On 16 Aug 2011, at 05:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Aug 15, 3:46 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 14 Aug 2011, at 23:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Why not? I'm just saying that if I've never been outside of Nebraska, I will have an exponentially better chance of being able to correctly imagine Kansas than I do of imagining Barcelona. I'm saying that it's
because between Nebraska and Kansas there is less cultural-semantic
incongruity than between Nebraska and Barcelona. The further you get
from what you are and what you know first hand, the more likely that
your assumptions about what you don't know will be mistaken, or more
precisely, that they will be composed of inverted stereotypes of the
self projected outward onto the 'other'.

That does not justify it either. The contrary might be true. being
embedded in a reality might fail us concerning the big picture.

Can you give me an example that supports this? We're embedded in a
reality whether we like it or not. I'm saying that the more similar
the target reality is to our reality, the better chance we have of
imaging or accounting for the phenomena that constitutes the target
reality.

I know you say that. reality is WYSIWYG (what you see is what you get). This is pure Aristotelianism. Science (including music and theology) begun when some human took distance with that idea. Plato's theory is the quasi opposite: what you see is the border of what you might hope for (at the most).

Physicist relate measurable numbers with measurable numbers.
They use an identity thesis which makes those numbers related to their experience. But if the relations are computable the identity thesis break down. (That is not obvious, but follows from UDA)

So IF we are digitalisable at SOME level, Plato is right. The measurable numbers of the physicists is only the tip of the reality iceberg.




That is the 1004 fallacy: to add irrelevant precision.

Haha, excellent. Although you could also say that adding irrelevant
precision can communicate the irrelevance OF precision in the
particular case it's being used.

Of course! And that is even true before and after someone (I forget his name) told you that the age of the captain was 42 (or is it 24?). Hmm ... I think it was 42.24, or 24.42, I don't remember. Perhaps 42.2424242424242424...





I admit, it's a pretty opaque sentence,

Nice.

but I'm trying to
use optical polarization as a handy metaphor for modeling how
perceptual-relativity inertial frames interfere with each other.

Usually complex notion are metaphorized through simple one. Not the
contrary.

Polarization seems simple to me compared to multi-sense perceptual
relativism?

When
you look through a polarizing filter, you see moire patterns on other
polarizing films which change according to the angle of the filter.
Your polarizing sunglasses afford you a degree of privacy, as do the
tinted window that you observe, but in addition, there is a fanciful, misdirecting optical phenomenon which is projected on the window. The
increased filtering density relates to the misdirection. That's my
guess about why we can't guess what it's like for a galaxy or a
molecule very well.

?

The interference pattern between our PRIF and the target PRIF can be
an irrelevant obstacle to our understanding of the contents of the
target PRIF.

Organisms I'm saying are multicellular entities. They are
physiological-somatic. Cells are bio-chemical. Molecules are chemo-
physical. Atoms are physical-quantum. All are electro-magnetic on the
outside

In the physical description. But do you take that description as
basically ultimate, or are you open that such a description by be
justified by a non physicalist theory?

It's not ultimate, but it is the public description that we can
access.

OK.



The private side of each level is presumably different from
our own,

That does not make sense. Person or subjects have private sides. Not levels.




and sensorimotive rather than electromagnetic,

Electromagnetic is not primitive and sensorimotive is not defined.



but we can
only imagine the sensorimotive content, unless possibly if we start
connecting things to our brain tissue directly.

and sensori-motive on the inside,

Which is poetry, according to you.

Even poetry has letters, words, syntax, and grammar.

Sure, but it can't define your term. It can't help someone to see what you mean precisely by that.




but they exist and insist on
different PRIF scales.

You seem to come back to dualism, with a poetical twist. I would be OK
with that, except that you are using it to pretend that this would
contradict the comp theory, when it would just put the substitution
level *very* low.

