On Jul 21, 7:03 pm, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> > On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces computation
> >>> to be there.
> >> The computations are concrete relations.
> > If the are concrete then we should be able to point to them.
> If your mind is a computer, you don't even need to point to them, everything
> you see and experience is direct evidence of the existence of the
> computation implementing your mind.
Ostensive definition is definitional, not an existence proof. The
Everything is Abstract
argument has nothing to work on if no abstract definitions are fed
> Also, I don't think the "point test" works for everything that has a
> concrete existence. How would a many-worlder point to the other branches of
> the wave function, or an eternalist point to the past? How would an AI or
> human in a virtual environment point to the concrete computer that is
> rendering its environment?
Again, ostensive definition is definitional, not an existence proof.
> > They don't need axioms to exist. Then the numbers relation can be
> >> described by some axiomatic.
> > And one can regard the numbers as defined by their relations. So the
> > "fundamental ontology" of numbers is reduced to a description of relations.
> Is a chair the same thing as a description of a chair, or an idea of a
> > The is no need to suppose they exist in the sense of tables and chairs.
> Assume both matter and number relations exist. With comp, the existence of
> number relations explains the existence of matter, but the existence of
> matter does not explain the existence of number relations.
Yes it does. Any number relation that has ever been grasped by
anybody exists in their mind, and therefore in their brain. And as
for the ungrasped ones...so what? It can make no difference
if they are there or not.
>It is therefore
> a simpler theory to suppose the existence of number relations is fundamental
> and the appearance of matter is a consequence, than to suppose both exist
> independently of each other.
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