On Aug 16, 1:49 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 16 Aug 2011, at 05:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> > Can you give me an example that supports this? We're embedded in a
> > reality whether we like it or not. I'm saying that the more similar
> > the target reality is to our reality, the better chance we have of
> > imaging or accounting for the phenomena that constitutes the target
> > reality.
> I know you say that. reality is WYSIWYG (what you see is what you
> get).

No, I say reality is WYSiWYG *and* WY Don't See IWYG also.

This is pure Aristotelianism.
> Science (including music and theology) begun when some human took
> distance with that idea.
> Plato's theory is the quasi opposite: what you see is the border of
> what you might hope for (at the most).

Not sure I understand. Do I hope for this world and therefore it
exists to me in a solipsistic way?

> Physicist relate measurable numbers with measurable numbers.
> They use an identity thesis which makes those numbers related to their
> experience.

That may be what physicists believe that they do, but probably in
reality they use an intuitive feel from numbers and experience which
they describe and communicate as an identity thesis, numbers, etc. The
actual understanding is an artifact of cognition and feeling.

> But if the relations are computable the identity thesis break down.
> (That is not obvious, but follows from UDA)
> So IF we are digitalisable at SOME level, Plato is right. The
> measurable numbers of the physicists is only the tip of the reality
> iceberg.

It's not 'we' who are digitizable, it's just some of our more outward
facing activities.

> > The private side of each level is presumably different from
> > our own,
> That does not make sense. Person or subjects have private sides. Not
> levels.

Yes, you're right. I should have said something more like "The kinds
of private phenomena that can be experienced by subjects on other
levels than our own are presumably different".
> > and sensorimotive rather than electromagnetic,
> Electromagnetic is not primitive and sensorimotive is not defined.

I'm stating that electromagnetic is primitive. I think it can be seen
that ultimately all physical law, when properly reconciled with 1p and
3p perspective, boils down to electromagnetism. Sensorimotive is the
experience of sense (discrimination between pattern variance and
invariance or 'change') and the experience of motive (to initiate or
respond to change). Sensorimotive is the defining ontology of

> > but we can
> > only imagine the sensorimotive content, unless possibly if we start
> > connecting things to our brain tissue directly.
> >>> and sensori-motive on the inside,
> >> Which is poetry, according to you.
> > Even poetry has letters, words, syntax, and grammar.
> Sure, but it can't define your term. It can't help someone to see what
> you mean precisely by that.

Sensorimotive describes the basic dynamic common to all experience,
theoretical or actual. It's the half of the cosmos that is unlike
matter and space because it is the experience of matter and space, ie,
'energy' (change) over 'time' (change relating to change). Since it is
so universal, it encompasses everything from the most literal
sequential sense of classical mechanics (S=Δx/Δt) to the most floridly
transcendental and transfigurative timelessness. Sensorimotive is
motion and emotion, sense and sensation. They are a single set of
phenomena, a coherent ontology of evanescent literalism and cumulative

> >>> but they exist and insist on
> >>> different PRIF scales.
> >> You seem to come back to dualism, with a poetical twist. I would be
> >> OK
> >> with that, except that you are using it to pretend that this would
> >> contradict the comp theory, when it would just put the substitution
> >> level *very* low.
> > I think it's not completely accurate to say that there is a
> > substitution level where literal quantity becomes figurative quality.
> > They are always facing opposite sides of the mobius strip, but looking
> > at the strip as a circular loop, there are some areas where there
> > substitution in one respect is almost possible, but in the opposite
> > respect is almost impossible. Where one point on the loop represents
> > maximum dimorphism between quality and quantity (such as mind and
> > matter: concrete multiplicities) the opposite point (such as I Ching
> > vs binary code: monastic abstractions) represents minimum dimorphism.
> You mean: I say "no" to the doctor. It is your right. Your paragraph
> confirms you have no reason except to introduce infinities which
> distinguish you from some others type of beings.

