On 11 Jul 2011, at 23:57, Craig Weinberg wrote:

I'm having trouble understanding what you're saying.

Computer chips don't behave in the same way though.

That is just a question of choice of level of description. Unless you
believe in substantial infinite souls.

Not sure what you mean in either sentence. A plastic flower behaves
differently than a biological plant.

Sure. But they have not the same function.



A computer chip behaves
differently than a neuron.

Not necessarily. It might, if well programmed enough, do the same thing, and then it is a question of interfacing different sort of hardware, to replace the neuron, by the chips.




Why assume that a computer chip can feel
what a living cell can feel?

Because all known laws of nature, even their approximations, which can still function at some high level, are Turing emulable. In the case of biology, there is strong evidence that nature has already bet on the functional substitution, because it happens all the time at the biomolecular level. Even the quantum level is Turing emulable, but no more in real time, and you need a quantum chips. But few believes the brain can be a quantum computer, and it would change nothing in our argumentation.





Your computer
can't become an ammoniaholic or commit suicide.

Why?

I'm talking about your actual computer that you are reading this on.
Are you asking me why it can't commit suicide or spontaneously develop
a hankering for ammonia?

Because, it is a baby, and its universality is exploited by the sellers, or the nerds. And we don't allow it any form of introspection, except some disk verification. So it has no reason, and no real means, to think about suicide. He has still no life, except that (weird) form of blank consciousness I begin to suspect. My computer is not a good example, when talking about computers in general. By computers I mean universal machine, and this is a mathematical notion.

A physical computer seems to be a mathematical computer implemented in a well, another probable universal being in some neighborhood. With comp, they are numerous. With QM, too.




The other side is well explained in the comp theory.

I'm giving it a good try reading your SANE2004 pdf but I think I'm
hovering at around 4% comprehension.

That's a bad note! What is the first 5th % that you don't understand?



If you want me to be able to
consider your hypothesis I think that you will have to radically
simplify it's insights to concrete examples which are not dependent
upon references to anyone else's work, logical/mathematical/or
philosophical notation, teleportation, or Turing anything.

Read just the UDA. The first seven steps gives the picture. Of course, you have to be able to reason with an hypothesis, keeping it all along in the reasoning.




As near as I can tell, it seems like you are looking at the hows and
whys of sensation - how physics and sensation are both logical
relations

No, they are related to arithmetical relations and set of arithmetical relations.



rather than noumenal existential artifacts and why it might
be necessary. I can't really tell what your answer is though.

God create the natural numbers, all the rest is created by the natural numbers. Created or subselected by their ancestors in long computational histories.
Comp leads to a many-world interpretation of arithmetic.





My focus
is on describing what and who we are in the simplest way. To my mind,
what and who we are cannot be described in purely arithmetic
relations, unless arithmetic relations automatically obscure their
origin and present themselves in all possible universes as color,
sound, taste, feeling, etc.

Nice picture. This is what happens indeed.




No problem. That would mean that the substitution level is low. It
does no change the conclusion: the physical world is a projection of
the mind, and the mind is an inside view of arithmetic (or comp is
false, that is, at all level and you need substantial souls). But we
don't even find a substance for explaining matter, so that seems a
regression to me. Anyway, it is inconsistent with the comp assumption.

When you say that the physical world is a projection of the mind, do
you mean that in the sense that it might be possible to stop bullets
directly with our thoughts or in the sense of physicality only seeming
physical because our mind is programmed to read it as such?


It is in between. Because physics is not the projection of the human mind, but the projection of all universal (machine (number)) mind. So, we can' change the laws of physics by the power of the mind, but we can develop degrees of independence. That is why we can fly, and go to the moon.




I would
agree that physicality arises only from the body's own physical
composition and our mind's apprehension of the body's awareness of
itself in relation to it's world, but I wouldn't say that physical
matter is a mental phenomenon. By definition, mental phenomena are
exempt from physical constraints, such as gravity, thermodynamics,
etc.

They are not; even in Platonia. You have to grasp at least up to the step^seven to see what I mean. I am not trying to propose a solution. I just show that materialism and mechanism are not comptaible, and then than mechanism propose a path toward the solution, which consists in a sort of dialog with a universal (Löbian) machine.





I don't know about the mind being an inside view of arithmetic. I
would say that arithmetic is only one category of sense and see no
reason to privilege it above aesthetic sense or anthropomorphic sense.

It is simple and Turing universal. I could chose any first order logical specification of a universal system instead of arithmetic, but arithmetic is much well known.



Sense is the elemental level to me. Pattern and pattern detection.
Counting is just another pattern. Not all patterns can be reduced to
something that can be counted.


The notion of universal machine provides just that. It is not trivial. This is what the mathematician have discovered in the 1920-30. I can explain you that this is possible, although there is a BIG price; which is that universal can crash, and no one can really predict it in general.




Some things have to be named. Still
others cannot be named or numbered.

Yes. Theoretical computer science is full or result with that shape.





But computer science explains why and how such feelings occur.

Computer science explains why pain exists?

In the case of pain, the why is easy. It provides motivation in the game of life (to eat or to be eaten).

The complex problem is how pain are possible, and yes, I think that computer science has interesting things to say here.





If you get the six or seven first steps, it is an easy exercise to
show that matter cannot be cloned. Ask if you have any difficulty.

Unfortunately I can't really get any of the steps.

I think it is a problem of motivation, or prejudice (like nothing can make me doubt on the primaty cahracter of physics, or something).

Try again, or ask question, at any step. Or never mind. Despite you don't seem to have a theory, UDA shows that you are correct in rejecting comp, for saving primitive matter. Knowing that might help you to begin your theory of mind-matter. It already says that you will need some infinities.

Bruno





On Jul 11, 4:26 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 11 Jul 2011, at 04:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:d. What is it that
explains non-cloning of matter? comp? Give me some details and I'll
try to understand.

Read http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract ...

If you get the six or seven first steps, it is an easy exercise to
show that matter cannot be cloned. Ask if you have any difficulty.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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