On Aug 18, 9:43 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 17 Aug 2011, at 06:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> > Not sure I understand. Do I hope for this world and therefore it
> > exists to me in a solipsistic way?
> I mean you can hope to be true, but you can never know that you are
> true for sure about anything, except your consciousness.
> Transcendental realities are transcendental, simply.

OK. I thought you were saying something else, like 'thoughts create

> > That may be what physicists believe that they do, but probably in
> > reality they use an intuitive feel from numbers and experience which
> > they describe and communicate as an identity thesis, numbers, etc. The
> > actual understanding is an artifact of cognition and feeling.
> Hmm... I can be OK. But here by identity thesis I mean the brain-mind
> identity thesis? Except the Everettian, most believe that "seeing a
> needle" is due to one needle and one brain, and one experience, when
> comp implies that for one experience there is an infinity of brain,
> and needle. Comp extends Everett on arithmetic.

I would say that seeing the image of a needle may indicate one needle,
one eye, one set of visual processing related areas of one brain, and
an indeterminate number of potential experiences, depending on how the
person feels about the needle, what associations they have, how long
they look at the needle, what else is competing for their attention,
etc. The same can be true if there is no needle, but just a memory or
visualization of a needle.

Switching the 1p and 3p, An actual titanium-steel needle is not going
to see a human being but it may have it's own interiority that is
either isomorphic to our image; a metallic alloy sense that greets
centuries like weeks and knows things like temperature and pressure -
or it could be some crazy 1p reality conjoined with all iron atoms in
the cosmos as a single resonant alien contelligence for billions of
years. Or door number three..

> >> But if the relations are computable the identity thesis break down.
> >> (That is not obvious, but follows from UDA)
> >> So IF we are digitalisable at SOME level, Plato is right. The
> >> measurable numbers of the physicists is only the tip of the reality
> >> iceberg.
> > It's not 'we' who are digitizable, it's just some of our more outward
> > facing activities.
> This, for a mechanist just means the level has not been correctly
> chosen.

What if it's not a level, but an evanescent wave of diminishing

> >>> and sensorimotive rather than electromagnetic,
> >> Electromagnetic is not primitive and sensorimotive is not defined.
> > I'm stating that electromagnetic is primitive. I think it can be seen
> > that ultimately all physical law, when properly reconciled with 1p and
> > 3p perspective, boils down to electromagnetism. Sensorimotive is the
> > experience of sense (discrimination between pattern variance and
> > invariance or 'change') and the experience of motive (to initiate or
> > respond to change). Sensorimotive is the defining ontology of
> > subjecthood.
> I think comp makes not one physical things primitive.

Maybe you're thinking more in terms of transcendentally primitive
(Sense, to me) where as sensorimotive electromagnetism is
existentially primitive.

> >>> but we can
> >>> only imagine the sensorimotive content, unless possibly if we start
> >>> connecting things to our brain tissue directly.
> >>>>> and sensori-motive on the inside,
> >>>> Which is poetry, according to you.
> >>> Even poetry has letters, words, syntax, and grammar.
> >> Sure, but it can't define your term. It can't help someone to see
> >> what
> >> you mean precisely by that.
> > Sensorimotive describes the basic dynamic common to all experience,
> > theoretical or actual. It's the half of the cosmos that is unlike
> > matter and space because it is the experience of matter and space, ie,
> > 'energy' (change) over 'time' (change relating to change). Since it is
> > so universal, it encompasses everything from the most literal
> > sequential sense of classical mechanics (S=Δx/Δt) to the most
> > floridly
> > transcendental and transfigurative timelessness. Sensorimotive is
> > motion and emotion, sense and sensation. They are a single set of
> > phenomena, a coherent ontology of evanescent literalism and cumulative
> > significance.
> That sounds nice, and as far I can make sense of it, the LUMs can
> too ...


> > I don't really get your meaning when you talk about introducing
> > infinities, and only partially get the doctor part of comp. I see how
> > my feelings about what a doctor proposes to do to me is a way of
> > forcing a binary categorization of my idea of the nature of mind/body,
> > but I think that the very binary reduction prejudices the test.
> Ha ! Yes, sure. It is a trap for materialist. No doubt. That's the
> goal: showing an impossibility. That is exactly what comp makes
> possible to do, and it is interesting because it put the finger on the
> real difficulties faced by the Aristotelians with the mind-body problem.
> > My
> > whole point is that mind can be reduced to binary logics on one end of
> > the continuum and that is cannot be reduced in any way at the other
> > end.
> That makes sense. The UDA makes this precise.

sounds promising. It makes it's own imprecision precise or it makes
irreducibility precise?

