On 03 Aug 2011, at 18:12, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/3/2011 12:39 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wed, Aug 3, 2011 at 4:21 AM, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

I agree with you vis a vis Craig. But I think functionalism may well allow different kinds of consciousness (and I'm not clear that Bruno's version does). That we "hear" an inner narration of our thoughts is probably an evolutionary accident arising because it was efficient to utilize some of the same brain structure used for hearing when thinking in language (c.f. Julian Jaynes). If we were making an artificial intelligent being we could chose to have separate hardware and software perform the perception and the cogitation. Would that being be conscious? I'd say so. It could certainly
act consciously.  Would it be conscious in the same way we are?  No.
Similarly with vision and visual imagination.

I'd say that if it produced the same outputs for the same inputs, it
would be conscious in the same way.

I'd agree, but my view derives from noting that there are "outputs" and "inputs" within the brain, between different modules. So bodily motions and speech are not the only "outputs".

Key remark, I think. You need it to give sense to the substitution level. Note that this uses an intensional Church thesis (saying that universal machine can, not only compute all computable functions, but can also compute them in all the computable manners: this follows of course from either the complier theorem, or the fact that universal machine can imitate all universal machine: the intensional Church thesis is an easy (but important) consequence of Church thesis.

The problem with saying that M is conscious iff M has the right behavior is that the empty program can emulate a sleeping brain (no imput no output). So the behaviorist, when referring to a particular instantiation of a program, might to say that M (the running machine) is conscious if it has not only the correct behavior but also that it would still have the relevant correct behavior would the inputs or situation be different. This leads to a problem with the physical supervenience thesis, a problem which eventually forces comp to detach consciousness from the physical phenomemon (or of any particular Universal machine) which supports it.



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