Bru, I forgot:

"At least they do not burn alive non buddhist, or very less often so. What
do you mean "where have they gotten"?"

Sure they don't burn alive non buddhists becaues they've had their head up
their asses for the last several thousand years.... and finally they were
woken up from their dogmatic slumber by the invasion of the Chinese.... they
were sitting up on their high horses dreaming about compassionat acts for
hundreds of years.... dreaming, and doing nothing!

By where have they gotten I mean it is a circular loop.... the same old
thing, no progress... just fantastical gnostic claims and the same old
discussions that we are having here.

On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 2:58 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
> On 04 Jul 2011, at 07:25, Constantine Pseudonymous wrote:
>
>  “It sound more like you are reifing body and system.”
>> Would you rather me rarefy it?
>>
>
> Worst. I don't give you any choice, *in* the mechanist theory. But I am
> talking on primitive bodies. They are so rare that they don't exist. But
> beliefs in bodies exists, and I can explain why (or refer to papers, because
> it is not so shortly explainable).
>
>
>
>
>
>  “Consciousness here and now is accepted by many as the most
>> undoubtable
>> truth”
>> That to which you point by the indicator consciousness, observe that…
>> it is not a clear and defined perception,
>>
>
> OK. But neither is time.
>
>
>
>
>  it is not a clearly
>> delineated “thing”…
>>
>
> Not sure. You know what it is. Just now, you can hardlmy doubt you are,
> even if you can doubt being awaken or dreaming, you know that you are
> conscious. You know that you are not an instance of philosophical zombie.
> All right? You can't prove it, nor even really express it, but you know you
> are living it here and now.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  it is a obscure and indefinite I-don’t-know-
>> whatness, an unknown unknown… something that cannot be clearly stated
>> or comprehended or defined…
>>
>
> Yes! It is exactly that :)
>
>
>
>
>  so you cannot say what it is…
>>
>
> You can approximate. It is in between believing and knowing there is *some*
> reality.
>
>
>
>
>
>  By calling
>> it consciousness you trick us… because you give us the impression we
>> know what it is or that it is, that we have some grip or handle on it
>> or that it is an object of knowledge.
>>
>
> Once there is self-consciousness, it certainly is. You know that you are
> conscious. You know perfectly what it is. It is what makes pain painful. You
> can attribute it to others. In computer science there are many object and
> properties which cannot be defined, yet can have a role in providing
> solutions to combinatorial problems, and it can be show that universal
> machine looking inward discover an ocean made of those non nameable things.
> The comp theory of mind is 99,99999999...% a theory of ignorance.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  Buddhists have been grappling
>> with the problem of so called consciousness for millennia… where have
>> they gotten?
>>
>
> At least they do not burn alive non buddhist, or very less often so. What
> do you mean "where have they gotten"?
>
>
>
>
>  They either b.s. or they claim that it is not what it
>> appears to be, that it is not a definitive thing, that it is
>> unrealized, and that its “essential nature” is something other then
>> what it appears to be… blah blah blah… they claim it is this or that….
>> the “primordial ground of reality” or “pure subtle energy” and other
>> fantastical notions…. So who knows what consciousness is?
>>
>
> All Löbian machines. That is all universal machine who knows its own
> universality. They have precise laws of thought (Boole) and laws of mind
> (Gödel, Löb, Solovay, .... computer science. I explained this in all detail
> in french, alas).
>
>
>
>
>
>  “Body and system are rather clearly mind constructions to organize
>> experience.”
>> But so is mind and mind-construction a mind-construction.
>>
>
> I was alluding to a result that I have explain in this forum. I think that
> you assume the existence of a physical primitive universe. I don't. Mind
> construction are some definable, and some non definable number relation (I
> do assume mechanism!).
>
>
>
>
>
>  Do you
>> distinguish between consciousness and experience?
>>
>
> Only if the context forces me to introduce nuances. I use at first the term
> in the largest sense possible. So consciousness and subjective experience,
> and first person experience are basically the same things. Now, I can give
> restricted definition, like accessible personal memories, to reason and
> prove things about those notion.
>
>
>
>
>  I think your choice in the usage of the term theology is not very
>> insightful. What etymological grounds and logic do you have for this?