> >>> Mind and matter are just categories of sense. Sense is the link
> >>> between them, however there are many categories of sense, only
> >>> some of
> >>> which can be described quantitatively.
> >> That's very good, and already intuit in a precise technical sense by
> >> the LUMs.
> >> So this is for me a bit more like a confirmation of comp than a
> >> problem.
> > Thanks. LUMs are Lobian Universal Machines?
> Yes. In honor to Martin Löb, who discovered the placebo phenomena of
> the LUMs: called Löb's theorem. At the modal level, it is the main
> axiom of the logique of self-reference. It says that if you can
> convince a LUM that if [believes in Santa Klaus implies the existence
> of santa Klaus] then, amazingly enough, she will believe in Santa Klaus.
> If the machine can prove Bp -> p, then she can prove p. or, in the
> language of the machine: B(Bp-> p) -> Bp.

Hmm. I don't know enough about it. Why does a LUM have to be

> >>> I'm fine with being a machine, but I'm also an anti-machine made of
> >>> psychic sugar meat.
> >> Excellent! This is the essence of the Aristotle theory of matter,
> >> when
> >> recasted, by Plotinus, in the platonic conception of reality.
> > I have considered myself a Panpsychic Neoplatonist, but that was just
> > an informal guess about where my sentiments lie.
> "Pan" (all)  is never well defined.
> >> Being a machine corresponf to the ability of the "B#"
> >> being an antimachine is related with the ability to intuit ~B# = D#.
> >> That is one of the motivation for getting the logic of the "certain
> >> observable" by Bp & Dt.
> > Me no like symbol notations. Can you translate into English (if you
> > want)?
> Perhaps later. See a bit below. Bp is meant for "the machine believes
> p" when written in the language of the machine. If the machine is a
> theorem prover for arithmetic, Bp is an abbreviation for
> beweisbar('p') with beweisbar the arithmetical provability predicate
> of Gödel, and 'p' is for the Gödel number of p (that is a description
> of p in the language of the machine). The "#" is for any proposition.

That helps. I'll try to figure out more what it means.

> >> You are just mistaken in reifying materiality, I think (and provably
> >> in the comp perspective, but we know that you don't follow it).
> > I don't think that I am reifying materiality. I'm saying that
> > materiality is itself reification. It is like a simulation of non-
> > simulation, only it's not a simulation and it's not exclusively
> > arithmetic - it is a concrete sensorimotive experience of abstract
> > electromagnetic relations (which are arithmetic). Does that help?
> Yes, and again the LUMs can understand, except the particular choice
> of electromagnetism. The laws of physics arise on the border of the
> whole of arithmetic, not just a part of it (assuming comp).
> >> But this makes you miss the role of consciousness and "souls" in the
> >> "creation of matter".
> > Does it? I think that matter is not created, it is experienced.
> Hmm... I partially agree. This might depend on the choice of some
> unimportant definitions.
> > It's
> > just the exterior of 'consciousness'.
> The LUMs agree, and the old Wittgenstein too.
> > On the level of simple 'matter'
> > experiencing matter, I imagine that consciousness=detection. on the
> > molecular level and above it's more like sensation. On the cellular
> > level and up it's more like feeling. On the level of the vertebrate
> > nervous system it's like awareness. On the level of the prefrontal
> > cortex, it is like awareness of awareness, or conscious thought. Each
> > level is a different PRIF. We think about matter, but matter doesn't
> > think about us. It detects us through the matter side of us - our
> > body.
> Hmm... I don't see how you could be sure that sensation appears at the
> molecular level, but then I do not follow your panpsychic idea, which
> does not make too much sense in the comp theory.

'Sensation' as opposed to 'detection' doesn't necessarily appear at
any particular level, it's more like a continuum. Think of the
relation of thought to emotion. Sensation and detection are like that.
I'm just giving a general guide to the spectrum of qualitative tone
tied to physical characteristics.

> >>> A computer in my image is the same machine (or
> >>> nearly so) but it's corresponding anti-machine is logic electronic
> >>> glass.
> >> You just oversimplify your anti-machine idea. You are not trying to
> >> solve the mind body problem, but to block any progress toward a
> >> solution.
> > I think that I have solved the mind body problem.
> Is that not a bit presumptuous?

Presumptuous would be to say that I know that I've solved it ;) I'm
open to being wrong, but someone has to show me why.

> > It's only a problem
> > when the mindbody fails to recognize the relation to bodymind and to
> > honor it's essential unity as well as it's existential polarity and
> > the involuted continuum topology between them.
> Even if that were true (which I doubt as far as I can put sense on
> this) that would solve nothing. On the contrary it seems to me, with
> all my respect, that you put the problem under the rug of very special
> infinities in both mind and matter. It does not solve the hard problem
> of matter (what it is, why does it seem to exist) and the hard problem
> of mind (mainly its relation with matter).

I don't understand what the special infinities you are talking about
are. How can there be a mind/body problem if we understand that the
mind and the body are just the anthropological scale manifestation of
the singularity relating the opposite of itself.

