>All right, but then honesty should force you to do the same with
>computer ships. Unless you presuppose the molecules not being Turing
>emulable.

Computer chips don't behave in the same way though. Your computer
can't become an ammoniaholic or commit suicide.The problem with
emulating molecules is that we are only emulating the side of the coin
we can see. The other side is blank and that's the side that
interiority and awareness is made of. We can add chips to our brain
though, or build a computer out of cells.

>Any mechanical arrangement defining a self-referentially correct
>machine automatically leads the mechanical arrangement to distinguish
>third person point of view and first person points of view. The
>machine already have a theory of qualia, with an explanation of why
>qualia and quanta seems different.

If you are saying that the machine may already have it's own qualia,
then sure, I agree, I just don't think it will be our qualia. I think
that our experience of yellow, for example, probably comes through
cellular experiences with photosynthesis and probably has not evolved
much since the Pre-Cambrian. Of course that's a guess. It could be a
mammalian thing or a hominid thing that arises out of the experience
of elaborations throughout the cortex. In order for a silicon chip to
generate that experience of yellow, I think it would have to learn to
speak chlorophyll and hemoglobin.

>I agree. But this is a consequence of comp, and it leads to a
>derivation of physics from computer science/machine's theology. No
>need to introduce any physics (old or new).

It could be that, but the transparency of comp to physical realities
and semantic consistencies are pretty convincing to me. I would rather
think that I am feeling what my fingers are feeling then imagining
that feeling is just a mathematical illusion. Mathematics seem
abstract and yellow seems concrete.

>That's certainly *looks* like the arithmetical plotinian physics.
>Again, you can extract it (or have to extract it for getting the
>correct quanta/qualia) from computer science (actually from just
>addition and multiplication and a small amount of logic).

>I don't really do that. I don't think that consciousness can be
>created or be synthetic. It is not the product of any machine, natural
>or artificial. Such machines only filter consciousness and select
>relative partial realities. My main point is that this is testable. It
>already explains non locality, indeterminacy, non-cloning of matter,
>and some formal aspect of quantum mechanics.

Sorry, not sure what you mean. Probably over my head. What is it that
explains non-cloning of matter? comp? Give me some details and I'll
try to understand.

>That is too vague. It can make sense in the computationalist theory.
>yet the brain itself is a construct of the mind. Not the human mind
>but the relative experience of the many universal numbers/
>computational histories. This follows from the digital mechanist
>hypothesis.

Again, I'm not familiar enough with the theories. It sounds like
you're saying that the brain is made of numbers. Maybe? Not sure it
makes a difference?