I think it's not completely accurate to say that there is a
substitution level where literal quantity becomes figurative quality.
They are always facing opposite sides of the mobius strip, but looking
at the strip as a circular loop, there are some areas where there
substitution in one respect is almost possible, but in the opposite
respect is almost impossible. Where one point on the loop represents
maximum dimorphism between quality and quantity (such as mind and
matter: concrete multiplicities) the opposite point (such as I Ching
vs binary code: monastic abstractions) represents minimum dimorphism.

You mean: I say "no" to the doctor. It is your right. Your paragraph confirms you have no reason except to introduce infinities which distinguish you from some others type of beings.




It's a holarchy, so that organisms include
physiological, biological, chemical, physical, and quantum phenomena,
but molecules by themselves do not include physiological level
awareness even though they contribute to it. Neurology is one step
further - a meta-organism which consolidates the sensorimotive content
of the entire body and it's experiences as well as producing
teleologies to be enacted through the body's (and brain's) actions.

I don't see any problem with this view in the comp theory, unless you
reify matter, mind and the link between, which is a way to create a
magical sort of mind body problem, and solving with magic, not just
poetical, links.

Mind and matter are just categories of sense. Sense is the link
between them, however there are many categories of sense, only some of
which can be described quantitatively.

That's very good, and already intuit in a precise technical sense by the LUMs.
So this is for me a bit more like a confirmation of comp than a problem.




I'm not saying that objects have no soul, I'm saying that 'soul' is a figment of comparability itself. The more something seems to look like you, act like you, think like you, the more you think it has a soul. That doesn't mean that the thing actually does have a soul like yours
though. I think that your position is that of a de Sepulveda
equivalent - to say that we are no better than a robot is a baseless
elevation of mechanism at the expense of human sovereignty,

I can understand that if you believe that machines are irremediably
stupid, you don't like the idea that you might be one of them. But let
us assume that you are self-confident. In that case you can take this
as a good news: the news that a machine can be as much nice as you.

I'm fine with being a machine, but I'm also an anti-machine made of
psychic sugar meat.

Excellent! This is the essence of the Aristotle theory of matter, when recasted, by Plotinus, in the platonic conception of reality.

Being a machine corresponf to the ability of the "B#"
being an antimachine is related with the ability to intuit ~B# = D#. That is one of the motivation for getting the logic of the "certain observable" by Bp & Dt.

You are just mistaken in reifying materiality, I think (and provably in the comp perspective, but we know that you don't follow it).

But this makes you miss the role of consciousness and "souls" in the "creation of matter".


A computer in my image is the same machine (or
nearly so) but it's corresponding anti-machine is logic electronic
glass.

You just oversimplify your anti-machine idea. You are not trying to solve the mind body problem, but to block any progress toward a solution.




The glass could very well be superior to sugar in many
respects, but it's never going to be better at being sugar.

plus it's
incredibly premature given that we have no reason to believe that any
electronic device has any more feeling than a doorknob so far.

If you do a computer with doorknob, it might implement a dream that he
is a human. It is not the doorknob which thinks, nor the brain, nor
the electronic device, but the person emulated by such device.

I don't think the device emulates a person, I think the person is just
the 1p experience of the device.

That is a weakness of your theory. You attribute consciousness to bodies. I believe in consciousness, but bodies are theoretical construction. Constructs of minds (not necessarily humans).




You are the one introducing implicitly infinities and non Turing
emulability in he picture, where, using comp, you could get the same
picture that you intuit by making the substitution level very low.

I don't think it can have a substitution level because physics cannot
be located within mathematics,

You are right physics cannot be located within mathematics. What I have shown is that IF there is a cognitive comp substitution level then physics is the border of mathematics (arithmetic, with the usual omega-comp, but the relation is more general). But the border of arithmetic, when viewed from inside, is beyond both math and physics.



it can only be described, partially, by
mathematics. There is no mathematics for the experience of physics.

Indeed. The LUMs say the same thing.





If we
had discovered a continent of robots with their own culture, then I
would agree, we should give them the benefit of the doubt. Since we
are creating machines from components known to be unconscious which
show no signs of autopoietic development, I don't see why I would want to dismiss the differences between living organisms and such organized
inorganisms.