> >>> I don't think the device emulates a person, I think the person is
> >>> just
> >>> the 1p experience of the device.
> >> That is a weakness of your theory. You attribute consciousness to
> >> bodies.
> > I attribute the nature of a specific instance of consciousness and the
> > nature of the specific body it correlates to a third attribute -
> > sense- which is the variance/invariance flux relation between them.
> > You've seen my diagram, right?
> >http://www.stationlink.com/art/SEEmap2.jpg
> That does not help. Sorry.
> >> I believe in consciousness, but bodies are theoretical construction.
> >> Constructs of minds (not necessarily humans).
> > I agree with the spirit of this view (and have held this view for many
> > years myself) but I think that my recent ideas are more particular
> > about what bodies are and are not. I understand that comp stipulates
> > that the arithmetic relation in itself gives rise to a simulated
> > materiality. Bodies become a computed rendering which is automatically
> > experienced as material by virtue of the relation - ie, the Matrix,
> > sprite/avatar graphic logic, etc.
> > I now think, however, that we can better understand the dynamic as not
> > a computed rendering but an encounter with the de-subjectified set
> > complement to awareness. Matter is not a computation, matter is
> > computation itself, as experienced by non-comp. You see what I mean?
> Not really. Especially that with comp, matter is not computable (when
> we observe it below the computational level).
> I can make sense (in comp) of "as experienced by non-comp", because
> the first person cannot be computable (from her correct first person
> point of view).

Right, so when non-comp first person encounters another person, it
encounters the 3p comp exterior of them. That's matter. 3p doesn't
have a point of view. It has no experience of sense-making, it's a-
signifying, generic calculation. Pure quantitative interaction. All of
the feeling is on the inside, where it's warm ;)

> > So I would not say that matter is theoretical or constructed,
> > otherwise it would not appear to us as the exact opposite. It is the
> > presentation of the non-theoretical and unconstructed firmament from
> > which the set complement of awareness experiences it's reflection.
> > Think it over. Consider that this is a possible solution - without
> > converting it to comp first. Start from square zero and run the
> > hypothesis. In order to come out of the mind/body problem, we have to
> > exit the door that Descartes entered.
> Why would we ever do that?

Because it's the other way just goes deeper into recursion. Observing
our observation of our observation of our observation...

> As far as I get your intuition, even on matter, it seems to me to fit
> just quite well with comp, and the LUMs are *already* saying.

You can model the universe with 3p comp as primitive, just as you can
model space and time as spacetime, it just turns the whole thing
inside out. Incredibly useful from an engineering perspective, but it
privileges the computational shadow of consciousness over the semantic
sensorimotive cause of consciousness. I can't blame you if you like
the inside out model better, I'm just saying that it actually is
inside out from a more scientific, impartial point of view.

> What does not fit is your idea that there is some matter (like
> electromagnetism)

electromagnetism is just 3p sensorimotive. The experience of feeling
that we cannot feel what something feels. Feeling of unfeeling.
Intention (motive) resisted without intent.

> that there is some infinite concrete mind, and a metaphorical twist relating 
> them, and this in a way which exclude the
> UMs and LUMs from the party. It is for me as sad as non plausible from
> what we already know.

It's both finite and infinite, mind and matter. The twist is both
literal and metaphorical. UMs and LUMs, if I understand them, only add
to the party. I think comp assumes that it is their party and that we
are merely guests. That to me is sad. If we are going to put up with
all this crap, we at least should be friends with the host. Of course
silicon could host beautiful molecular level experiences that
transcend our own, just not in an animal-feeling way. More in it's own
smooth as telflon grease CGI animation way.

> >> I see it very well.
> >> Babbage designed a universal machine before discovering its
> >> mathematical existence.
> >> Turing discovered its mathematical existence before designing it.
> > Interesting, but as far as giving the benefit of the doubt, do you
> > agree that you can assume more about something that you have designed
> > than something you discover? If I build a house, I know where I put
> > the fireplace, do I not? If I discover a house on an unexplored
> > island, what do I know about who lives there?
> Yes. That is why we can study the theology of simpler LUMs than
> ourselves. We can "design it", but all UMs and LUMs hide others UMs
> and LUMs, like all nameable "god" (anything non Turing emulable) hide
> another nameable god, in the LUM's theology.
> I mean, even if we design a LUM, after awhile we might no mire
> recognize her. They can change themselves a lot. UMs are unknown. LUMs
> are just enough smart to understand that they are UMs.

I haven't really seen that though. I see no indication of artificial
life transcending our expectations of what is logically possible, let
alone physically possible. Patterns can become more complex, but that
complexity is in the eye of the beholder. I don't think a Mandelbrot
set feels like what it looks like to us. It's just one of our
interesting designs.

> >>>> But you make a strong statement: there is no level at.
> >>> Not just that there is no level, but that 'level' itself is a
> >>> quantitative framing of the problem.
> >> Yes. The level is a quantitative framing. But I think it is an
> >> ignorance of what is computer or a universal machine which makes you
> >> think that this automatically eliminate the qualitative truth of the
> >> person.
> > I understand that you think that, and it's true that I'm not nearly as
> > close to 'the trees' as you are in this field (obviously), but I would
> > say that I don't underestimate the potential of machines to the extent
> > that you imagine. As I've said, I am on board for the billion tongued
> > cybernetic orgy, I'm just giving you a view of the forest that I think
> > you are not seeing as much as you might think. The forest view is that
> > turning something simple like yellow into an interference pattern
> > between massive equations is the loooong way around, and will just get
> > us lost deeper into the trees.
> Yellow seems simple to you because you have a brain which do the hard
> work for you.