I don't really get your meaning when you talk about introducing
infinities, and only partially get the doctor part of comp. I see how
my feelings about what a doctor proposes to do to me is a way of
forcing a binary categorization of my idea of the nature of mind/body,
but I think that the very binary reduction prejudices the test. My
whole point is that mind can be reduced to binary logics on one end of
the continuum and that is cannot be reduced in any way at the other

> > Mind and matter are just categories of sense. Sense is the link
> > between them, however there are many categories of sense, only some of
> > which can be described quantitatively.
> That's very good, and already intuit in a precise technical sense by
> the LUMs.
> So this is for me a bit more like a confirmation of comp than a problem.

Thanks. LUMs are Lobian Universal Machines?

> > I'm fine with being a machine, but I'm also an anti-machine made of
> > psychic sugar meat.
> Excellent! This is the essence of the Aristotle theory of matter, when
> recasted, by Plotinus, in the platonic conception of reality.

I have considered myself a Panpsychic Neoplatonist, but that was just
an informal guess about where my sentiments lie.

> Being a machine corresponf to the ability of the "B#"
> being an antimachine is related with the ability to intuit ~B# = D#.
> That is one of the motivation for getting the logic of the "certain
> observable" by Bp & Dt.

Me no like symbol notations. Can you translate into English (if you

> You are just mistaken in reifying materiality, I think (and provably
> in the comp perspective, but we know that you don't follow it).

I don't think that I am reifying materiality. I'm saying that
materiality is itself reification. It is like a simulation of non-
simulation, only it's not a simulation and it's not exclusively
arithmetic - it is a concrete sensorimotive experience of abstract
electromagnetic relations (which are arithmetic). Does that help?

> But this makes you miss the role of consciousness and "souls" in the
> "creation of matter".

Does it? I think that matter is not created, it is experienced. It's
just the exterior of 'consciousness'. On the level of simple 'matter'
experiencing matter, I imagine that consciousness=detection. on the
molecular level and above it's more like sensation. On the cellular
level and up it's more like feeling. On the level of the vertebrate
nervous system it's like awareness. On the level of the prefrontal
cortex, it is like awareness of awareness, or conscious thought. Each
level is a different PRIF. We think about matter, but matter doesn't
think about us. It detects us through the matter side of us - our

> > A computer in my image is the same machine (or
> > nearly so) but it's corresponding anti-machine is logic electronic
> > glass.
> You just oversimplify your anti-machine idea. You are not trying to
> solve the mind body problem, but to block any progress toward a
> solution.

I think that I have solved the mind body problem. It's only a problem
when the mindbody fails to recognize the relation to bodymind and to
honor it's essential unity as well as it's existential polarity and
the involuted continuum topology between them.

> > I don't think the device emulates a person, I think the person is just
> > the 1p experience of the device.
> That is a weakness of your theory. You attribute consciousness to
> bodies.

I attribute the nature of a specific instance of consciousness and the
nature of the specific body it correlates to a third attribute -
sense- which is the variance/invariance flux relation between them.

You've seen my diagram, right?


> I believe in consciousness, but bodies are theoretical construction.
> Constructs of minds (not necessarily humans).

I agree with the spirit of this view (and have held this view for many
years myself) but I think that my recent ideas are more particular
about what bodies are and are not. I understand that comp stipulates
that the arithmetic relation in itself gives rise to a simulated
materiality. Bodies become a computed rendering which is automatically
experienced as material by virtue of the relation - ie, the Matrix,
sprite/avatar graphic logic, etc.

I now think, however, that we can better understand the dynamic as not
a computed rendering but an encounter with the de-subjectified set
complement to awareness. Matter is not a computation, matter is
computation itself, as experienced by non-comp. You see what I mean?
So I would not say that matter is theoretical or constructed,
otherwise it would not appear to us as the exact opposite. It is the
presentation of the non-theoretical and unconstructed firmament from
which the set complement of awareness experiences it's reflection.
Think it over. Consider that this is a possible solution - without
converting it to comp first. Start from square zero and run the
hypothesis. In order to come out of the mind/body problem, we have to
exit the door that Descartes entered.

> > I don't think it can have a substitution level because physics cannot
> > be located within mathematics,
> You are right physics cannot be located within mathematics. What I
> have shown is that IF there is a cognitive comp substitution level
> then physics is the border of mathematics (arithmetic, with the usual
> omega-comp, but the relation is more general).
> But the border of arithmetic, when viewed from inside, is beyond both
> math and physics.

