"Chidren can get this by themselves at the age of seven." Bruno, are you or have you ever been a member of the Theosophist party!
On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 2:16 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 05 Jul 2011, at 03:41, B Soroud wrote: > > in other words... I can legitimately claim that something is, but I cannot > claim that "I am"... > > > I distinguish the first person I from the third person I. The first is not > doubtable (without feeling lying to myself). the second is. > Chidren can get this by themselves at the age of seven. They often get the > blues. that is normal. We can feel being alone, but then we can also make > some leap of faith, in the other, in something. > > Bruno > > > > > being = 1/0 and 1/0 = -1/-0 > > in other words.... when we assert self-existence.... we effectively assert > something and nothing simultaneously. > > so why make such a empty assertion. If it was true you wouldn't have to > make the assertion. It is your logical construction and nothing more. > > On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 6:30 PM, Constantine Pseudonymous < > bsor...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Yes, Bruno... i think you have made a grave grave error in assuming >> self-consciousness as an intuitive indisputable. >> >> something is, that is for sure..... but in regards to what is we >> cannot speak.... >> >> there is some being, but I want to call this "being" into question. >> >> what asserts or negates its existence.... and how is this questionable >> being distinct from Being as such? >> >> You can name-call whatever you want, and you can assert unity... you >> can make whatever assertions you want in regards to a something.... >> >> no one denies something is..... but no one says they know what that >> Something is, or how it is distinct or different from the something >> that we are. >> >> there is us, and there is IT.... two somethings.... one Big and the >> other small.... what is the difference... and how can we determine the >> difference if we know next to nothing in regards to either. >> >> so I want to say X and x is.... but i want to also show us that in >> fact x is (being) is.... or in another words is (being) is an x. >> >> X = X >> >> but that tells us nothing. >> >> some people assert a distinction between consciousness and >> existence... and say that you can't have one without the other.... but >> don't really define the distinction or they simply claim that they are >> identical.... well that doesn't really help us. >> >> so rather then I AM... i must say Something is... which is like say >> being is unknown or is = x >> >> well we already knew that! >> >> >> >> On Jun 9, 10:11 pm, Rex Allen <rexallen31...@gmail.com> wrote: >> > On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 2:34 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> > > On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 10:00 AM, Rex Allen <rexallen31...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> > >> > >> I'm also fine with block-multiverse. And with a block-mindscape. >> > >> > >> Neither of which allow for free will. Since both of which are >> static, >> > >> unchanging, and unchangeable - making it impossible that anyone >> "could >> > >> have done otherwise" than they actually did. No one can be free of >> > >> that fact - and therefore no one has free will. >> > >> > > 'making it impossible that anyone "could have done otherwise" than >> they >> > > actually did.' >> > >> > Right. A necessary (but not sufficient) condition of freedom is that >> > they must have been able to have done otherwise. >> > >> > This alone isn’t sufficient, because "quantum randomness" (in a >> > non-block context) also makes it possible that they could have done >> > otherwise - but random decisions aren't free either. >> > >> > > You say it is impossible that anyone could have done otherwise from >> what >> > > they did. Well what determined what they did? Their mind? Their >> biology? >> > > Their chemistry? The physics of the subatomic motions of the >> particles in >> > > their brain? >> > >> > I don’t think it matters in a “block” context, does it? >> > >> > > To say the mind is not doing any decision making because its behavior >> can be >> > > explained at a level where the mind's operation cannot be understood, >> is >> > > like saying a computer is not computing or a car is not driving, >> because if >> > > you look at a computer or a car at a low enough level you see only >> particles >> > > moving in accordance with various forces applied to them. >> > >> > The ability to make decisions is ubiquitous. Ants, wasps, lizards, >> > turtles, mice, dogs - whatever. They can all be said to make >> > decisions. Do ants have free will? >> > >> > Even computers can be said to make decisions...and saying that they do >> > seems just as valid as saying that humans do. Do the computerized >> > monitoring and control systems at nuclear power plants have free will? >> > If they automatically "decide" to close some valve in response to >> > sensor readings, are they exercising free will? >> > >> > > You can render meaningless almost any subject by describing >> > > it at the wrong level. >> > >> > Wrong? What would make some level the “wrong” level and another the >> > “right” level? >> > >> > If a subject *can* be described at some level (or should be >> > describable in theory), then that has to be of some significance, >> > doesn’t it? >> > >> > If human behavior ought