Part II

>     What is your source of that information?
About human tetrachromats?
http://www.klab.caltech.edu/cns186/papers/Jameson01.pdf

Everything else is just my hypothesis.

>To "suspect that "..." is
>to bet that "..." is true. How different is that from what Bruno is
>talking about with the "Yes, Doctor"? You seem to be using Bruno's
>definition of /Theaetetian/ conception of knowledge without even
>acknowledging it! What is holding you back?

I don't get the connection. From Bruno's Yes, Doctor I get the idea of
substitution level, although most of what I'm talking about isn't to
do with prosthetic computation, it's about a topological hypothesis of
ontology. I haven't been able to make sense of Bruno's Theaetetian
conception yet so I can't say if I'm telepathically plagiarizing him.

>     Seriously, Craig, you are asking for too much! A lack of an
>explanation that you can understand is not evidence of falsehood! How do
>you know that you understand the idea?

I think I understand Jason's idea if that's what you're referring to,
I just reject it on the grounds that it is contingent upon the
existence of something which I consider to be a logical impossibility.
There can be no ancestor of red. It either has red or it doesn't. It
can't be something that is almost color but still a little bit goat
horn. To quote you in the future... non-sequitur,

>At best you can bet that you are
>correct; you can not be certain. Yes, you can have certainty that X is X
>and that it cannot contradict its own existence, but what can this tell
>you of the properties of X?

It can tell you that you know more about X or red than you think you
do. If that's what you're asking.

> Knowledge of the "truth values" of questions
>about the properties of X implies that you can process the meaning of X
>is {a, b, c, ...} statements. How exactly do you "process meanings"?

Not sure what this means really. Meanings are not processed, they are
revealed. Understood (the etymology of understand gives a better sense
of this *nter-standing as in, entero, something that supports you in
the gut, that settles you as it settles within you). The gap between
the sense of what you are and what the meaning is closes so that the
sensorimotor circuit is completed - irrespective of physical presence.
You can understand things which are not physically present, but some
semblance of their meaning is semantically present.

>You use your brain.

More accurate to say that I am my brain? I don't use a brain to think,
I am a brain that thinks.

> If that brain is hardwired from DNA to process some
>range of frequencies as "red" then guess what, u will see red when some
>EMF excitation stimulated some rod or cone in the retina of your eye...

Where does the DNA get red from?

>     All of this physical process involves work that generates entropy.
>So there is a physical aspect to this.

I would say that since sensorimotive phenomena is the interior side of
electromagnetism, and is it's ontological opposite, that qualia
generates negentropy which balances the existential-relativity-entropy
side.

>> If that were true, then unplugging your monitor would change the
>> content of the internet. Regardless of the form a computer presents
>> it's data to us in, it is processed the same way to itself, machine
>> language, bytes.

>[SPK]
>     Non-sequitur.

I'm just saying that formatting is important to us, not to the
computer. It's a false equivalence to presume that just because you
see information formatted through a human friendly presentation layer
doesn't mean that that layer has it's own awareness. It's a drawing. A
cartoon.

> Don't know. That's more of a cosmological question. The ontology of
> awareness is not only mysterious, it is mystery itself.

     {SPK]
     obscurum per obscurius?

Yes and no. Mystery arises from the privatization of sense through the
subjective topology. Sensorimotive experience gives rise to mystery
just as wealth gives rise to poverty. Knowing means knowing that you
don't know, which is another way of saying that the self feels what it
is by feeling what it is not (how else could there be a self?)

>     I agree, but we need to show necessitation of the
>"organic-somatic-neurological".

The interior topology is not about necessity, it's about freedom,
imagination, joy, violence. Color exists because it is desirable. On
the subjective side of the curtain, the universe, she just wanna have
fun.

>That is just 'level of substitution" specifications!

Not getting the connection.

> And what exactly defined "sense" as in "beneath
>arithmetic is sense"? Whose "sense"? Are you claiming that Consciousness
>is prior to Existence?

I doubt that whatever sense gives rise to arithmetic sense would be
recognizable to us as Consciousness, but since it's beyond time and
space, it could be described as both absolutely omniscient, absolutely
unconscious, and maybe even relatively semi-conscious too. Sort of
like Yahweh-Cthulhu-frisbee-akashic records-interior of the big bang.

>     What is the difference between fundamental and irreducible? The
>example you are giving about colors, in that they are like prime
>numbers, is contingent on the metric that the other colors in our
>spectrum define! T o say that X is relatively prime to Y is not a proof
>that X is not divisible by Z. You are not showing a difference in kind
>that would specify a categorical difference.