Hard to parse, but I don't think that I object?

> > it can only be described, partially, by
> > mathematics. There is no mathematics for the experience of physics.
> Indeed. The LUMs say the same thing.

cool. I seem to be down with the LUMs?

> >>> If we
> >>> had discovered a continent of robots with their own culture, then I
> >>> would agree, we should give them the benefit of the doubt. Since we
> >>> are creating machines from components known to be unconscious which
> >>> show no signs of autopoietic development, I don't see why I would
> >>> want
> >>> to dismiss the differences between living organisms and such
> >>> organized
> >>> inorganisms.
> >> The discovery of the universal machine is, imo, a profound conceptual
> >> reason to do so.
> >> But all the evidences from biology and neurophysiology not only are
> >> in
> >> favor of comp, but even for a rather high substitution level.
> >> And the evidences from physics is that it might not be that high.
> > So you don't see a significant epistemological difference between
> > design and discovery?
> I see it very well.
> Babbage designed a universal machine before discovering its
> mathematical existence.
> Turing discovered its mathematical existence before designing it.

Interesting, but as far as giving the benefit of the doubt, do you
agree that you can assume more about something that you have designed
than something you discover? If I build a house, I know where I put
the fireplace, do I not? If I discover a house on an unexplored
island, what do I know about who lives there?

> >> But you make a strong statement: there is no level at.
> > Not just that there is no level, but that 'level' itself is a
> > quantitative framing of the problem.
> Yes. The level is a quantitative framing. But I think it is an
> ignorance of what is computer or a universal machine which makes you
> think that this automatically eliminate the qualitative truth of the
> person.

I understand that you think that, and it's true that I'm not nearly as
close to 'the trees' as you are in this field (obviously), but I would
say that I don't underestimate the potential of machines to the extent
that you imagine. As I've said, I am on board for the billion tongued
cybernetic orgy, I'm just giving you a view of the forest that I think
you are not seeing as much as you might think. The forest view is that
turning something simple like yellow into an interference pattern
between massive equations is the loooong way around, and will just get
us lost deeper into the trees.

>A brain, or even a cell is already betting implicitly (by
> nature) on a quantitative framing. You can't avoid that without
> introducing special infinities in the picture.

Only the exterior of the brain or cell appears quantitative. It is
quantitative to us because it's not us.

> > I'm stating that I think there is
> > an overlapping range where substitution is most feasible (through
> > music or language for example), but that is the opposite range that
> > can be addressed mathematically.
> ?

The sensorimotive continuum extends from the literal to the
figurative. The literal end is the most object-facing and indirect,
quantified. The figurative end is most subject-facing and direct,

> >> I kill all guru independently of sex, race, religion, origin. The
> >> immaterial and the material one.
> > I'm sure de Sepulveda would find the killing of all heathens
> > acceptable, not just native Americans.
> He would have kill anyone preventing him to get the Indian Gold.

Probably that too.

> >> OK, I am 'poetical too', and alluding to the buddhist motto that you
> >> have to kill all the buddhas when on the spiritual path. It is a way
> >> to say that I try to dismiss all argument by authority. Even nature's
> >> one.
> > How is the illusion of authority to be accounted for then?
> > And the passion to dismiss it?
> I don't dismiss the authorities. Authorities use argument, they never
> use argument by authority.
> Violence, terror and authoritative argument are the argument of those
> who have no faith or confidence.

I can go along with that. Still though I was more after the ontology
of authority itself. How does it arise?

> It might be my english. I love argument by some authority? I dismiss
> argument per authority.

I think I get what you're saying, and I agree - an argument that ends
with 'because I said so' or 'because God said so' isn't an argument.
> > You can't
> > just say 'you cannot use'... the sine qua non evidence of the problem.
> > How is disqualifying that not an argument from authority?
> You can use it like you can divide by zero.
> No problem in poems, but in science it leads to exploding rockets,
> loss of job, crash, trash, or the mockery of the colleagues (in the
> best case).

