On Jul 24, 3:32 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> Craig, I agree with 1Z, it is hard to comment some of your statements
> because we don't know what are the assumptions, and what is the
> argument.
> When you invoke the wetness as a criteria for life, you are indeed
> just silicon or number racist.

I don't think that I am. Consciousness that we are familiar with is a
function of our being a living organism, which is a function of being
made of organic molecules which collectively participate in a cellular
community through the use of water. Water may be as much a function of
the potential for animal feeling as oxygen is from the potential of
wood to burn. We just don't know that the material is independent from
the function. You need real oxygen to burn a real log. Simulated fire
doesn't provide warmth.

> With respect to comp, that would change nothing. it would mean that
> consciousness, for some weird reason needs the water molecules, which
> would act like low level necessary routines. But water behavior is
> Turing emulable (according to the physics of today).
> What if I come at your restaurant, with my daughter and her husband
> who just bought and use an artificial brain with usual silicon ships
> which simulates its brain at the level of the water and all molecules
> including the microtubules (just above the uncertainty of Heisenberg
> level). Would you still say "sorry, we don't serve machine"? That is
> silicon racism indeed.

If I can drink the simulated water in their brain, if it can keep a
plant alive just like regular water, then I'd say it's not a machine,
it's just an alternate physiology.

> What if he has a super laser based quantum machine, simulating him far
> below the QM uncertainty. Would you still say "sorry, we don't serve
> machine"? That is quantum laser racism.

Would the laser based quantum machine be able to simulate a burning
log that heats up the restaurant?

> Comp is just the theoretical assumption that such a level exists.

Well yeah if you aren't testing the validity of comp, then sure, you
could simulate anything given the axiom that anything can be
simulated. What comes out of it?

> you should not have too much difficulties to grasp that comp implies
> that either the universe is not robust enough to run a significant
> part of the universal dovetailing,

not sure what that means.

> or the laws of physics emerge from
> number theory,

I think the opposite. Numbers are implicit patterns of insistence
which correlate to explicit physical existence but neither/both emerge
from the other.

> and this in a precise way (involving modalities like
> proof, know, observe, feel). That is mainly what UDA steps 1-7 shows.
> The step 8 is more difficult and the best version today is on this
> list (under the label MGA). Search the MGA thread. Step 8 shows that
> the robustness argument is a red herring.

not there yet i guess...


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