In that context I'm using fundamental as a category for things that
are indispensable, as opposed to things which are notable only in
their purity. The mechanical properties of color are not really
relevant. You can mix two white chemicals and get something yellow.
I'm not trying to posit a universal alchemical nature of color
primacy. It only interests me at all as far as it lets me point out
how blue blue is and how unlike anything it is from everything that
has no blue in it. Purple, however, is like blue but blue has no
purple in it, so it's a secondary color. But this whole sub thread is
a distraction, my only point is that it's significant that certain
colors exist and no more can be conceived of and how different that is
from a physical-quantifiable-computable phenomenon. Not trivially
different, but insurmountably, ontologically different.

>     Why is that? Because the Romba does not have a subroutine in its
>program that generates a model of the room and a model of a Romba in it
>that is updated and corrected by information that the physical Romba
>system would acquire via sonar whatever subsystems.
>     Check out these robots! http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ehno85yI-sA

Awesome robot! It still has no sensorimotive participation with it's
environment. The behavior we see is electromagnetic only. Inside the
starfish components there is still only automatic execution of
meaningless, though impressively adaptive instruction sets.

On Jul 12, 12:22 am, "Stephen P. King" <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:
> Hi Craig!
>
>      Forgive me but could you elaborate on....
>
> On 7/11/2011 10:08 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:> On Jul 11, 8:08 pm, Jason 
> Resch<jasonre...@gmail.com>  wrote:
> >> On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 1:29 PM, Craig 
> >> Weinberg<whatsons...@gmail.com>wrote:
> >> Not just their quantity, but the relationships of their connections to each
> >> other.
> > Ok, but you are still privileging the exterior appearances of neurons
> > over the interior. You are saying that experience is a function of
> > neurology rather than neurology being the container for experience.
> > I'm saying it's both, and causality flows in both directions.
>
> [SPK]
>      How does this "causality flows in both directions " work? I have a
> model of something that has that kind of feature, but I am curious about
> yours.>> This is functionalism, it is what things do that matters, not what 
> they are
> >> made of.
> > Not what things do, but what they are able to do (and detect/sense/
> > feel/know) based upon what they are.
>
> [SPK]
>      How, exactly, are you defining identity as implicit in your
> question here? To say that X is X, as in the phrase "...what they are
> ...", is to assume that you known what X is exactly, no? Is this public
> or private information?
>
> >> I think you would find that
> >> a lot of the processes going on within a person's head is irrelevant to the
> >> production of consciousness.
> > What we get as waking consciousness is an aggressively pared down
> > extraction of the total awareness of the brain and nervous system, not
> > to mention the body. There are other forms of awareness being hosted
> > in our heads besides the ones we are familiar with.
>
> {SPK]
>      Are you taking into account, for example, decoherence? Are you
> assuming a classical or quantum world?
>
> >   In an earlier post you mentioned hemoglobin
> >> playing a role, but if we could substitute a persons blood with some other
> >> oxygen rich solution which was just as capable of supporting the normal
> >> metabolism of cells, then why should the brain behave any differently, and
> >> if it does not behave differently how could the perception of yellow be 
> >> said
> >> to be different?
> > It's a matter of degree. As Bruno says 'substitution level'. Synthetic
> > blood is still organic chemistry, it's not a cobalt alloy. Your still
> > hanging on to the idea that what you think the nervous system is doing
> > is what denotes consciousness. I'm saying that it is the nervous
> > system itself which is conscious, not the logic of the 'signals' that
> > seem to be passing through it.
>
> [SPK]
>      What difference in kind is there between a component that is
> equivalent in function *and* is integrable with the system to be
> substituted? To say that it is made of cobalt alloy would be merely an
> argument from illicit substitution of identicals!
>
> >>>> quintillion wires tangled in knots and electrified don't see colors or
> >>>> feel pain.
> >>> I think they can
> >>> Based upon what?
> >> My belief that dualism, and mind-brain identity theory are false, and the
> >> success of multiple realizability, functionalism, and computationalism in
> >> resolving various paradoxes in the philosophy of mind.
> > Can wires time travel, become invisible or omnipotent also, or just
> > perceive color?
>
> [SPK]
>      How is the specification of wires relevant to the claim? But,
> Jason, which dualism are you regretting and why? There are more than one!
>
>
>
> >>> Can cartoons see feel pain? Why not?
> >> Cartoons aren't systems that receive and update their state and disposition
> >> based upon the reception and processing of that information.
> > Sure they are. Cartoons receive their shape based upon the changing
> > positions of colored lines and points.
>
> [SPK]
>      Umm, are you not implicitly assuming cartoons in the process of
> generation where the constructors of the cartoons have, as available
> information, the changing positions of colored lines and points?
>
>
>
>
>
> >> If visual sensations were so simple, why would
> >> 30% of your cortex be devoted to its processing?  This is a huge number of
> >> neurons, for handling at most maybe a million or so pixels.  How many
> >> neurons do you think are needed to sense each "pixel" of yellow?
> > Your computer is 100% devoted to processing digital information, yet
