causally"
>>> and the "effective" at play, I think.
>>> I hope this was not too technical. The work of Gödel plays a
>>> fundamental role. This explanation is detailed in "Conscience et
>>> Mécanisme", and related more precisely to the inference inductive frame.
>>> To sum up: machine consciousness, in the theory, confers self-speeding
>>> up abilities to the machine with respect to the most probable
>>> continuation/universal-**machine. It is obviously something useful for
>>> self-moving creature: to make them able to anticipate and avoid
>>> obstacles, which would explain why the self-moving creatures have
>>> developed self-reflexive brains, and become Löbian (self-conscious).
>>> Note that here the role is attributed to self-consciousness, and not
>>> really to consciousness. But you need consciousness to have self-
>>> consciousness. Consciousness per se has no role, like in pure
>>> contemplation, but once reflected in the Löbian way, it might be the
>>> stronger causally effective force operating in the 'arithmetical
>>> truth', the very origin of the (self) acceleration/force.
>>> Note that the Gödel speed-up theorem is not hard to prove. There is a
>>> simple proof of it in the excellent book by Torkel Franzen "Gödel's
>>> theorem An Incomplete Guide To Its Use and Abuse" which I recommend
>>> the reading (despite it is more on the abuses than the uses). The
>>> original paper is in the book by Davis: the undecidable (republished
>>> in Dover), and which I consider as a bible for "machine's theology".
>>> Bruno
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