Yes, Bruno... i think you have made a grave grave error in assuming
self-consciousness as an intuitive indisputable.

something is, that is for sure..... but in regards to what is we
cannot speak....

there is some being, but I want to call this "being" into question.

what asserts or negates its existence.... and how is this questionable
being distinct from Being as such?

You can name-call whatever you want, and you can assert unity... you
can make whatever assertions you want in regards to a something....

no one denies something is..... but no one says they know what that
Something is, or how it is distinct or different from the something
that we are.

there is us, and there is IT.... two somethings.... one Big and the
other small.... what is the difference... and how can we determine the
difference if we know next to nothing in regards to either.

so I want to say X and x is.... but i want to also show us that in
fact x is (being) is.... or in another words is (being) is an x.

X = X

but that tells us nothing.

some people assert a distinction between consciousness and
existence... and say that you can't have one without the other.... but
don't really define the distinction or they simply claim that they are
identical.... well that doesn't really help us.

so rather then I AM... i must say Something is... which is like say
being is unknown or is = x

well we already knew that!

On Jun 9, 10:11 pm, Rex Allen <> wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 2:34 PM, Jason Resch <> wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 10:00 AM, Rex Allen <> wrote:
> >> I'm also fine with block-multiverse.  And with a block-mindscape.
> >> Neither of which allow for free will.  Since both of which are static,
> >> unchanging, and unchangeable - making it impossible that anyone "could
> >> have done otherwise" than they actually did.  No one can be free of
> >> that fact - and therefore no one has free will.
> > 'making it impossible that anyone "could have done otherwise" than they
> > actually did.'
> Right.  A necessary (but not sufficient) condition of freedom is that
> they must have been able to have done otherwise.
> This alone isn’t sufficient, because "quantum randomness"  (in a
> non-block context) also makes it possible that they could have done
> otherwise - but random decisions aren't free either.
> > You say it is impossible that anyone could have done otherwise from what
> > they did.  Well what determined what they did?  Their mind?  Their biology?
> >  Their chemistry?  The physics of the subatomic motions of the particles in
> > their brain?
> I don’t think it matters in a “block” context, does it?
> > To say the mind is not doing any decision making because its behavior can be
> > explained at a level where the mind's operation cannot be understood, is
> > like saying a computer is not computing or a car is not driving, because if
> > you look at a computer or a car at a low enough level you see only particles
> > moving in accordance with various forces applied to them.
> The ability to make decisions is ubiquitous.  Ants, wasps, lizards,
> turtles, mice, dogs - whatever.  They can all be said to make
> decisions.  Do ants have free will?
> Even computers can be said to make decisions...and saying that they do
> seems just as valid as saying that humans do.  Do the computerized
> monitoring and control systems at nuclear power plants have free will?
>  If they automatically "decide" to close some valve in response to
> sensor readings, are they exercising free will?
> > You can render meaningless almost any subject by describing
> > it at the wrong level.
> Wrong?  What would make some level the “wrong” level and another the
> “right” level?
> If a subject *can* be described at some level (or should be
> describable in theory), then that has to be of some significance,
> doesn’t it?
> If human behavior ought to be describable at the level of quarks and
> electrons, just as computer behavior ought to be describable at the
> level of quarks and electrons, and just as rock behavior ought to be
> describable at the level of quarks and electons - then this shared
> “describability” has to tell us something significant - doesn’t it?
> The fact that all of these things are describable at the same level,
> the level of quarks and electrons, surely this means something.
> If humans could *not* be described at the level of quarks and
> electrons, but computers could, *that* would definitely tell us
> something significant, wouldn’t it?
> > You might as well say there is no meaningful difference between a
> > cat and a rock, since they are after all, just electrons and quarks.
> There’s a meaningful difference between a cat and a rock - *to me*.
> But maybe not in any other sense.
> > If you describe the mind at the correct level, you find it is making
> > decisions.
> I can interpret it that way, yes.  Or I can interpret it as just
> moving through a sequence of states.
> I can interpret it either way I want, as the whim strikes me.  It’s
> like looking at the picture of the candlestick and then seeing the two
> faces.  I can go back and forth between the two interpretations.  I’m
> flexible that way.
> The interpretation that the mind is making decisions is not *forced* on me.
> Can you interpret the mind as just moving through a sequence of
> states?  Maybe if you concentrate?
> > You say it is impossible that the decision it makes could have
> > been otherwise.  This is good for the mind, it means it is guaranteed that
> > its will is carried out.
> It also means that the mind’s will is not free.
> > That said, I don't mean to say there are not interesting implications for
> > some of the concepts discussed on this list, such as the definition of
> > personal identity or the view that we are all part of one mind/self/soul.
> Part of the same mind/self/soul?  That doesn’t sound too plausible to
> me.  If it were true in any meaningful way, I think I would have
> noticed.
> Though, it may be true in the same way that we could be part of the
> same zip code or something.
> >  Regarding personal identity, does it make sense to punish the 50 year old
> > man with a prison sentence if it was a different person who committed the
> > act 20 years ago?  (If you regard the two as different persons).  Further,
> > is there any role of punishment / retribution in the justice system when had
> > we been born in another persons shoes we would have made the same decisions
> > and ended up in the same place as that person?  If ultimately we are the
> > same person, we should have much more compassion and understanding for
> > others and their actions.
> Generally, I think a more mechanistic view of human behavior would
> (ironically?) result in a more humane society.
> A more mechanistic view would reduce the impulse to take things
> personally, and would encourage a more pragmatic, less emotional
> approach to solving society’s problems - and to dealing with each
> other.
> Of course, anything can be taken too far - and usually is - but still
> it seems to me like the right direction to steer towards.
> Compatibilism, however, totally short circuits that, and to no good end.
> Brent said, in an earlier thread:
> “That's like telling gays they should be happy with ‘civil unions’.
> 'Free will', meaning free of coercion and compulsion, as used in law,
> is useful concept referred to in many, many decisions which set
> precedents - just as 'marriage' appears in many laws and regulations.
> So there are excellent reasons of understanding to keep it.  If you
> are a determinist, then compatibilism is the theory that shows this
> legal meaning is compatible with determinism; so you don't have to
> give it up and reinterpret hundreds of years of law and social
> discourse.”
> I think that given the vast amount that has been learned in the last
> 100 years, there is a definite need to reinterpret the hundreds of
> years of law and social discourse that permeates society, but which
> isn’t informed by this recent knowledge.
> One can say that what we have works, and if it ain’t broke don’t fix
> it - but I think this is a much easier position to take when you’re on
> top of the pile than when you’re on the bottom of it.
> It’s ironic that in that same post he used gays in his example, given
> how common it is for social conservatives (in the US) to condemn
> homosexuality as a sinful “choice”, denying that it has any biological
> basis.
> Until the 2003 Supreme Court decision in Lawrence vs. Texas, many US
> states still had sodomy laws on the books and were occasionally
> prosecuting them.
> That’s the kind of discrimination and irrationality that compatibilism
> provides cover for.  That’s the “hundreds of years of law and social
> discourse” that Brent doesn’t want to give up.
> (I’m not actually accusing Brent of holding any particular position,
> btw.  Just making a point!)
> Rex

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