> > the basic binary unit could not be simpler. Yellow is the same. It
> > doesn't break or malfunction. Yellow doesn't ever change into a never
> > before seen color. It's almost as simple as 'square' or a circle. I
> > agree that the depth of the significance we feel from color and the
> > subtlety with which we can distinguish hues is enhanced by the
> > hypertrophied visual cortex. With all of those neurons, why not a
> > spectrum of a thousand colors, each as different and unique as blue is
> > to yellow?
>
> > I don't think neurons are needed to sense yellow, they are just
> > necessary for US to see yellow. I think cone cells probably see it,
> > protozoa, maybe algae sees it.
>
> [SPK]
>      From whence obtains meaning? Is the yellow an illusion or some
> phantom to bewitch the mind? How do you know what yellow is like from
> the first person aspect of an algae? I don't think that they do not, but
> exactly how could they, in your opinion?
>
> >> So would you say a rock see the yellow of the sun and the blue of the sky?
> >>   It just isn't able to tell us that it does?
> > No, I would say that inorganic matter maybe feels heat and
> > acceleration. Collision. Change in physical state. Just a guess.
>
> [SPK]
>      How could you know if you could not act that question to the rock?
> So the question become whether or not communication is possible with you
> and a rock. Where the specifics of a language and the attributions of
> meanings to the objects of experience the result of a computation? If
> not, what determined them? If they are not determined then how are they
> different from noise?
>
>
>
> >> That is the reason for seeing different colors is it not?  What defines red
> >> and green besides the fact that they are perceived differently?
> > What defines them is their idiosyncratic, consistent visual quality.
>
> [SPK]
>      "Idiosyncratic"http://www.thefreedictionary.com/idiosyncratic"; A
> structural or behavioral characteristic peculiar to an individual or
> group." What determined or selected that group from the universe of all
> similar entities? If that selection process is not equivalent to some
> computational process then it is indistinguishable from noise, aka, some
> random process! (Please do not involve some form of a "god in the gap"
> argument!)
>
> > Red is also different from sour, does that mean sour is a color? You
> > don't need color to tell berries from bush. It could be accomplished
> > directly without any sensory mediation whatsoever, just as your
> > stomach can tell the difference between food and dirt. (Not that the
> > stomach cells don't have their own awareness of their world, they
> > might, just not one that requires us to be conscious of it)
>
> >> That would be confusing, I couldn't tell if I were looking at a bush or
> >> eating.  I wouldn't know the relative position of the bush in relation to
> >> myself or other objects either.
> > You're trying to justify the existence of vision in hindsight rather
> > than explaining the possibility of vision in the first place. Again,
> > omnipotence would be really convenient for me, it doesn't mean that my
> > body can magically invent it out of whole cloth.
>
> [SPK]
>      As in "I think therefore I was!" as opposed to the a priori "I
> think therefore I am"? Omnipotence would not solve the problem of
> computation here! Not only would you need infinite physical resources,
> but you would also need infinite time to perform the computation, or
> else you have to admit a random process caused it to be the only case of
> colors that you experience!!! The dichotomy is not false!
>
> >> We have some reason.  There are species of monkeys where all the females 
> >> are
> >> trichromatic, and all the males are dichromatic.  When the first 
> >> trichromats
> >> evolved, did their brains and senses not conjure up a new palette which
> >> never before existed?
> > I can't know that, but I suspect that there is only one visible schema
> > experienced by living things on this planet with different levels of
> > discrimination. That is exactly the case with tetrachromat humans,
> > they don't see a pure color that is invisible to everyone else, they
> > just make finer distinctions between our trichromat colors. Possibly
> > life forms evolved in different solar systems would have a different
> > palette altogether if the star(s) are significantly different than our
> > sun.
>
> [SPK]
>      What is your source of that information? To "suspect that "..." is
> to bet that "..." is true. How different is that from what Bruno is
> talking about with the "Yes, Doctor"? You seem to be using Bruno's
> definition of /Theaetetian/ conception of knowledge without even
> acknowledging it! What is holding you back?
>
>
>
> >>> A longer beak, yes. Prehensile tail,
> >>> sure. You've already got the physical structure, it just gets
> >>> exaggerated through heredity. Where is the ancestor of red though?
> >> The first being which had both senses capable of distinguishing different
> >> frequencies of light, and a brain capable of integrating those differences
> >> into the environmental model of that being.  It is likely that this being
> >> did not perceive red light in the same way we do, it is even possible you
> >> don't perceive red in the same way I do.  For all we know, your brain may 
> >> be
> >> the ancestor of red as you know it.  Two people can taste the same thing,
> >> and one person likes it while the other dislikes it, just like two people
> >> can read the same book and like it or dislike it.  It depends on the
> >> structure of their brains.
> > Meh, that's just an appeal to uncertainty. It doesn't explain what red
> > was before it was red nor why the fact that it cannot be conceived
> > doesn't make it different from something physical like a beak for
> > which an ancestral form can easily be imagined.
>
> [SPK]
>      Seriously, Craig, you are asking for too much! A lack of an
> ...
>
> read more »

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