>>
>
> Many reasons:
> Computationalism, alias digital mechanism, is a theological hypothesis. It
> is the belief in a form of technologically possible reincarnation, (cf the
> "yes doctor" in the sane04 paper), and once you grasp the Universal
> Dovetailer argument, it is more than that (comp immortality, quantum
> immortality, consciousness becoming a prison (Rossler), etc.
> Then in arithmetic I define the theology of a machine/number as the set of
> arithmetical proposition true about that machines. I limit myself to "sound"
> machines (they prove only true sentences), and the incompleteness phenomenon
> splits the truth into the provable and unprovable part. Yet a lot of
> unprovable truth are still accessible, by betting for example, by the
> machine, despite being non provable.
> And then the theology of the correct self-introspecting machine offers an
> arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus, but also of some text by Lao-Tse,
> and give a light on some mystical discourse which reverse the usual idea
> mind-matter.
>
> Another reason is strategical and concern the long term. We will not win
> again the fairy-tales theologies, which maintains the humans in the age of
> irresponsibility (let daddy think for you), without tolerating the doubt
> (that is the scientific method) in the field.
> In that vein, it is a way to suggest that the debate between atheists and
> christians is really a dispute between two variants of Aristotle theology,
> and to mention that things like QM (perhaps) and DM (certainly) point on
> possible different sort of theology.
>
> I answer you other post hereby:
>
>
> On 04 Jul 2011, at 07:57, Constantine Pseudonymous wrote:
>
>
>  Bruno, what makes you think that mathematics can apply to anything
>> beyond the physical world, is not mathematics restricted to the domain
>> of the physical world....
>>
>
>
> Why? And what do you mean by "physical world". This is plausibly just the
> inside view of arithmetical reality (provably so with the digital mechanist
> assumption). Just ask, and I can explain the proof, or I will refer to a
> link where I am going to explain it, because, I have already explain this
> more than one times on this list. It is not difficult at all, except for
> *some* point. Anyway, I have never really believe in a *primitive* physical
> universe. But I do believe in the physical reality, and the local stability
> of natural laws. I give an explanation why the appearance of this are
> unavoidable for a vast class of machine's points of view.
>
>
>  it doesn't apply to the qualitative metaphysical domain of anima-
>> psyche.
>>
>
> In which theory? What are your assumption?
> The fact are that the modal logic of universal machine self-reference,
> which are there (those have been discovered, not invented) on the contrary
> provides an explanation of the quality and the quantity in the domain of
> mind. You can take this as a toy psychology, or a toy theology, because it
> is limited to the case of ideal machine. But the result are negative; the
> ideal machine's soul falls apparently and generate matter almost exactly
> like Plotinus explains, when he recast Aristotle theory of matter in the
> Platonic realm. The toy theory of the ideal machine shows her already unable
> to close the gap for many qualitative aspect of their experiences, but the
> machines can already explain why it has to be so, if they are correct
> machines. That is not obvious. Gödel mentioned the staring idea, and later
> Hilbert and Bernays made the hard work, and later Löb simplify it
> considerably, ... eventually Solovay closes the propositional part of the
> "machine's theology" by axiomatized them in the logic G (what the machine
> can really say on its possibilities) and G* (what is true on its
> possibilities).
>
>
>  Bruno is totally misrepresenting and inverting Plato..... he is trying
>> to reduce something complex, conflicted, and ambiguous to his strange
>> and odd system.
>>
>
> Not at all. I don't care about Plato. I follow a pedagogical method to keep
> on pointing on the important ideas. By Plato in metaphysics I mean the often
> discussed and criticized idea in the dialogs that reality is not WYSIWYG
> (what you see is what you get), that is the idea that physics is only a part
> of theology or of some other science (like Mathematics for the so-called
> Mathematicians (like Xeusippes), or arithmetic for (neo)Pythagoreans). I am
> aware of the labyrinths of conflicting ideas. By Plato in math, I usually
> mean Aristotle's middle excluded principle (the common use in philo of
> math). By classical theory of knowledge I mean one of the theory proposed by
> Theaetetus in the Theatetus. But usually I recall all that, and the
> motivation is to explain some result in computer science which put light on
> the reversal mind/matter forced by the Universal Dovetailer Argument.
