On Aug 11, 1:14 am, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 8/10/2011 8:20 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
> > Hi Stathis,
> >     Exactly how would we know that that component was unconscious?
> > What is the test?
> > Onward!
> > Stephen
> Your just confusing things. It's a hypothetical.  Craig holds that only
> organic kinds of things can be conscious, so hypothetically one could
> make a functionally identical (input/output) component that was not
> conscious.

Not exactly. I'm saying that what we mean by conscious is a special
case of biological awareness. It's not that something inorganic cannot
be 'conscious' in another way, it's that it won't feel like we feel
because it has never lived as an animal. A computer made of silicon
can reproduce i/o to some extent, just as a telephone can reproduce
human i/o to some extent, but our ability to infer a human presence
behind a voice on a telephone or a program running a chip is just our
inference. This is what sensory awareness does - it's a kind of
ventriloquism in reverse, jumping the gaps between protocol junctions
to try infer sensible characteristics about the source.

Conscious cannot meaningfully be described as a binary distinction
from non-conscious in this context. It's a qualitative range. I'm
saying that you need R, G, and B pixels on a monitor to get the color
image of human consciousness and that inorganic matter appears to only
be able to provide blue pixels. Yes, you can watch a program in blue
pixels only, but it's not the same thing as full color, regardless of
how many pixels and how fine a resolution there is. You cannot make a
single red pixel out of blue.


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