That's the problem. Contemporary science is in the Dark Ages about
this. Feeling is 'the love that dare not speak it's name'. Heresy.
Apostasy. That's what makes me suspect that I am really onto
something. The new paradigm is going to be birthed in blood
(figuratively I hope). Of course it will be. I'm not professionally
invested in it so I can dare to describe the Emperor's genitals in
detail. I understand completel that others would want to distance
themselves from that particular event horizon/blast radius. The
Emperor still has no clothes though.

> > Hmm. I sort of get that. Arithmetic truth = invariances behind
> > mathematical systems? Could these be feelings? What of addition and
> > multiplication are just abstract representations of the universal
> > sensorimotive qualia of 'more'. + = more and more, x = more (mores)
> Numbers are simpler to understand than universal sensorimotive qualia.

Right, because understanding is the long way around. Qualia are
supposed to be experienced first, understood later - if at all.

> And those qualia light just decribe the human experience of numbers,
> not the numbers.
> If your child asks why is 6 even, you will seek an explanation along
> the lines of 3+3, not along the line of neurophysiology.

But if your child asks what is 'even', you can make a gesture like one
hand weighing something and then the other hand weighing something.
'Even' you can say. And they get that. The idea of being divisible by
two or any other formal definition of even is language. The qualia of
even is more primitive. Parity. Rounded rhythm or cyclic
complementarity to what is 'odd'. The oddest of the odd are 'prime'.
It's a sense we can identify with and use to make sense of other
things. It's just that after we learn the numerical symbols, it's
difficult to get underneath them and remember what they were before we
named them. As hard as reading this sentence without seeing words. We
conflate the numbers with their meaning, but it is the experienced
meaning which is primitive.

> Scientist are like children, they want clear short explanation, and if
> they don't exists, well, they wait you decompose your ideas in short
> comprehensible steps. Numbers are very easy to play with. Indeed it
> takes time for many to understand that actually we don't really know
> about them. It is difficult to understand that the numbers are not
> that easy.

What is it about numbers that makes them appear easy?

> > I don't think I'm a proof guy, but I can give examples. Like how we
> > can move our arm voluntarily without literally thinking a verbal
> > command to our arm to move. If we worked like a comp machine,
> Which one? You talk like if you knew how all machine are working, but
> you might just knew the universal machine below. Even chess player
> machine have evolved, even if they are all running on nand gates, at
> some level. The expression working like a comp machine does betrays
> prejudices or reductionist conception of numbers and machines.

I don't mean to be prejudiced or reductionist about numbers and
machines, I'm just not familiar with the trees - I just know which
forest is on the left and which is on the right.

> Which might be a bit unnerving when the argument pretend to oppose
> your own life work ...
> You might at least try to fake modesty.

Did I mention I have five 'planets in Aries'? Meaning,  I'm not being
immodest, I'm just unaware of any perspective but my own. I'm a
jellyfish. My point in telling others my idea is not to convince them,
its to see if they can see something I haven't thought of.

I think though that your life's work is exceptionally good though, I
just want to add a qualitative mirror to it so that it's explanatory
power and scope is doubled.

> You say you are not a proof man, so don't talk like if it was the case.

Sorry, it's just a matter of expedience. I forget that other people
aren't inside my mind.

> > I think that approach has a particular limit in this case, namely that
> > it restricts all findings to being 'conventional'. There is no
> > possibility of getting behind reason itself, which is a problem
> > because I think it's clear that sense precedes reason.
> I agree with you, but this does not exclude that sense might have
> reasons, on another level or layer of reality.

It's a good point, and I think that it does have reasons on another
layer of reality, but that that layer also has another layer of sense.
It's involuted like a Klein Bottle. The brain is a set of images and
concepts in our minds and experiences. Our experiences are phenomena
facilitated by the brain. Both levels are real and neither is
completely a construction of the other.

> You do have some intuition of the mind, and I know that in each
> universal machine 'head' there is already a conflict between heart and
> reason.
> But I have read the end of the arithmetical novel, and reason and
> heart can live together very well .. in the head of universal machine.
> They does not need to oppose each other, except in practical decisions
> circumstances.

The don't need to oppose each other on one side of the bottom of the
Klein Bottle, but they do on the top.

> > There's still something wrong with the
> > plurality I think. There's only relativism pretending at reality
> > without any sense of weight and significance embodied amongst the
> > plural 1p views. There is no difference between hypnopompic and
> > hypnogogic transitions.
> I don't see any reason why. You might develop.