The discovery of the universal machine is, imo, a profound conceptual
reason to do so.
But all the evidences from biology and neurophysiology not only are in
favor of comp, but even for a rather high substitution level.
And the evidences from physics is that it might not be that high.

So you don't see a significant epistemological difference between
design and discovery?

I see it very well.
Babbage designed a universal machine before discovering its mathematical existence.
Turing discovered its mathematical existence before designing it.





But you make a strong statement: there is no level at.

Not just that there is no level, but that 'level' itself is a
quantitative framing of the problem.

Yes. The level is a quantitative framing. But I think it is an ignorance of what is computer or a universal machine which makes you think that this automatically eliminate the qualitative truth of the person. A brain, or even a cell is already betting implicitly (by nature) on a quantitative framing. You can't avoid that without introducing special infinities in the picture.

I'm stating that I think there is
an overlapping range where substitution is most feasible (through
music or language for example), but that is the opposite range that
can be addressed mathematically.

?




We are not
duplicable, at any level. And the evidence you give are just providing
fuel to the idea that the level is low, or based on the counter-
intuitive nature of mechanism, which is indeed, as I said just to
Benjayk, hard to believe ... by machine. So I expect them, and
illustrate that they confirm mechanism more than they refute it.

?

I don't say 'don't try to understand', I say 'render unto existence
what is quantifiable, and render unto qualia what is essential'.

You talk like Aristotle.

I was going for Jesus?

What makes someone a guru? I'm not claiming to know anything special,

You did once actually.

I did? Not sure in what context, but I'll take your word for it.

I'm just presenting ideas that seem to make sense of the mind body
problem to me.

Too bad my job consists to kill all gurus.

Hah, Now who is calling the kettle intolerantly ethnocentric?

?
I kill all guru independently of sex, race, religion, origin. The
immaterial and the material one.

I'm sure de Sepulveda would find the killing of all heathens
acceptable, not just native Americans.

He would have kill anyone preventing him to get the Indian Gold.



OK, I am 'poetical too', and alluding to the buddhist motto that you
have to kill all the buddhas when on the spiritual path. It is a way
to say that I try to dismiss all argument by authority. Even nature's
one.

How is the illusion of authority to be accounted for then?
And the passion to dismiss it?


I don't dismiss the authorities. Authorities use argument, they never use argument by authority. Violence, terror and authoritative argument are the argument of those who have no faith or confidence.

It might be my english. I love argument by some authority? I dismiss argument per authority.

Does arithmetic generate authority or destroy
it?

Both.





You are no doing science, but promoting a personal opinion.

The science of consciousness cannot exclude the personal, or else it's not being scientific. To disqualify the personal from the cosmos is to
disown the very asker of the questions of science.

You make a confusion of levels. You can assume subjects and develop
theory on their experiences, and eventually confront them with
experience reports, even with your own. But you cannot use your own in
the presentation of your idea. You can't use expression "because I
feel so". Especially in the mind body problem, where, beyond being
invalid, it makes things pretty obscure.

But 'I feel so' is the whole basis of the mind body problem.

'I feel so " is correct in the data. And if you are pensioned, you can use "i feel so" in the conclusion and prospective, but not in the course of the argument, or at least not as an argument.
But yes, "I feel so" is the whole basis of the mind body problem.
I feel so.
:)




You can't
just say 'you cannot use'... the sine qua non evidence of the problem.
How is disqualifying that not an argument from authority?

You can use it like you can divide by zero.
No problem in poems, but in science it leads to exploding rockets, loss of job, crash, trash, or the mockery of the colleagues (in the best case).





It is
problematic because it excludes entities from the club of conscious
entities from appearances.

It's not just appearances. Again, if we land on the planet of the
robots, I'm all in favor of giving them the benefit of the doubt. If I
make a device specifically to impersonate a human-like intelligence
out of refined minerals and petrochemicals, why would I assume that at
some point they might become something else?

Because you get the bill of the hospital and discover that those
bastard doctors put your a petrochemicals brain in the skull, and you
did not notice. Now you noticed it just by seeing the exorbitant bill.