No, I don't think that is the case. There is no yellow but the yellow
that seems simple. Yellow is simple. 3p Neurology that correlates with
yellow is complex, but that complexity is not much diminished when a
person is not experiencing yellow. I suspect that the neurological
footprint of the difference between yellow and blue is insignificant.

>It is like walking, that seems simple, but we cannot do
> walking biped robots. But there are progress, even for yellow (like
> the discovery that LUMs have a quite reasonable notion of qualia
> attached to them).

Walking is simple - to us. Making something robotic act like it's
walking is very difficult, because that's not how we walk. We walk by
sensorimotive participation, not by detached computation.

> >> A brain, or even a cell is already betting implicitly (by
> >> nature) on a quantitative framing. You can't avoid that without
> >> introducing special infinities in the picture.
> > Only the exterior of the brain or cell appears quantitative. It is
> > quantitative to us because it's not us.
> Exactly. That is whay I will say that I have a brain, like I have a
> heart? Not that I am a brain nor I am a heart.


> > I can go along with that. Still though I was more after the ontology
> > of authority itself. How does it arise?
> That is a vast question, and the answer can vary among the authorities
> we talk about.
> It can arise through work, for a scientist.  Or through stealing the
> work of some others (leading to fake authorities).
> Through corruption for some politicians. Through self-referential
> correctness for the LUMs. Through relative self-referential
> correctness for the average concrete LUMs (relative to its most
> probable computations). It can arise for lack of resource leading to
> higher level of self-organization, or phase transition.

I would say that is what passes for authority in a teleonomy -
dominant as in not recessive genes, but it's not compelling to me at
all that the position that something ends up in - a formula that
proves to be useful, etc, automatically has any teleological
authority. There's nothing to suggests that knowledge knows or cares
if it is knowledgeable.

> >> It might be my english. I love argument by some authority? I dismiss
> >> argument per authority.
> > I think I get what you're saying, and I agree - an argument that ends
> > with 'because I said so' or 'because God said so' isn't an argument.
> Yes.
> >>> You can't
> >>> just say 'you cannot use'... the sine qua non evidence of the
> >>> problem.
> >>> How is disqualifying that not an argument from authority?
> >> You can use it like you can divide by zero.
> >> No problem in poems, but in science it leads to exploding rockets,
> >> loss of job, crash, trash, or the mockery of the colleagues (in the
> >> best case).
> > That's the problem. Contemporary science is in the Dark Ages about
> > this. Feeling is 'the love that dare not speak it's name'. Heresy.
> > Apostasy. That's what makes me suspect that I am really onto
> > something. The new paradigm is going to be birthed in blood
> > (figuratively I hope). Of course it will be. I'm not professionally
> > invested in it so I can dare to describe the Emperor's genitals in
> > detail. I understand completel that others would want to distance
> > themselves from that particular event horizon/blast radius. The
> > Emperor still has no clothes though.
> I agree that we are in the Dark Age, but I'm afraid we propose a
> different remedy.
> You want "poetry" to come back in science, and I want "poetry-and-
> fairy tales" to live theology.

I want science to consider not fictional content (poetry, fairy
tales), but the phenomenology of fiction itself (sensorimotive
perception) as a primitive topology of the cosmos. The cosmos is both
a storyteller and a story that has no teller.

> I think that the human science should be more rigorous, but this would
> mean being more modest. It means adding more interrogation mark, the
> stopping of talking like if we knew something, etc.

Some things we need to realize that we know less about than we think,
other things we should recognize that we understand and experience
more than we can prove scientifically.

> I work for getting theology back in science. With the genuine
> understanding of science, which I admit is not so widespread among
> scientists,  this not make theology more true, but more doubtable and
> criticizable. More humble.
> I think that religion is truth, and science is the only tool (but I
> include the brain in the set of theories, machines, hypotheses, etc.)

Which theology though? Which religion? My view is that we need a new
reconciliation of scientific and gnostic epistemology. A more
enchanted universe and a more scientific self.

> Those who separate religion and science transform religion in a
> mixture of superstition and authoritative arguments, and they
> transform science itself into another pseudo-religion.


