On 09 Jul 2011, at 04:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:

You assumptions are not enough clear so I never know if you talk of what is or of what seems to be.
I'm trying for 'what seems to be what is',

OK. But what is your assumption?



since what is isn't
knowable

In which theory. I think that a part of 'what is' is knowable (for example consciousness). And I think elementary arithmetical conviction is communicable. I am pretty sure I can prove to you that 17 is a prime number, or even (less obvious) that the equation x^2 = 2 *( y^2) has no non null integers solution.




and what seems to be doesn't matter if it doesn't reflect
what is.

OK. But the question is: what are you assuming? I get the feeling that you assume a primitively physical universe. I am OK with that theory, which might indeed be true, except that even without QM, the question of the interpretation of the physical laws is not entirely trivial for me. But then, as you do, (so you are coherent with comp) you need a non computationalist theory of mind. My point is a proof that you are coherent. Sane04 sum up an argument showing that mechanism (comp) and materialism (physicalism) are logically (with some nuances) incompatible.

Now, in the branching dilemma materialism XOR mechanism, you keep materialism, apparently.

I keep doubting, but keeping mechanism for the sake of the reasoning, transforms the mind-body problem into a body problem in theoretical computer science (which is a branch of number theory). The mind theory is then very natural: it is the study of what machine can prove, know, observe, feel, hope about herself. The matter theory is counterintuitive. But not so much weird than most interpretation of QM.

The theory of everything becomes number theory.
And then a miracle occurs! By the incompleteness theorem of Gödel, which is among what machine can prove, numbers can distinguish (or numbers get deluded, I don't know) provability from knowledge, observation, sensations, etc.



I limit the mystery to the numbers through the notion of machines and self-reference.
If you limit the mystery, then won't what you get back be defined by
how you have defined those limits?

Sorry. I was unclear. Consciousness and Matter are the mysteries I work on. What I pretend, is two things:

1) if you (at least) agree that your daughter marries a guy who got, to survive some diseases, an artificial heart, an artificial kidney, and an artificial brain. The heart is "just" a pump, and the brain is "just" a computer. The idea here is that the brain is a natural carbon based computer. Computer, as it happens, can all emulate each others. Well, If you agree to think about that hypothesis, you can see that we have literally no choice: we have to extract the physical patterns and the reason of their stability in the way "machine's dreams" can become first person sharable, and relate to more particular universal number.

2) Some Löbian machine already exists, like PA and ZF, and are very well studied, and thanks to the work of Gödel and others, we can axiomatize completely the theology of the universal machine. The proper theology is just computer science minus computer's computer science. In this epoch you can also paraphrazed it by Tarski minus Gödel (truth on computer minus what computers can prove). But computer can do much more things than proving, than can know, observe, etc. Even in the "naïve" theory of ideally correct machine, with believable = provable, knowable = provable and true, observable = provable and consistent, feelable (sorry for that word) = provable and consistent and true.





Consciousness content, like fear, can modify the matter distribution
around. At a deeper level, we select the realities which support us
since a long time (deep computation).
I think that's true or half true, but not even the most evolved lama
or enlightened yogi can fail to react to multiple bullets fired
through their head or a massive dose of cyanide.


Of course. Although we don't know, for sure, their first person experiences.




The problem is to relate them to third person sharable notions.
They can't be related except through direct neurological intervention.

?

Are you using an brain-mind identity thesis. I guess so. It is OK, because, well you believe that your daughter married a (philosophical) zombie.


There is never going to be a quantitative expression to bring the
color blue to a mind which is part of a brain that has never seen
blue.

OK. (Except serendipitously)



You can, however, potentially intervene upon the brain
electronically, perhaps simulate a conjoined twin connection, and
create a memory of blue. Blue cannot be described quantitatively
however.

You are right on this. But "Blue cannot be described quantitatively" is a qualitative assertion, and machines can make qualitative assertion too. They too can understand that their qualia are not communicable.





An electromagnetic wavelength is not a visual experience,

Nor is the virtual cortex functioning.



it's just a measurement of linear quantity.

We can still doubt all the content of consciousness
Then why not doubt the doubt of all the content of consciousness?

Because consciousness is a fixed point on it. You can't doubt it because to genuinely doubt, you have to be conscious. That does not prove (even to you) that you are conscious, that proves only that from your own private first person experience, you cannot genuinely doubt it.




If a part remains not explainable, then it would be nice to have a meta-explanation for
that. (and this happens with the logic of self-reference)
Not sure I'm following. The meta explanation is that physics and
perception are two sides of a coin which function in two very
different ways but they overlap in certain ways.