Doctor, why don't I feel like being a petrochemical being?

Because you feel to be the person executed by the computer, you don't
feel the matter which constitute that computer. There are no nerves in
the petrochemical product.

I think it depends upon what nerves have been replaced. If It's
cerebellum - maybe I don't notice much except that I have an easier
time balancing. If it's the prefrontal cortex, maybe I never notice
being alive again, and my body languishes in a walking zombie coma.

Either you think there is no level. Then comp is true, and you have to find and justify the infinities. or there is a level, and then your remark are practical implementation considerations.




What is the difference between the mathematical reality that you are
saying does not exist and the arithmetical reality that you do
'believe in'? What is an example of each?

Arithmetical truth concerns the sentence involving natural numbers,
and addition and multiplication, + the logical symbols.
I do intuit that all such sentence is either true or false. Even
complex one like the twin prime conjecture, or any statement about
what do, or don't, a machine.

Set theoretical truth concerns the sentence involving sets and
appartenance, with basic law of union, intersection, power set,
comprehension. I don't intuit them aswell, especially for big infinite
sets. So it makes no sense for me to believe that the continuum
hypothesis (a typical complex statement in set theory) is true of
false. There are too much different sort of models (structures
satisfying the axiom).

For arithmetic we have a reasonable notion of standard model.

Hmm. I sort of get that. Arithmetic truth = invariances behind
mathematical systems? Could these be feelings? What of addition and
multiplication are just abstract representations of the universal
sensorimotive qualia of 'more'. + = more and more, x = more (mores)

Numbers are simpler to understand than universal sensorimotive qualia.
And those qualia light just decribe the human experience of numbers, not the numbers. If your child asks why is 6 even, you will seek an explanation along the lines of 3+3, not along the line of neurophysiology. Scientist are like children, they want clear short explanation, and if they don't exists, well, they wait you decompose your ideas in short comprehensible steps. Numbers are very easy to play with. Indeed it takes time for many to understand that actually we don't really know about them. It is difficult to understand that the numbers are not that easy.




A universal machine can emulate a pair of
universal machine, without the need to twist itself.

That's the problem. If it can twist itself, it can untwist itself,
whereas the mind cannot untwist the body into mind.

Have you a proof of this? But "twist" is too metaphorical to ask for a
proof, I guess.

I don't think I'm a proof guy, but I can give examples. Like how we
can move our arm voluntarily without literally thinking a verbal
command to our arm to move. If we worked like a comp machine,

Which one? You talk like if you knew how all machine are working, but you might just knew the universal machine below. Even chess player machine have evolved, even if they are all running on nand gates, at some level. The expression working like a comp machine does betrays prejudices or reductionist conception of numbers and machines.






the
instruction to move would be the same as the feeling of moving our
arm. We would be able to control what people think about by moving
their body
I have seen
concrete early warnings of this in server virtualization. In theory
each server is an identical, isolated partition within a larger
hardware node. It works ok most of the time, but sometimes there are
corruptions of the logic underlying the partitions so that the entire
node needs to be reboot. There is no way to recover from within the
system or to save a particular partition, you have to physically power the whole thing down and restart it. Restarting devices is by far the
most effective way of fixing computer problems. Error messages are
generally not helpful, and self-monitoring in general is less reliable
than the system it is monitoring.

With PC. Not with Mac :)

That could be true, but I don't have first hand experience with anyone
using datacenters full of Macs.

You begin to look like a program failing to succeed a Turing test.
I wrote generators of sentence like that in my youth.

See, this is what I'm talking about with degenerating into ad hominem
or condescending arguments.

OK. Apology for that. But it was a way to tell you it looks like jargon.

No problem, and I apologize for it looking like jargon, I just don't
always know how to say it in a more parsimonious way.
I just want to
point out that the jargon-ness doesn't diminish the argument. It just
makes it more annoying to figure out.

Which might be a bit unnerving when the argument pretend to oppose your own life work ...
You might at least try to fake modesty.

You say you are not a proof man, so don't talk like if it was the case.