> >>> Hmm. I sort of get that. Arithmetic truth = invariances behind
> >>> mathematical systems? Could these be feelings? What of addition and
> >>> multiplication are just abstract representations of the universal
> >>> sensorimotive qualia of 'more'. + = more and more, x = more (mores)
> >> Numbers are simpler to understand than universal sensorimotive
> >> qualia.
> > Right, because understanding is the long way around. Qualia are
> > supposed to be experienced first, understood later - if at all.
> >> And those qualia light just decribe the human experience of numbers,
> >> not the numbers.
> >> If your child asks why is 6 even, you will seek an explanation along
> >> the lines of 3+3, not along the line of neurophysiology.
> > But if your child asks what is 'even', you can make a gesture like one
> > hand weighing something and then the other hand weighing something.
> > 'Even' you can say. And they get that. The idea of being divisible by
> > two or any other formal definition of even is language.
> No. It use language to convey an idea. What if your child ask you that
> question through a phone?

I'm not saying that the child can only learn through non-verbal
gesture, but they are at a disadvantage if they can't be present in
the room with their teacher, and especially if they can't see them.
Explaining 'even' over the phone has to be encoded and decoded into a
second layer of verbal language.

> > The qualia of
> > even is more primitive. Parity. Rounded rhythm or cyclic
> > complementarity to what is 'odd'. The oddest of the odd are 'prime'.
> > It's a sense we can identify with and use to make sense of other
> > things. It's just that after we learn the numerical symbols, it's
> > difficult to get underneath them and remember what they were before we
> > named them.
> Don't tell me. I am (also) a math teacher. But then it is up to me to
> find exercise forcing them to get the idea lying beyond the symbol.

And in doing that, don't you rely upon metaphor of sense/motive

> > What is it about numbers that makes them appear easy?
> That is a mystery. Probably because they are so deep and common in all
> reasonable living circumstances. The number 2 incarnates himself in so
> many thing father/mother, moon/sun, true/false, up/down, left/right,
> east/west, ... my 2 cents!

That's numerology :)

> > I think though that your life's work is exceptionally good though, I
> > just want to add a qualitative mirror to it so that it's explanatory
> > power and scope is doubled.
> Nice. I think we might agree on some fundamental things. The approach
> might be very different. I am an ultra-conservator. Like Xeusippes, I
> think, well perhaps I will not go as far as asking Plato to banish
> Aristotle, but at least to have a good conversation with him. I think
> that metaphysical naturalism is the bullet of the mind-body problem.
> >> You say you are not a proof man, so don't talk like if it was the
> >> case.
> > Sorry, it's just a matter of expedience. I forget that other people
> > aren't inside my mind.
> I'm afraid you are not the only one.
> >>> I think that approach has a particular limit in this case, namely
> >>> that
> >>> it restricts all findings to being 'conventional'. There is no
> >>> possibility of getting behind reason itself, which is a problem
> >>> because I think it's clear that sense precedes reason.
> >> I agree with you, but this does not exclude that sense might have
> >> reasons, on another level or layer of reality.
> > It's a good point, and I think that it does have reasons on another
> > layer of reality, but that that layer also has another layer of sense.
> > It's involuted like a Klein Bottle.
> But this seems to me a bit of 1004, you see. A nice metaphor, but I
> have no clue where the bottle is living. It also does not fit well
> with the comp supervenience thesis which is that you can (quasi-
> conventionnaly) associate a mind to some body, but a mind cannot
> attach itself to *a* body, only to infinities of body. Indeed that is
> how comp will justify the quantum many world. Comp implies a many-
> world internal interpretation of elementary arithmetic.

I'm suspicious of MWI. I think that it works in a sense but the fact
that you already know why someone would find MWI unsatisfying on the
face of it is a bit of a yellow flag. I think that one of the things
that significance does is to collapse redundancy. Perhaps in so doing,
we arrive at a single universe which is multiply coherent, rather than
multiple worlds which have no significance relative to each other.

> > The brain is a set of images and
> > concepts in our minds and experiences. Our experiences are phenomena
> > facilitated by the brain. Both levels are real and neither is
> > completely a construction of the other.
> That is correct. What you might not appreciate is that both are still
> an *emanation* of just the number relation. It makes Pythagoras
> literally true. That is made possible by Church thesis. It is a bit
> technical, but fundamental.

