>> But it can only be emulated in a virtual environment interfacing with
>> a computer literate human being though.
>
>Why. That's begging the question.

Are you suggesting that a virtual emulation of petroleum will someday
be usable in real world cars?

>But a virtual mouse will (I will talk *in* the comp theory).

Sure, but a virtual mouse could live on virtual granite and bleach too
if you programmed it that way. It's just a cartoon simulation of
molecules, not physical molecules.

>What do you mean by matter? Primitive matter does not exist. A TOE has
>to explain where the belief in matter comes from without assuming it.

Matter as experienced by persons on an ordinary mesocosmic level.
Matter comes from the singularity dividing it's substance with it's
absence, which is space. The experience of the division is
sensorimotive energy or feeling changes of the interior/trans-terior
of the singularity divided by it's absence which is time.

>> This is why a brain
>> must be alive and conscious (not in a coma) to be informed or inform,
>> and why a computer must be turned on to execute programs, or a
>> mechanical computing system has to have kinetic initialization, etc.
>
>Not at all. All you need are relative genuine relations. That does
>explain both the origin of quanta and qualia, including the difference
>of the quantitative and the qualitative.

At the moment of death, how do the relative genuine relations change
in a brain enough to justify permanent unconsciousness? How can we
turn on a computer without some electricity or mechanical chain
reaction?

>> The path that energy takes determines the content of the experience to
>> some extent, but it is the physical nature of the materials through
>> which the continuous sense of interaction occurs which determine the
>> quality or magnitude of possible qualitative elaboration (physical,
>> chemo, bio, zoo-physio, neuro, cerebral) of that experience.
>
>How?

In the same way that a living cell is a qualitatively different
gestalt than the sum of it's parts. It not only does things that the
molecules alone do not, but it feels things that they do not. Maybe it
feels less than the molecules? Maybe both. Maybe the richness of the
cellular qualia comes at the expense of condensing a range of spawning
sensorimotive micro-experiences from the atomic level? The difference
is that some atoms support molecules which support cells and some
don't. I have no reason to believe that molecules which do not support
cells should get the benefit of the doubt of being able to produce all
functions of cells, particular when those functions appear to us to be
significant to us. The difference between being alive and dead is
significant. There's nothing wrong with being dead if you're a stone,
but if stone was going to start growing and reproducing sexually, I
think it probably would have done so by now. Why does everything have
to be able to turn into a human mind?

>> Physical
>> will take you to detection, chemo to sense, bio to feeling, zoo to
>> emotion, neuro to cognition, cerebral to full abstraction (colloquial
>> terms here, not asserting a formal taxonomy).
>
>You say so, but my point is that if you assume matter, your theory
>needs very special form of infinities. Which one?

I assume the appearance of matter, and the appearance of different
levels of matter's extension. What infinities are required for that?

>> All are forms of
>> awareness. Consciousness implies awareness of awareness
>
>That is self-consciousness.

I think of self-consciousness as awareness of self-awareness, ie
neurotic feedback on the theme of consciousness. Awareness is 'there
is a flower'. Consciousness is 'I am looking at a flower'. Self
consciousness is 'Am I weird for looking at a flower?'. This is just
how I'm using these terms, not trying to say there is an objective
definition of loose linguistic concepts like 'consciousness'.

>> which maybe
>> comes at the neuro or  cerebral level, maybe lower? It has nothing to
>> do with the complexity of the path that the energy takes. Complexity
>> is an experience, not a discrete ontological condition.
>
>You need infinities to make complexity an experience, and that is like
>putting the horse behind the car.

?

Complexities are an experience so whatever that requires must be the
case.

>I was mentioning the mind-body problem. No formula was involved. You
>put infinities and uncomputability everywhere, where comp put it in
>very special place with complete justification.

I'm just recognizing the half of the cosmos which computes more than
it is computable. The part that feels better when it takes a shower,
not because it satisfies a simulation's logic.

>> It's a worthwhile problem, to be sure, it's just not my
>> thing. I do think, however, that if we can accurately describe the
>> pattern of what the hard problem seems to arise from, it may have
>> implications for both the easy and hard problems. At worst, my view
>> limits the aspirations of inorganic materials to simulate
>> consciousness,
>
>That is vitalism. It fails to explain anything. It makes the problem
>less tractable. It is similar to the God of the gap. Comp explains why
>there is a gap. I am not sure you study the theory.

Comp explains feeling? First person subjectivity? Comp seems really
abstract to me. I don't see how it would explain the experience of a
two year old.

>Comp explains completely why feelings are NOT numbers. You don't study
>the theory, and you criticize only your own prejudice about numbers
>and machines.

Why not just tell me what comp says about why feelings aren't numbers?
I have studied the theory to an extent, but it doesn't make sense to
me after that. I don't know what it's referring to or why. It needs
concrete, commonsense examples for me to understand it.

>You can use non-comp, as you seem to desire, but then tell us what is
>not Turing emulable in "organic matter"?

The difference between how an organism feels and how an inorganic
compound feels is not emulable. It can only be imagined by or
experienced vicariously by another organism

Craig
http://s33light.org.

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