Craig



On Jul 10, 11:32 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 10 Jul 2011, at 15:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >> You might find out that molecules in brain are unconscious too.
>
> > The fact that consciousness changes predictably when different
> > molecules are introduced to the brain, and that we are able to produce
> > different molecules by changing the content of our consciousness
> > subjectively suggests to me that it makes sense to give molecules the
> > benefit of the doubt.
>
> All right, but then honesty should force you to do the same with  
> computer ships. Unless you presuppose the molecules not being Turing  
> emulable.
>
>
>
> >> What in the brain would be not Turing emulable
>
> > Let's take the color yellow for example. If you build a brain out of
> > ideal ping pong balls, or digital molecular emulations, does it
> > perceive yellow from 580nm oscillations of electromagnetism
> > automatically, or does it see yellow when it's own emulated units are
> > vibrating on the functionally proportionate scale to itself? Does the
> > ping pong ball brain see it's own patterns of collisions as yellow or
> > does yellow = electromagnetic ~580nm and nothing else. At what point
> > does the yellow come in? Where did it come from? Were there other
> > options? Can there ever be new colors? From where? What is the minimum
> > mechanical arrangement required to experience yellow?
>
> Any mechanical arrangement defining a self-referentially correct  
> machine automatically leads the mechanical arrangement to distinguish  
> third person point of view and first person points of view. The  
> machine already have a theory of qualia, with an explanation of why  
> qualia and quanta seems different.
>
>
>
> >> You need to speculate
> >> on a new physics,
>
> > Yes, I do speculate on a new physics. I think that what we can
> > possibly see outside of ourselves is half of what exists.
>
> I agree. But this is a consequence of comp, and it leads to a  
> derivation of physics from computer science/machine's theology. No  
> need to introduce any physics (old or new).
>
> > What we
> > experience is only a small part of the other half. Physics wouldn't
> > change, but it would be seen as the exterior half of a universal
> > topology. I did a post this morning that might 
> > help:http://s33light.org/post/7453105138
>
> That's certainly *looks* like the arithmetical plotinian physics.  
> Again, you can extract it (or have to extract it for getting the  
> correct quanta/qualia) from computer science (actually from just  
> addition and multiplication and a small amount of logic).
>
>
>
> > I do appreciate your point, and I think there is great value in
> > studying cognitive mechanics and pursuing AGI regardless of it's
> > premature assumption to lead to synthetic consciousness.
>
> I don't really do that. I don't think that consciousness can be  
> created or be synthetic. It is not the product of any machine, natural  
> or artificial. Such machines only filter consciousness and select  
> relative partial realities. My main point is that this is testable. It  
> already explains non locality, indeterminacy, non-cloning of matter,  
> and some formal aspect of quantum mechanics.
>
> > I think that
> > physicalism and mechanism are both useful in their appropriate
> > contexts -
>
> Mechanism and physicalism are incompatible.
>
> > the brain does have physical organization which determines
> > how consciousness develops,
>
> I do agree with this.
>
> > just as a cell phone or desktop determines
> > how the internet is presented. It's a bidirectional flow of influence.
> > We unknowingly affect the brain and the brain unknowingly affects us.
> > They are two intertwined but mutually ignorant topologies of the same
> > ontological coin.
>
> That is too vague. It can make sense in the computationalist theory.  
> yet the brain itself is a construct of the mind. Not the human mind  
> but the relative experience of the many universal numbers/
> computational histories. This follows from the digital mechanist  
> hypothesis.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > Craig
>
> > On Jul 9, 2:35 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 09 Jul 2011, at 18:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >>> Sure, it would be great to have improved synthetic bodies, but I  
> >>> have
> >>> no reason to believe that depth and quality of consciousness is
> >>> independent from substance. If I have an artificial heart, that
> >>> artificiality may not affect me as much as having an artificial leg,
> >>> however, an artificial brain means an artificial me, and that's a
> >>> completely different story. It's like writing a computer program to
> >>> replace computer users. You might find out that digital circuits are
> >>> unconscious by definition.
>
> >> You might find out that molecules in brain are unconscious too.
> >> What in the brain would be not Turing emulable? You need to speculate
> >> on a new physics, or on the fact that a brain would be a very special
> >> analogical infinite machine. Why not?
> >> You might still appreciate my point. I don't think that today someone
> >> shown that comp leads to a contradiction, but comp leads to a
> >> reappraisal of the relation between first person and 3 person, or, at
> >> some other level, of consciousness and matter, and this in a testable
> >> way.
> >> But there is no problem with what you say. If you believe in
> >> physicalism, then indeed mechanism is no more an option.
> >> In my opinion, mechanism is more plausible than physicalism, and also
> >> more satisfactory in explaining where the "illusion" of matter come
> >> from. Actually I don't know of any other explanation.
>
> >> Bruno
>
> >>> On Jul 9, 12:14 am, Kim Jones <kimjo...@ozemail.com.au> wrote:
> >>>> Indeed, why? Any talk of 'artificial circuits' might risk the
> >>>> patient saying 'No' to the doctor. I want real, digital circuits.
> >>>> Meat circuits are fine, though there might be something better. I
> >>>> mean, if something better than 'skin' comes along, I'll swap my
> >>>> skin for that. Probably need the brain upgrade anyway to read the
> >>>> new skin. You could even make me believe I had a new skin via the
> >>>> firmware in the brain upgrade. No need to change skin at all.
>
> >>>> I could even sell you a brain upgrade that looked like it was
> >>>> composed of meat when in fact it was a bunch of something else. You
> >>>> only have to believe what your brain presents you.
>
> >>>> Kim Jones
>
> >>>> On 09/07/2011, at 12:44 PM, meekerdb wrote:
>
> >>>>>> Replacing parts of the brain depends what the artificial circuits
> >>>>>> are
> >>>>>> made of. For them to be experienced as something like human
> >>>>>> consciousness then I think they would have to be made of  
> >>>>>> biological
> >>>>>> tissue.
>
> >>>>> Why?  Biological tissue is made out of protons, neutrons, and
> >>>>> electrons just like computer chips.  Why should anything other
> >>>>> than their input/output function matter?
>
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> >>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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