No, I do appreciate that view, and I used to have that view myself,
but lately it seems to me that that the number relation and the sense
relation must be a shared emanation...that is the emanation is the
sharing between those two opposites. If anything, the sense relation
is more primitive. It is not necessary to have any contact with number
to participate in the experience of the cosmos, but it is necessary
for number to make sense to something non-computable for it to be
> >> You do have some intuition of the mind, and I know that in each
> >> universal machine 'head' there is already a conflict between heart
> >> and
> >> reason.
> >> But I have read the end of the arithmetical novel, and reason and
> >> heart can live together very well .. in the head of universal
> >> machine.
> >> They does not need to oppose each other, except in practical
> >> decisions
> >> circumstances.
> > The don't need to oppose each other on one side of the bottom of the
> > Klein Bottle, but they do on the top.
> >>> There's still something wrong with the
> >>> plurality I think. There's only relativism pretending at reality
> >>> without any sense of weight and significance embodied amongst the
> >>> plural 1p views. There is no difference between hypnopompic and
> >>> hypnogogic transitions.
> >> I don't see any reason why. You might develop.
> > It's missing the Relativity-Perception escalation. There needs to be a
> > political sense of orientation, authority, high and low, less and more
> > not just as impartial symmetry but weighted asymmetry. The involuntary
> > and unbidden preference of one thing over another. This is what makes
> > our waking reality more real than our dreaming reality by comparison
> > from waking but not by comparison from the dream state.
> OK.
> >>> Does the theory of qualia claim that it is necessary and inevitable
> >>> consequence of function?
> >> The term function is ambiguous. The comp qualia does not rely on
> >> function. The universal dovetailer generates all possible qualia, and
> >> compute no function. It is more like a complex self-referential loop
> >> related to some local relative truth.
> > It seems shaky to talk about 'generating' with no function. I think I
> > get what you mean, but I would say 'reveals' or 'presents' rather than
> > generates.
> OK.
> >>> I'm not sure I understand. I think of numerology as an interiority
> >>> of
> >>> numbers, but what would a non-literal association of purely
> >>> quantitative relation be?
> >> The mind of a machine looking inward. When LUMS look inward, they
> >> discover many things, including incommunicable qualia. They can
> >> invent
> >> terms for those sensations.
> > How do you know they do that?
> Thanks to the work of Gödel, Löb and Solovay (and others). Gödel has
> discovered that elementary arithmetical theories can "talk" about
> themselves. PA (Peano Arithmetic), which is the best know and studied
> LUM, can prove propositions about the numbers, but also about PA. So
> we can indeed talk with PA about PA's ability to prove things and also
> to infer things, and to know things, to observe things, etc. This is
> made possible by the fact that PA can distinguish by herself the
> difference between truth and provability. I might say more when I have
> more times. In one word, the whole Theaetetus of Plato makes sense for
> PA (and for all LUMs), and makes it possible to grasp that PA is about
> as intelligent and concious than you and me.
> It makes me feel that the singularity is in the past, and what people
> call "singularity" is not the point where machine will be as claver as
> human, but when they will be as stupid as humans. This is almost a
> comp law: competence leads to stupidity. By programming the computers,
> we make their soul falling from heaven to earth.

It's compelling to an extent. I am aware of Gödel and incompleteness
to the extent that I can at least have an idea where that trail might
lead. Also I recognize that for every sense there is a computational
correlate such that the depth of awareness over time is expressed as
complexity across space , however, if the computation is not driven by
it's own interior sense but is instead lead by the nose of
programmatic axioms, I don't see that the resulting phenomena would be
a digitally embodied spirit, but a mystic oracle along the lines of a
massively elaborate I Ching.

Oracles are quite interesting, and the voices that they reveal are
somewhat orthogonal to human consciousness. Such a thing would have
interesting things to say, I'm sure, but I don't think they can be
held responsible for what they are saying. I think that they present
non-random refractions of the total psyche, such that precognitive
advice and other kinds of trans-personal information can be acquired,
but I would be very surprised if this information, like all prophetic
divination, is not contaminated with shadow advice. Just because
something can tell the truth doesn't mean that it has to or wants to.
> >>> But what is the view of the Turing machine? What does it care about?
> >>> What does it struggle with?
> >> It depends on too many factors. A clever computer is a computer which
> >> cares about finding a better or more respectful user, or fighting for
> >> dispensing themselves from the "user imperative".
> > That just seems anthropomorphized to me. Does the computer care about
> > semiconductors and electric current?
> They have a priori no idea that this exist, like the pre-historical
> human did not knew anything about neurons.
> Only those machines accepting a job in the semiconductors and electric
> current industries might develop knowledge of that type, a priori.
> We could build a self-referential circuitry, but even nature put the
> self-reference at a higher level. I don't feel my neurons, and I have
> a vague idea that I have a tummy when I eat too much cheese, but
> that's all. The same will appear with machine, they will not know how
> they are working at the circuitry level.

So if we don't know about neurons, and the computer doesn't know about
semiconductors, then what does? Why doesn't the mechanics of the
machine itself have a soul and a life?

> >>>>> Is it an
> >>>>> invisible sense that somehow arises nonlocally but paradoxically
> >>>>> remains locally constrained?
> >>>> Yes.
> >>> You don't think that could just be projection of our own 1p naive
> >>> realism view?
> >> No. because it is counterintuitive. It is the naive realism view
> >> which
> >> is flawed (assuming comp as always).
> > I think it's naive realism to imagine that a rock with a face on it is
> > a sentient entity.
> We certainly agree with that.
> > That would be the intuitive assumption.
> > Counterintuitive would be to think that the face is only a face
> > because your subconscious sensorimotive levels associate shapes like
> > that with faces automatically for you.
> >>> I think the machine doesn't understand the sentence either.
> >> You will hardly convince me that machine cannot think, in that way.
> > I can't resist pointing out a coincidence. The quote 'science is
> > nothing but a refinement of common Sense' could be reworded, 'science
> > is nothing but an organized way of interpreting coincidence'. Same
> > thing.
> But is a bit more than this, with comp. I mean sometimes happening are
> not coincidence, and that is what lead us to a possibility (only) to
> organize some interpretation of "coincidence". When Amstrong put his
> foot on the moon, the moon was there! That was *probably* not a
> coincidence. The moon, Amstrong, the LEM, the computers in the LEM,
> and the humans on earth, do seem to have shared some computations.