I'm not offended, but I don't focus on my
difficulties in understanding your writing, even though it is a
significant barrier at times. It doesn't really help either of us to
define the debate in terms of how well we like each others style of
communication or attitude or personality.

I don't want to be hominem, but we are not on the same length wave.
You argue for he truth of something, where I propose assumption and
reasoning.
What you do looks like continental philosophy, and this seems to me to
lead to arbitrary segregation, that you show up indeed by asserting
that humans cannot survive with digital brain, that machine cannot
think, etc.

Shouldn't it just be about
figuring out the best truths?

I think the best way to get close to truth consists in making clear
what we are willing to assume, and to develop reasoning and submitting
them to others.
Even, perhaps especially in a field which concerns personal experience
and their relations with what is or might be.

I think that approach has a particular limit in this case, namely that
it restricts all findings to being 'conventional'. There is no
possibility of getting behind reason itself, which is a problem
because I think it's clear that sense precedes reason.

I agree with you, but this does not exclude that sense might have reasons, on another level or layer of reality.

You do have some intuition of the mind, and I know that in each universal machine 'head' there is already a conflict between heart and reason. But I have read the end of the arithmetical novel, and reason and heart can live together very well .. in the head of universal machine. They does not need to oppose each other, except in practical decisions circumstances.




From an perspective outside of our own. The noumenal 3p view of the
phenomena which we experience subjectively as 1p.

Well, comp makes the 3p-physics a 1p plural view. That shocks myself a
little bit.

That sounds promising.

It is done. I mean the door is open. There is job for an army of mathematicians there.



There's still something wrong with the
plurality I think. There's only relativism pretending at reality
without any sense of weight and significance embodied amongst the
plural 1p views. There is no difference between hypnopompic and
hypnogogic transitions.

I don't see any reason why. You might develop.





What is required to refute comp?

An observable phenomenon which contradict our self-finiteness/Turing
emulability.

Yellow?

Err... There is a theory of qualia. Ah but I explain below.




A physical phenomenon which contradicts the physics derived from
arithmetic and some reasonable theory of knowledge.
Or the discovery of the brain of a very special type of non Turing
emulable process + an argument that it plays a role in our
consciousness.

Comedy?

Lol.



I assure you that there is a theory of qualia (and quanta) for (ideal)
machine. And the theory fits with both the neuro-theories, and the
religious or philosophical theories, especially with the non-
reductionist one. There is only a pedagogical problem, which is that
it relies on theoretical computer science, which is not astonishing,
given the comp hypothesis. It relies specifically on the discovery of
arithmetical self-reference (Post, Kleene, Gödel, Tarski, ... Solovay).
It fits well with Maturana and Varella autopoesis, but perhaps at a
more abstract level than biologist are used too.

Does the theory of qualia claim that it is necessary and inevitable
consequence of function?

The term function is ambiguous. The comp qualia does not rely on function. The universal dovetailer generates all possible qualia, and compute no function. It is more like a complex self-referential loop related to some local relative truth.




I can see clearly why the subjective psyche that we are would be able
to assign agency to a computer process, since our awareness runs on
figurative sense-making by analogy, but I can't see my a computer
process would assign anything figurative to it's own computation.
Metaphor can be work on a literal level, but from where would literal
quantitative functions infer non-literal associations?

Excellent question. When a machine (quantitive relations) looks
inward, its faces non-literal association, because they are there.
Numbers cannot put numbers on most on the views on their intrinsic
ignorance. It would also cost a lot to enumerate the names to find
their quantitative quality so that the soul (an ultra non quantitative being) and consciousness (the instinctive bet that there is a reality,
perhaps an invariant reality) provides tremendous self-speeding up
ability (common, I bet, on all self-moving entities).

I'm not sure I understand. I think of numerology as an interiority of
numbers, but what would a non-literal association of purely
quantitative relation be?

The mind of a machine looking inward. When LUMS look inward, they discover many things, including incommunicable qualia. They can invent terms for those sensations.