to be describable at the level of quarks and >> > electrons, just as computer behavior ought to be describable at the >> > level of quarks and electrons, and just as rock behavior ought to be >> > describable at the level of quarks and electons - then this shared >> > “describability” has to tell us something significant - doesn’t it? >> > >> > The fact that all of these things are describable at the same level, >> > the level of quarks and electrons, surely this means something. >> > >> > If humans could *not* be described at the level of quarks and >> > electrons, but computers could, *that* would definitely tell us >> > something significant, wouldn’t it? >> > >> > > You might as well say there is no meaningful difference between a >> > > cat and a rock, since they are after all, just electrons and quarks. >> > >> > There’s a meaningful difference between a cat and a rock - *to me*. >> > But maybe not in any other sense. >> > >> > > If you describe the mind at the correct level, you find it is making >> > > decisions. >> > >> > I can interpret it that way, yes. Or I can interpret it as just >> > moving through a sequence of states. >> > >> > I can interpret it either way I want, as the whim strikes me. It’s >> > like looking at the picture of the candlestick and then seeing the two >> > faces. I can go back and forth between the two interpretations. I’m >> > flexible that way. >> > >> > The interpretation that the mind is making decisions is not *forced* on >> me. >> > >> > Can you interpret the mind as just moving through a sequence of >> > states? Maybe if you concentrate? >> > >> > > You say it is impossible that the decision it makes could have >> > > been otherwise. This is good for the mind, it means it is guaranteed >> that >> > > its will is carried out. >> > >> > It also means that the mind’s will is not free. >> > >> > > That said, I don't mean to say there are not interesting implications >> for >> > > some of the concepts discussed on this list, such as the definition of >> > > personal identity or the view that we are all part of one >> mind/self/soul. >> > >> > Part of the same mind/self/soul? That doesn’t sound too plausible to >> > me. If it were true in any meaningful way, I think I would have >> > noticed. >> > >> > Though, it may be true in the same way that we could be part of the >> > same zip code or something. >> > >> > > Regarding personal identity, does it make sense to punish the 50 year >> old >> > > man with a prison sentence if it was a different person who committed >> the >> > > act 20 years ago? (If you regard the two as different persons). >> Further, >> > > is there any role of punishment / retribution in the justice system >> when had >> > > we been born in another persons shoes we would have made the same >> decisions >> > > and ended up in the same place as that person? If ultimately we are >> the >> > > same person, we should have much more compassion and understanding for >> > > others and their actions. >> > >> > Generally, I think a more mechanistic view of human behavior would >> > (ironically?) result in a more humane society. >> > >> > A more mechanistic view would reduce the impulse to take things >> > personally, and would encourage a more pragmatic, less emotional >> > approach to solving society’s problems - and to dealing with each >> > other. >> > >> > Of course, anything can be taken too far - and usually is - but still >> > it seems to me like the right direction to steer towards. >> > >> > Compatibilism, however, totally short circuits that, and to no good end. >> > >> > Brent said, in an earlier thread: >> > >> > “That's like telling gays they should be happy with ‘civil unions’. >> > 'Free will', meaning free of coercion and compulsion, as used in law, >> > is useful concept referred to in many, many decisions which set >> > precedents - just as 'marriage' appears in many laws and regulations. >> > So there are excellent reasons of understanding to keep it. If you >> > are a determinist, then compatibilism is the theory that shows this >> > legal meaning is compatible with determinism; so you don't have to >> > give it up and reinterpret hundreds of years of law and social >> > discourse.” >> > >> > I think that given the vast amount that has been learned in the last >> > 100 years, there is a definite need to reinterpret the hundreds of >> > years of law and social discourse that permeates society, but which >> > isn’t informed by this recent knowledge. >> > >> > One can say that what we have works, and if it ain’t broke don’t fix >> > it - but I think this is a much easier position to take when you’re on >> > top of the pile than when you’re on the bottom of it. >> > >> > It’s ironic that in that same post he used gays in his example, given >> > how common it is for social conservatives (in the US) to condemn >> > homosexuality as a sinful “choice”, denying that it has any biological >> > basis. >> > >> > Until the 2003 Supreme Court decision in Lawrence vs. Texas, many US >> > states still had sodomy laws on the books and were occasionally >> > prosecuting them. >> > >> > That’s the kind of discrimination and irrationality that compatibilism >> > provides cover for. That’s the “hundreds of years of law and social >> > discourse” that Brent doesn’t want to give up. >> > >> > (I’m not actually accusing Brent of holding any particular position, >> > btw. Just making a point!) >> > >> > Rex >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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