That I explain by observing that the moon, Armstrong's foot, the LEM,
the computers in the LEM, and the humans on Earth all extend into the
same overlapping PRIF - that of material bodies of a similar density.

> >>> Isn't that a philosophical prejudice?
> >> Not, it is a rule of the science-game.
> > I tend to lose interest in games quickly.
> Me too (actually). I am patient on many things, but not with game (nor
> really concrete computer). But I love theoretical computer science and
> theoretical game theory.
> >>> At what point does a machine look inward? Does LET X=X+1 discover
> >>> non-
> >>> mechanical enumerables?
> >> No, "let x = x+1" is a too simple machine. There are two main
> >> thresholds: universality and löbianity.
> >> A machine is universal when she can emulate all other machines, and
> >> is
> >> Löbian when she knows that she is universal. All this can be made
> >> precise technically in computer science.
> > Very interesting and clarifying. I still think it's anthropomorphic
> > projection though.
> I accept the very well shared theory of knowledge. I know that you
> don't like symbols, but it is simpler for me, for you (really), and
> for my fingers who have to type those symbols. So let me give you the
> classical theory of knowledge. Let write (abbreviate) "I know p" by
> Kp. And "implies" by "->". It is the classical implication, which
> works in platonia, so that A -> B, really just means that either A is
> false, or B is true. You cannot have A without B.
> Kp -> p    ( I know p implies p)
> Kp -> KKp   (I know p implies that I know that I know p)
> (Kp & K(p -> q))  -> Kq     ( I know p, and I know (p -> q) implies I
> know q  (platonistic knower: he know the consequence of its knowledge:
> this is unrealist for human and AI, but it simplifies the long term
> work of the philosopher and theologian).
> The "K" of the Löbian machine is captured by the "provability of the
> machine" (that Gödel has successfully translated in the language of
> arithmetic) + the Theaetical condition that p is true (which is NOT
> possibly representable in the language of the machine (but she can do
> it indirectly at the meta-level by betting on approximation of truth).
> So when I say that he machine has opinion p; it just means that the
> machine asserts, one day, or another, p. If I say that she know p. It
> means that she asserted p, and that p is true.
> There is no anthropomorphic projection. We just agree with the
> classical theory of knowledge, and I apply (naively?) Dennet's
> intentional stance toward the machine: if she told me 1+2=3, I will
> assume that "1+2=3" is among her opinion.
> I restrict myself to ideally correct and honest LUMs, like PA and ZF.

Thanks for explaining. It's interesting but I am more looking at
taking the Cartesian approach further, so that rather than reducing
experience to gated logics and assuming that it is primitive, the
approach that leads to an understanding of awareness is one that seeks
to question all forms of patter recognition.

 it seems more truthful to admit that the fundamentals of experience -
our own experience of life in fact, tends to begin and end in an
irrational twilight rather than 1+2=3 opinions. Both extremes have
significance, but I don't think that one is more primitive.
Geometrically ordered molecular relations from amorphous mineral
deposits, which in turn are re-informed through air and water to
become geometrically ordered transparent crystals.

> >>>>> If
> >>>>> so, I'm saying that the universe is more than what is true,
> >>>> It is more than that what can be smelled, felt, observed, proved,
> >>>> inferred, prayed, ... OK. But more than what is true? I am not
> >>>> sure I
> >>>> can see what that means.
> >>> Fiction. Metaphor. The universe is what might be, and it is the wish
> >>> to be what it is not.
> >> That is part of the truth.
> > Your position seems to place the particular fiction of materiality
> > outside of truth?
> Yes. I know that this is curious, but matter is outside truth, even
> outside being. This is really a consequence of comp, but it is shared
> by Plotinus. In a sense in Plotinus, God and Matter don't exist. They
> are outside the realm of the relative beings, which belongs to the
> Noùs, the realm of the (divine) intellect. God exists, to be sure, and
> matter too, but they are transcendent to the intelligible and the
> observable. They are invisible, even if it will appears that the
> universal soul "has already a foot in that matter", which can
> accelerate the fall, and not help the coming back to God.

I get that, and I can relate to that, but the idea that the beliefs of
a machine should be part of the 'truth' while the physical presence of
a block of iron is not part of truth, throws up a yellow flag to me.
It seems to make more sense the other way around, at least from a
phenomenological perspective rather than a noumenal one. I think that
if matter doesn't exist, then the word existence is probably not a

> In Plotinus, and arguably in the Timaeus and Parmenides of Plato,
> Matter is where God lose control. It is What God can't determinate. It
> is God's blindspot. And it has inintelligible properties (the sensible
> one).