And what is the coin?

With comp, physics is the border of the universal mind (to be short). But the mind identity is no more one-one, but one-many. My point is that this is testable, and the quantum weirdness seems to qualify for a good candidate for the computationalist weirdness.




If you trust both perception and physics

But that is exactly what we should not trust too much, and especially
not take literally.
I think it's okay to trust them as long as you understand that the
trust you place in either direction has consequences. I want bridge
builders to take physics very seriously and I want artists to take
their perception very seriously. For myself, I want to be able to
focus on whatever frequencies along the continuum are most appropriate
for the context (sanity).

I am afraid you should take math much more seriously, and theology, also.
I mean the theology behind the superstition, the fear sellers, etc.




I think you are bringing some identity thesis, which might force you
to bring infinities in the picture to make it coherent. But You are
not precise enough to make it appears.
Does this help? http://www.stationlink.com/art/dualism5.jpg

Rational dualism is consistent with computationalism. Indeed a rational octalism, I could say, appears. The eight simpler intensional variants of the logic of self-reference.

But I don't see the theory. My feeling is that you mystify both matter and mind, and their relation. You might have the correct intuition, but I don't see a clue on what is matter and what is mind, just an association which violates comp, and thus introduces infinities, that you will have to handle.

Bruno






On Jul 8, 5:23 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 08 Jul 2011, at 14:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:

That's what I thought he said.  But I see no reason to suppose a UD
is
running, much less running without physics.  We don't know of any
computation that occurs immaterially.


All computation occurs materially and immaterially. An abacus doesn't
count itself. You ultimately have to have a conscious interpreter to
signify any particular text as quantitatively meaningful.

The idea here is that a universal intepreter (and I think abacus does
that job) is enough. And then to reason.
You assumptions are not enough clear so I never know if you talk of
what is or of what seems to be.

Unplug all
monitors from all computers and what do you have left? Expensive
paperweights.

Why not just see perception as both local-solipsistic and generic-
universal?

I think Rex has defend such a view. It does not satisfy me. you start
from the mystery. I limit the mystery to the numbers through the
notion of machines and self-reference.

Isn't that exactly what it seems to be -

Well, but that is not an argument for a platonist. If it seems like
this, it is certainly not this. You do describe; perhaps correctly, a
first person experience. The problem is to relate them to third person
sharable notions.

a phenomena which
both seamlessly integrates psychological experience and physical
existence together in some contexts and clearly distinguishes between them in others? If that's the case, then why not see that principle of a meta-dualism which is a continuum between a dualism and two monisms
(each representing each other as the opposite of themselves) as the
principle governing all phenomena, all the way up and down the
macrocosm-mesocosm-microcosm.?

If you can't trust perception, then why do you suppose that you can
trust your perception that you can't trust perception?

That is a nice argument, but it shows that we cannot doubt
consciousness. We can still doubt all the content of consciousness,
except this one.
This does not force us to start from that concept, except by accepting
its existence, and that it has to be explained. If a part remains not
explainable, then it would be nice to have a meta-explanation for
that. (and this happens with the logic of self-reference)



If you can't trust physics then how do you explain the fact that
physical entities (bullets, psychoactive molecules) affect
consciousness but not the other way around?

Consciousness content, like fear, can modify the matter distribution
around. At a deeper level, we select the realities which support us
since a long time (deep computation).



If you trust both perception and physics

But that is exactly what we should not trust too much, and especially
not take literally.

then all you have to do is
identify the relationship between them as the most likely aspect to be distorted by both perception and physics, and the most defining of our
subjective condition as a particular subjective phenomenon.

I think you are bringing some identity thesis, which might force you
to bring infinities in the picture to make it coherent. But You are
not precise enough to make it appears.

Bruno











Yes, perception can be tricked and exposed as a limited neurological
phenomenon, however under most circumstances, our perception somehow
seems to do quite an admirable job of passing on to us precise
meanings and high quality information from both straightforward
physical sources and more mysterious and creative psychological
sources. The integrity of that information, as it passes through
countless neurological transductions - from optical-sonic correlations
to gestalt memory associations, is what perception is; not just the
final neurological rattlings, it's the whole thing. Sense is
universal. Not human sense of course. Not physical sense, and not
psychological sense, but the sense period, common and uncommon, is the
thread that binds it all together. Whether it's the string of String
theory, or a strand of DNA, or a string of alphanumeric characters, a
conversation thread, etc. it's all about pattern and sense.

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