The soul of the Turing machine has no part. It is the first person. It
is not a material entity, nor even a number from the view of the
machine. The math is given by defining knowledge of the machine simply
by its true beliefs, and "believe" is defined, for ideally correct
machine (well defined mathematical object) by a machine's assertion.
take a look perhaps on the second part of the sane04 where I explain
this.

But what is the view of the Turing machine? What does it care about?
What does it struggle with?

It depends on too many factors. A clever computer is a computer which cares about finding a better or more respectful user, or fighting for dispensing themselves from the "user imperative".



Note that there is a recreative introduction by Raymond Smullyan on
the self-reference logic G. "Forever Undecided". It might help, and in
sane04 I have been inspired by its pedagogy.

Is it the tape, the read head, the chip, the marker?

It is not even the program. It is a person emulated by a program. We
might call it an engram, because it is not a program programmed by
someone, but a program selected by billions years of evolution.

Evolution of what?

Evolution of species.


Is it an
invisible sense that somehow arises nonlocally but paradoxically
remains locally constrained?

Yes.

You don't think that could just be projection of our own 1p naive
realism view?

No. because it is counterintuitive. It is the naive realism view which is flawed (assuming comp as always).



To me it makes sense that the only thing experiencing the Turing
Machine as a machine is us. The machine itself is not a machine in
it's own experience,

OK.

it is different isolated materials with common
sense only on a physical and chemical level, not on a semantic level.

I don't understand your sentence.

I think the machine doesn't understand the sentence either.

You will hardly convince me that machine cannot think, in that way.




We read
words as a sentence, but the words don't read themselves even as words
or letters. There isn't even an objective pattern there, just ink on
paper or pixels on a screen. The patterns of letters the meanings of
words are our patterns which insist on a semantic level. On the
physical or chemical level there are no patterns that relate to our
interpretations. A machine works the same way. It has no interiority
related to the function we have imposed on it, it's just a
'collection' of discrete physical and chemical bodies bound together
with our motives.

My point is that physics cannot be entirely enveloped by number
theology. If that means that comp is false, then comp is certainly
false.

Well, the point is that it can be tested. Up to now, thanks to the
quantum, it does fit rather well.

So you say. Does it matter whether quantum is a misinterpretation or
not?

I was alluding to the quantum facts, not the quantum theory. Still less the human interpretations of those facts. I was alluding to facts, like violation of Bells inequality, the quantum zeno effects, single particle interferences, etc.




You cannot demolish a (sufficiently precise theory) by a philosophical
prejudice.

Isn't that a philosophical prejudice?

Not, it is a rule of the science-game.




I define, roughly, the theology of a number by all what is true about that number, and I define the science of the number by all what that
number can prove.
Incompleteness then associated a theology to each number, and the
self-
referentially correct numbers share all the same abstract theology
(but different from inside). But the fundamental laws are the same
for
all, and they contain and justify the way the physical laws appear
and
get stable in some first person plural point of views.

I think you're saying here that what physical is can be described by
numbers because what is true about the physical can be enumerated.

Not at all. And most things that machine can discover looking inward
are not enumerable. The whole recursion theory (theoretical computer
science) study the degrees on non-mechanicalness of what machine can
discover inside its head (figuratively speaking). Big features of
physicalness are not enumerable.

At what point does a machine look inward? Does LET X=X+1 discover non-
mechanical enumerables?

No, "let x = x+1" is a too simple machine. There are two main thresholds: universality and löbianity. A machine is universal when she can emulate all other machines, and is Löbian when she knows that she is universal. All this can be made precise technically in computer science.




If
so, I'm saying that the universe is more than what is true,

It is more than that what can be smelled, felt, observed, proved,
inferred, prayed, ... OK. But more than what is true? I am not sure I
can see what that means.

Fiction. Metaphor. The universe is what might be, and it is the wish
to be what it is not.

That is part of the truth.



it is also
what might be true, and what can be made true through motive action.

Yes, but arithmetical reality is rich enough to internalize all the
"might be true". (Assuming comp).

If there is something that arithmetic reality is not rich enough to
internalize, then reality cannot be reduced to arithmetic.