It's missing the Relativity-Perception escalation. There needs to be a
political sense of orientation, authority, high and low, less and more
not just as impartial symmetry but weighted asymmetry. The involuntary
and unbidden preference of one thing over another. This is what makes
our waking reality more real than our dreaming reality by comparison
from waking but not by comparison from the dream state.

> > Does the theory of qualia claim that it is necessary and inevitable
> > consequence of function?
> The term function is ambiguous. The comp qualia does not rely on
> function. The universal dovetailer generates all possible qualia, and
> compute no function. It is more like a complex self-referential loop
> related to some local relative truth.

It seems shaky to talk about 'generating' with no function. I think I
get what you mean, but I would say 'reveals' or 'presents' rather than

> > I'm not sure I understand. I think of numerology as an interiority of
> > numbers, but what would a non-literal association of purely
> > quantitative relation be?
> The mind of a machine looking inward. When LUMS look inward, they
> discover many things, including incommunicable qualia. They can invent
> terms for those sensations.

How do you know they do that?

> > But what is the view of the Turing machine? What does it care about?
> > What does it struggle with?
> It depends on too many factors. A clever computer is a computer which
> cares about finding a better or more respectful user, or fighting for
> dispensing themselves from the "user imperative".

That just seems anthropomorphized to me. Does the computer care about
semiconductors and electric current?

> >>> Is it an
> >>> invisible sense that somehow arises nonlocally but paradoxically
> >>> remains locally constrained?
> >> Yes.
> > You don't think that could just be projection of our own 1p naive
> > realism view?
> No. because it is counterintuitive. It is the naive realism view which
> is flawed (assuming comp as always).

I think it's naive realism to imagine that a rock with a face on it is
a sentient entity. That would be the intuitive assumption.
Counterintuitive would be to think that the face is only a face
because your subconscious sensorimotive levels associate shapes like
that with faces automatically for you.

> > I think the machine doesn't understand the sentence either.
> You will hardly convince me that machine cannot think, in that way.

I can't resist pointing out a coincidence. The quote 'science is
nothing but a refinement of common Sense' could be reworded, 'science
is nothing but an organized way of interpreting coincidence'. Same

> > Isn't that a philosophical prejudice?
> Not, it is a rule of the science-game.

I tend to lose interest in games quickly.

> > At what point does a machine look inward? Does LET X=X+1 discover non-
> > mechanical enumerables?
> No, "let x = x+1" is a too simple machine. There are two main
> thresholds: universality and löbianity.
> A machine is universal when she can emulate all other machines, and is
> Löbian when she knows that she is universal. All this can be made
> precise technically in computer science.

Very interesting and clarifying. I still think it's anthropomorphic
projection though.

> >>> If
> >>> so, I'm saying that the universe is more than what is true,
> >> It is more than that what can be smelled, felt, observed, proved,
> >> inferred, prayed, ... OK. But more than what is true? I am not sure I
> >> can see what that means.
> > Fiction. Metaphor. The universe is what might be, and it is the wish
> > to be what it is not.
> That is part of the truth.

Your position seems to place the particular fiction of materiality
outside of truth?

> >>> it is also
> >>> what might be true, and what can be made true through motive action.
> >> Yes, but arithmetical reality is rich enough to internalize all the
> >> "might be true". (Assuming comp).
> > If there is something that arithmetic reality is not rich enough to
> > internalize, then reality cannot be reduced to arithmetic.
> OK. But with comp we dont need to go outside arithmetic, because
> arithmetic from inside is already bigger than any outside that we
> could imagine.

I feel the same way about sense. Anything can make sense if it is
experienced. Not everything can be counted.

> > If there is
> > nothing that cannot be reduced to arithmetic then the label arithmetic
> > is a 1004.
> As a label, perhaps. But it is a precise theory of everything: private
> and sharable realities included.

Sense is better. :) Arithmetic may be more practical as far as
cognitive logics, but cognitive logics are limited. Insanity is an
important natural resource.

> > That's why I like sense better than arithmetic. It
> > specifies that the universe is about sense (in every sense), and what
> > is beyond it is non-sense.
> I agree, but the LUMS agree also. That's a first person correct view.
> But we search the 3-TOE.

