On 08 Jul 2011, at 14:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:

That's what I thought he said. But I see no reason to suppose a UD is
running, much less running without physics.  We don't know of any
computation that occurs immaterially.

All computation occurs materially and immaterially. An abacus doesn't
count itself. You ultimately have to have a conscious interpreter to
signify any particular text as quantitatively meaningful.

The idea here is that a universal intepreter (and I think abacus does that job) is enough. And then to reason. You assumptions are not enough clear so I never know if you talk of what is or of what seems to be.



Unplug all
monitors from all computers and what do you have left? Expensive
paperweights.

Why not just see perception as both local-solipsistic and generic-
universal?

I think Rex has defend such a view. It does not satisfy me. you start from the mystery. I limit the mystery to the numbers through the notion of machines and self-reference.



Isn't that exactly what it seems to be -

Well, but that is not an argument for a platonist. If it seems like this, it is certainly not this. You do describe; perhaps correctly, a first person experience. The problem is to relate them to third person sharable notions.



a phenomena which
both seamlessly integrates psychological experience and physical
existence together in some contexts and clearly distinguishes between
them in others? If that's the case, then why not see that principle of
a meta-dualism which is a continuum between a dualism and two monisms
(each representing each other as the opposite of themselves) as the
principle governing all phenomena, all the way up and down the
macrocosm-mesocosm-microcosm.?

If you can't trust perception, then why do you suppose that you can
trust your perception that you can't trust perception?

That is a nice argument, but it shows that we cannot doubt consciousness. We can still doubt all the content of consciousness, except this one. This does not force us to start from that concept, except by accepting its existence, and that it has to be explained. If a part remains not explainable, then it would be nice to have a meta-explanation for that. (and this happens with the logic of self-reference)




If you can't trust physics then how do you explain the fact that
physical entities (bullets, psychoactive molecules) affect
consciousness but not the other way around?

Consciousness content, like fear, can modify the matter distribution around. At a deeper level, we select the realities which support us since a long time (deep computation).



If you trust both perception and physics

But that is exactly what we should not trust too much, and especially not take literally.


then all you have to do is
identify the relationship between them as the most likely aspect to be
distorted by both perception and physics, and the most defining of our
subjective condition as a particular subjective phenomenon.

I think you are bringing some identity thesis, which might force you to bring infinities in the picture to make it coherent. But You are not precise enough to make it appears.

Bruno



Yes, perception can be tricked and exposed as a limited neurological
phenomenon, however under most circumstances, our perception somehow
seems to do quite an admirable job of passing on to us precise
meanings and high quality information from both straightforward
physical sources and more mysterious and creative psychological
sources. The integrity of that information, as it passes through
countless neurological transductions - from optical-sonic correlations
to gestalt memory associations, is what perception is; not just the
final neurological rattlings, it's the whole thing. Sense is
universal. Not human sense of course. Not physical sense, and not
psychological sense, but the sense period, common and uncommon, is the
thread that binds it all together. Whether it's the string of String
theory, or a strand of DNA, or a string of alphanumeric characters, a
conversation thread, etc. it's all about pattern and sense.

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