OK. But with comp we dont need to go outside arithmetic, because arithmetic from inside is already bigger than any outside that we could imagine.


If there is
nothing that cannot be reduced to arithmetic then the label arithmetic
is a 1004.

As a label, perhaps. But it is a precise theory of everything: private and sharable realities included.



That's why I like sense better than arithmetic. It
specifies that the universe is about sense (in every sense), and what
is beyond it is non-sense.

I agree, but the LUMS agree also. That's a first person correct view. But we search the 3-TOE.




We can't take the mathematical
modeling of the visible electromagnetic spectrum to make concrete an
expectation of the color of gamma rays.

We can make that, by using that mathematical modelling and interface
it to a mathematical modelling done at the right substitution level
of
a human brain, and then using the mathematical modelling of the vocal
cords to translate and hear a guy saying "oh! yes, I distinctively
see
something".

Would he say that what he sees is a warm color? A cool color? Is it
bold or shy? Is it very similar to other visible colors or is it as
different from RGB as salty is to dizzy? Would his answers be random
or if we asked enough questions could we get a sense of what the
actual color of gamma rays looks like?

Here the theory says that you have to ask this to him. It might be
difficult, but not much more to figure out what might sounds look for
bat.

Interesting. So the theory is that the theory itself cannot make a
concrete expectation, but that a machine can be designed which can.

Indeed.



Hence private 1p plural realities.

It is not that simple, I think, but yes *that* happens.



But here you will say that the guy is just a zombie, where
the correct computationalist will say that the experience itself is
in
Platonia, and the modeling being done by the equation's solution or
by
the physical universe just changes probabilities of the relative
manifestation of that consciousness.

Sounds like obfuscation to me.

I have to refer to a work. Sorry. But I refer to a precise couple of
theories which are standard: comp and arithmetic (including its meta-
arithmetic which is not added, but really part of arithmetic).

Seeing a color is a simple thing if you
can see in color.

Well, it is 1-simple, but 3-complex.

I don't think it's 3-accessible at all. Color is 1p or 0p.

The 3-complex is not 1-complete, but the 3-theory explains it has to be like that, even for machines.



I don't know it, but i have a hard time believing that gold is
intrinsically 79-like in all possible universes. It doesn't follow
logically. I think that 79 is only gold if you are calculating protons in a nucleus, and not ping pong balls in a bag or pixels on a screen.

Particles comes from symmetries for group transformation, but we don't
know really where the parameters come from. Physics has not yet
anwered, but has put a lot of light. is gold a geographical object or
a physical object? That is obviously a complex open problem in the
machine physics.

I think gold is a semantic subject with a physical-quantitative
correlate.

In that case then, you are arguing that there is no special difference
between oxygen and arsenic. I'm just prejudiced against arsenic
because I don't like it.

I see.

What are you afraid of? That the Arsenic people steals our jobs, or
what?

Haha.  No, I'm arguing that there is a difference between oxygen and
arsenic that matters to us.

Due to our contingent clothes.



The difference between life and death. To
arithmetic, it's just the difference between 8 and 33.

You oversimplify. Especially that oxigen and arsenic are infinitely complex object in the comp theory.




So yes. The carbon did have some advantage in the molecular evolution
of universal beings, but now we see that, perhaps thanks to the
human,
the silicon can also drive universal beings, and you just say "no"
because, by definition, they don't have carbon.

I'm not opposed to humans making living organisms out of silicon, I'm only saying that if they aren't living organisms, they are not likely
to be able to feel like a living organism.

Then we agree. the whole point is that comp says that we can make
living people from silicon, metallic clocks, even stones and toilet
paper (if you are patient enough to play a very long game).

How does comp know that they are alive without just defining life as a
kind of mathematically animated death?

Comp does not know that (in your terming). Comp bets on that.




On the contrary. It is the discovery of lifes and persons in
arithmetic. Consciousness got more than one role (self-speeding up),
rather handy in a jungle where compete an infinity of universal
entity, not all being machines, BTW.

