Rex.... have you studied Spinoza's notion that freedom is the
recognition of necessity? If you haven't read Spinoza I would
recommend him on this free will/determinism issue.
On Jun 9, 8:00 am, Rex Allen <rexallen31...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 5:58 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> > On 09 Jun 2011, at 07:14, Rex Allen wrote:
> >> On Tue, Jun 7, 2011 at 5:42 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >>> On 07 Jun 2011, at 00:52, Rex Allen wrote:
> >>>> On Mon, Jun 6, 2011 at 6:13 PM, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au>
> >>>> wrote:
> >>>>> It is not that hard to get, so would be worth your
> >>>>> while trying to understand.
> >>>> I think I understand this already. The whole teleporting
> >>>> moscow-washington thing, right?
> >>>> In Platonia, there are many computational paths that branch out from
> >>>> the current state that represents "me".
> >>>> Each of these paths looks like a "possible future" from my subjective
> >>>> standpoint.
> >>>> But, they're not possible, they're actual. In Platonia, they all
> >>>> exist. And they do so timelessly...so they're not "futures" they're a
> >>>> series of "nows".
> >>>> So, subjectively, I have the "illusion" of an undetermined "future".
> >>>> But...really, it's determined. Every one of those paths is
> >>>> objectively actualized.
> >>>> So how does this prove what I said false? All those static "futures"
> >>>> are mine. They're all determined. I'm still on rails...it's just
> >>>> that the rails split in a rather unintuitive way.
> >>>> Even if we say that what constitutes "me" is a single unbranched
> >>>> path...this still doesn't make what I said false. I'm one of those
> >>>> paths, I just don't know which. But ignorance of the future is not
> >>>> indeterminism. Ignorance of the future is ignorance of the (fully
> >>>> determined)
> >>>> future.
> >>> This is an argument against any determinist theory, or any block-universe
> >>> theory. It is an argument again compatibilist theory of free will, and an
> >>> argument against science in general, not just the mechanist hypothesis.
> >> Hard determinism is incompatible with science in general?
> > ? On the contrary. It was your argument against determinism which I took as
> > incompatible with science or scientific attitude.
> I'm not arguing against determinism. I'm fine with determinism and
> it's consequences.
> > But third person determinism does not entails first person
> > determinism, nor do determinism in general prevents genuine free will.
> Determinism doesn't prevent your "redefined" version of "free will",
> which of course isn't free will at all - but rather a psychological
> coping mechanism disguised as a reasonable position.
> BUT...I didn't say third person determinism. I said "hard
> determinism"...the alternative to the soft determinism of
> > People believing that determinism per se
> > makes free will impossible confuse themselves with God.
> No, people who believe that determinism is incompatible with free will
> have a firm understanding of the meaning of both determinism and free
> > But now I am no more sure what you are saying. Are you OK with hard
> > determinism? Are you OK with block-multiverse, or block-mindscape?
> I'm fine with "hard determinism". I am a "hard determinist"...which
> is the position that determinism is incompatible with free will.
> I'm also fine with block-multiverse. And with a block-mindscape.
> Neither of which allow for free will. Since both of which are static,
> unchanging, and unchangeable - making it impossible that anyone "could
> have done otherwise" than they actually did. No one can be free of
> that fact - and therefore no one has free will.
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