The 3-TOE is that the 3 and the 1 are different views of the same
thing. Sense.

> The 3-complex is not 1-complete, but the 3-theory explains it has to
> be like that, even for machines.

In all possible universes or just reverse engineered from the logic we
are familiar with?

> > Haha.  No, I'm arguing that there is a difference between oxygen and
> > arsenic that matters to us.
> Due to our contingent clothes.

By that, do you mean the same general idea as PRIF?
> > The difference between life and death. To
> > arithmetic, it's just the difference between 8 and 33.
> You oversimplify. Especially that oxigen and arsenic are infinitely
> complex object in the comp theory.

Simplified sure, but still I'm bringing up the point of
disorientation. Lack of preference. No simulation of non-simulation.
This is the difference between quantity and quality. 1p is stuck being
what it is and what it can sense or make sense of. 3p can't get stuck
being anything in particular. That's why a 3-TOE is only a TOAST
(Theory of all Some Things).

> > How does comp know that they are alive without just defining life as a
> > kind of mathematically animated death?
> Comp does not know that (in your terming). Comp bets on that.

That's the problem. Comp has a choice. Life does not. It's like a
wealthy person choosing to live a life of poverty versus someone is
destitute through no fault of their own. The wealthy person will
always know it was their choice, and that knowledge is a kind of
wealth. The trail of breadcrumbs back to wealth is always potentially
there if they really wanted or needed to get it back. They would know
how to try, who to talk to, where to start. They would know what could
be sacrificed to accomplish that and would not have the same barrier
of fear in doing it.

> >> On the contrary. It is the discovery of lifes and persons in
> >> arithmetic. Consciousness got more than one role (self-speeding up),
> >> rather handy in a jungle where compete an infinity of universal
> >> entity, not all being machines, BTW.
> > Who is a person that has been discovered in arithmetic?
> You, all of us. Even if comp is false, in which case there are zombies.

There are zombies already. Catatonic states. Sleepwalking. Sleep
eating. Sleep driving.

> > But metaphorical and zoological is the antithesis of solid and
> > mathematical. That's the point. If you are doing metaphor literally,
> > you're doing it wrong. It's like saying Church thesis makes limb
> > amputation desirable.
> In the long run we light abandon our bodies, just to be able to move
> at the speed of light, and better explore the realities.

Couldn't we just do that by dying?

> >>>> OK, but to save your point of view you have to put the substitution
> >>>> infinitely low, postulate matter, postulate mind, and postulate
> >>>> some
> >>>> twist, and all this for not baptizing the machine. All this for
> >>>> making
> >>>> us feeling different if not superior. I don't buy that.
> >>> I like 'baptizing the machine'. But no, I don't have a sentimental
> >>> attachment to anthropocentric biology. Believe me, I would like
> >>> nothing more than to be uploaded into a billion tongued sex machine
> >>> that lives forever, but I don't think that it's as simple as
> >>> drawing a
> >>> straight line from Turing to Tchaikovsky.
> >> The reasoning works just from the truth of the comp hypothesis, not
> >> its practical possibility.
> > That's the problem. It is impossible to implement practically because
> > it disqualifies everything besides hypothetical function.
> ?
> There is nothing hypothetical, except the existence of a substitution
> level, which seems the case by looking at biology, physics, etc. It
> will be practical soon enough, but that is another topic.

I think that by locating arithmetic beneath sense, you are making
reality hypothetical. Sense contingent upon the theoretical existence
of numbers (or the concrete existence of what unknowable phenomenon is
represented theoretically as numbers)

> > If there are 1p realities that exist only through the execution of the
> > machine (like the experience of the color of Gamma Rays), how do you
> > know that our phenomena won't encounter the same barrier in being
> > translated from our reality to theory as they would be from theory to
> > machine reality?
> Because we bet the doctor has chosen the right level.
> > Why can't the machine hack into our reality and give
> > us the color of Gamma Rays?
> She might be able to do that, although some amount of luck might be
> needed. It might be true in practice and theory, yet unprovable in
> theory. The theory justifies that you have to pray, here.

Is luck arithmetic?


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