Who is a person that has been discovered in arithmetic?

You, all of us. Even if comp is false, in which case there are zombies.




At least you are coherent, you seems to need stuffy matter, like
the
EM field, then mechanism cannot make sense, unless I am wrong
somewhere 'course.

Matter is just the rear end of mind,

OK. With comp, we can said that matter is somehow the border of the
universal mind, where God loses control, somehow.

Right. Teleology yields to teleonomy as the condition of becoming
finite, but it doesn't go quietly. It tries to gain control by
figuring out a way of tricking the teleonomy (a-signifying side of
mind we know as physical matter as objects in space) into serving it's purposes. But to the other side of that teleonomy, it makes sense that
the experience would be one of being forced into an incomprehensible
mold - that the most subjective part of it's awareness is being
orchestrated incomprehensibly by supra-conscious forces. When we
dream, we may be doing the computing for something else.

I'm describing how 'God loses control'. By turning it's back on
itself.

Something
like the solar system or DNA. That doesn't mean that those things are experiencing our lives or that what we understand of them is what they are, because the two topologies are existentially divided, even though
they are essentially the same.

I'm saying that the landlord may be renting rooms out in our psyche
behind our backs to other entities (macrocosmic? microcosmic?) who may
have no idea we exist.

You feel superior?

Depends in what way. In the ability to feel and understand zoological
and metaphorical realities, yes. In the ability to rapidly calculate
logical functions quantitatively no.

It is a cliché. It is an overgeneralization from a contingent cluster
of machines, which exists since some years. I am ataliking about all
machines. Church thesis makes the concept solid and mathematical.

But metaphorical and zoological is the antithesis of solid and
mathematical. That's the point. If you are doing metaphor literally,
you're doing it wrong. It's like saying Church thesis makes limb
amputation desirable.

In the long run we light abandon our bodies, just to be able to move at the speed of light, and better explore the realities.




It's not a matter of superior,
it's a matter of appropriate skill sets. By projecting superiority on
me personally though, you distract from the issue and make it just a
challenge on the ego level.

It's only pretending to
matter, and that difference, insignificant on a microelectronic
scale
makes for an exponentially greater difference when scaled up to the
level of a massively sophisticated machine. An organism is
organized,
but an organization by itself is not automatically an organism.

OK, but to save your point of view you have to put the substitution
infinitely low, postulate matter, postulate mind, and postulate some
twist, and all this for not baptizing the machine. All this for
making
us feeling different if not superior. I don't buy that.

I like 'baptizing the machine'. But no, I don't have a sentimental
attachment to anthropocentric biology. Believe me, I would like
nothing more than to be uploaded into a billion tongued sex machine
that lives forever, but I don't think that it's as simple as drawing a
straight line from Turing to Tchaikovsky.

The reasoning works just from the truth of the comp hypothesis, not
its practical possibility.

That's the problem. It is impossible to implement practically because
it disqualifies everything besides hypothetical function.

?
There is nothing hypothetical, except the existence of a substitution level, which seems the case by looking at biology, physics, etc. It will be practical soon enough, but that is another topic.




We have to explain the cells
and the organs first. Experience itself. We can't just assume 'If we
build it out of equations, beings will come through the solutions'.
It's possible that they will, but I think it's wildly overconfident to assume that the chemical, genetic, biological, and somatic levels can be skipped without loss of their contributions to human consciousness.

I have never said that.

This means only that you bet that our comp  level of substitution is
low.  UDA works even if you ask the digitalist doctor to copy the
entire observable universe at the Planck level, or even below (in some
physics).

If there are 1p realities that exist only through the execution of the
machine (like the experience of the color of Gamma Rays), how do you
know that our phenomena won't encounter the same barrier in being
translated from our reality to theory as they would be from theory to
machine reality?

Because we bet the doctor has chosen the right level.



Why can't the machine hack into our reality and give
us the color of Gamma Rays?

She might be able to do that, although some amount of luck might be needed. It might be true in practice and theory, yet unprovable in theory. The theory justifies that you have to pray, here.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to