> I have no odd system. Just an odd result (odd with respect to Aristotle
> theology) in a very well known classical theory. QM is weird, but DM is
> weirder. Perhaps even false. We don't know yet. You might try to find a
> flaw. I have many versions. Above a rigor threshold people get sleepy, and
> below, they misunderstand. UDA is enough to get that the comp transforms the
> mind-body problem in a body problem. Then a second part (AUDUA) translates
> the problem in arithmetical terms.
>
> On this list many agrees that the "TOE" needs the shape of "everything"
> with some measure (the big debate was between the degree of relativity of
> that measure). I show that the Church Turing thesis, gives a very solid
> notion of everything, with a natural way to isolated the self-relative
> measure keeping distinct the communicable and incommunicable part of the
> experiences. The only bad news is that it needs math and math tools
> (theoretical computer science, mathematical logic). But UDA needs only a
> passive understanding of Church thesis (the existence of a universal digital
> machine). Only AUDA needs some amount of mathematical logic.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>> On Jul 3, 7:34 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>
>>> On 02 Jul 2011, at 21:24, B Soroud wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  "A property of consciousness is"
>>>>
>>>
>>>  it sounds like you are reifying "consciousness"... consciousness is
>>>> not a thing in itself, consciousness does not exist in and of
>>>> itself... it can only be understood within the interdependent and
>>>> complex framework of sensation, bodies, space.... consciousness of
>>>> something, in and through something.... inseparable from the system
>>>> of space, energy, matter and motion... and essential equal to it....
>>>> not something seperate and distinct from it that can exist
>>>> independently of it....
>>>>
>>>
>>>  consciousness is not something that exists in itself....
>>>> consciousness is always embodied consciousness of life.... in and
>>>> through life and the complex instrument of form and the mystery of
>>>> sensation and generation. Consciousness is a phenomena of the "body"
>>>> and its natural system... and is equal to that "body" and "body
>>>> system".
>>>>
>>>
>>>  it sounds like you guys are reifing consciousness....
>>>>
>>>
>>> It sound more like you are reifing body and system.
>>>
>>> Consciousness here and now is accepted by many as the most undoubtable
>>> truth, even if unprovable to a pair.
>>> Body and system are rather clearly mind constructions to organize
>>> experience.
>>>
>>> Anyway, my point is logical. If the brain works at some level like a
>>> digital machine, then physics emerge from arithmetic (or any universal
>>> system (in the Post Church Turing sense).
>>>
>>> Computationalism makes the mind body problem into a math problem,
>>> sometimes called the "measure problem" in this list.
>>>
>>> In the theory of digital machines (theoretical computer science)
>>> consciousness appears like a word used by machines to refer to
>>> something they want consider as true, even undoubtable, yet
>>> incommunicable/unprovable. It has a role, including a role in the
>>> origin and stability of the material observable.
>>>
>>> I can only refer you to my papers (see my url). My goal is not to
>>> argue on the truth, nor even the plausibility that the brain act as a
>>> Turing machine, but that IF that is true then Plato's theology is more
>>> correct than Aristotle, in a way which is empirically testable. Just
>>> to be short and clear. Comp makes theology a science. In all case,
>>> even if comp is false, it happens that machines have an interesting
>>> theology, where theology is defined as the set of propositions true
>>> *about* a machine (as opposed to science, which is what machine can
>>> prove).
>>>
>>> To oppose theology and science makes both theology and science into a
>>> pseudo-theology.
>>> Everything I say is just consequences of taking seriously the idea
>>> that we might survive with an artificial digital brain. If we get a
>>> contradiction (not weirdness) then we refute comp. If we get only
>>> weirdness, then we can compare it to the weirdness around you and see
>>> if the theory shed some light.
>>>
>>> You seem to assume some Aristotelian notion of matter (system, body,
>>> energy, ...). Well, that just cannot work unless you postulate a
>>> special type of non computationalist theory of mind. That is all my
>>> point. I do not pretend this is entirely obvious.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  On Sat, Jul 2, 2011 at 11:22 AM, Pzomby <htra...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>
>>>  On Jul 1, 4:23 am, selva kumar <selvakr1...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Is consciousness causally effective ?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>  In my opinion, yes, if in simple terms, it is logically correct to
>>>> state:  A property of consciousness is….the capacity and ability of
>>>> individual human consciousness to create intentionally desired
>>>> physical and mental effects.
>>>>
>>>
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