On 8/12/2011 8:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
It can be noticed separately in that hemisphere but if it is not
communicated it will be a separate consciousness.
I think we have almost converged to agreement here. If the AI part
communicates to the brain hemisphere just as the brain part it replaced
then it will be instantiating the same consciousness, part of which is
residing in or supervening on the AI part. Consciousness depends only
on the AI emulating brain stuff at the interface.
But now consider the AI part divided in two parts, an internal part D
that has no interface outside of the AI and E the complement of D in
AI. Then we replace D with a different D'. What will be required that
the part of consciousness supervening on AI is unchanged is that D'
provides the same input/ouput as D did. So no matter where we put the
cut between two parts the input/output across this cut must be the same
- otherwise consciousness will be changed. This implies that all the
functional structure must be maintained.
I'm not sure I believe that, but it seems to follow from the kind of
strict functionalism that says 'yes' to the doctor.
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