I think it's just awareness' blind spot. We feel that matter does not
feel us. As opposed to music, which we can believe understands how we
feel. If I was going to have a God, it would be matter as well.

> >>>>> it is also
> >>>>> what might be true, and what can be made true through motive
> >>>>> action.
> >>>> Yes, but arithmetical reality is rich enough to internalize all the
> >>>> "might be true". (Assuming comp).
> >>> If there is something that arithmetic reality is not rich enough to
> >>> internalize, then reality cannot be reduced to arithmetic.
> >> OK. But with comp we dont need to go outside arithmetic, because
> >> arithmetic from inside is already bigger than any outside that we
> >> could imagine.
> > I feel the same way about sense. Anything can make sense if it is
> > experienced. Not everything can be counted.
> Here comp introduced a key nuance between what is not countable, even
> by God, and why is not countable by the finite creature. And there are
> many intermediate gods and realities, with corresponding notion of
> countability. it is very rich, but the main one are the God and "man"
> countability notion.
> Almost all non trivial machine's property are God-countable, but not
> "Man"-countable.
> By God I just mean Arithmetical Truth, and by "man" I means UMs and
> LUMs.

But if all properties are sensible, whether or not they are countable,
then sense is the greater infinity?

> >>> If there is
> >>> nothing that cannot be reduced to arithmetic then the label
> >>> arithmetic
> >>> is a 1004.
> >> As a label, perhaps. But it is a precise theory of everything:
> >> private
> >> and sharable realities included.
> > Sense is better. :) Arithmetic may be more practical as far as
> > cognitive logics, but cognitive logics are limited. Insanity is an
> > important natural resource.
> That is about the first things the LUMS told me: If I am consistent
> then it is consistent that I say BS.
> Well, I would nuance you and use inconsistency instead of insanity.
> Insanity leads to asylum only.

Insanity doesn't always last forever. It can bring enlightenment in
it's wake.

>Inconsistency leads to a vast variety
> of creative catastrophes, and there are evidence that nature plays
> with that. I don't know, about our physical reality, when the first
> lie has been made. Perhaps at the big bang, or even much before, I
> really have no idea.
> >>> That's why I like sense better than arithmetic. It
> >>> specifies that the universe is about sense (in every sense), and
> >>> what
> >>> is beyond it is non-sense.
> >> I agree, but the LUMS agree also. That's a first person correct view.
> >> But we search the 3-TOE.
> > The 3-TOE is that the 3 and the 1 are different views of the same
> > thing. Sense.
> No problem with that. In the 3-TOE which can be isolated from comp,
> and which can be taken as just elementary arithmetic (RA, a UM which
> is not a LUM), the 1-views and the 3-views are different views of
> arithmetic. But the computer science constrained enrich the picture,
> for there are 8 views: the three primary one 0-view (gods "view"), 1-
> view (the usual 3-view, the intelligible one), the 3-view (the usual 1-
> view, the soul, the person, the subject), and the two material
> hypostases (the intelligible matter= the observable view), and the
> sensible matter (the feelings and sensations).
> All that are ways the internal LUM in arithmetic can view arithmetic
> from inside.

Hmm. It seems very abstract and hypothetical to me.

> >> The 3-complex is not 1-complete, but the 3-theory explains it has to
> >> be like that, even for machines.
> > In all possible universes or just reverse engineered from the logic we
> > are familiar with?
> In all realities accessible by machines. Gods are not more powerful
> with that respect, but the "God" (truth) is far different.
> >>> Haha.  No, I'm arguing that there is a difference between oxygen and
> >>> arsenic that matters to us.
> >> Due to our contingent clothes.
> > By that, do you mean the same general idea as PRIF?
> Define PRIF with more precision, and I will see if I do something :)

Perceptual-Relativity Inertial Frame is the gestalt coherence which
groups together separate bodies (on the space and matter side) and
separate experiential conditions (on the energy and time side) so that
they make internally consistent sense. It is the principle of locality
and temporality which literally defines here and now (literally and

> >>> The difference between life and death. To
> >>> arithmetic, it's just the difference between 8 and 33.
> >> You oversimplify. Especially that oxigen and arsenic are infinitely
> >> complex object in the comp theory.
> > Simplified sure, but still I'm bringing up the point of
> > disorientation. Lack of preference. No simulation of non-simulation.
> > This is the difference between quantity and quality. 1p is stuck being
> > what it is and what it can sense or make sense of. 3p can't get stuck
> > being anything in particular. That's why a 3-TOE is only a TOAST
> > (Theory of all Some Things).
> Why? No a 3-TOE, if it works well should be able to explain as much as
> possible the 1-reality.

The 1 and the 3 overlap but they also underlap, otherwise they would
not be different. The 1 is private and privacy cannot be explained in
the 3 reality (hence no Cartesian theater or tiny tv sets in the
visual cortex).

> >>> How does comp know that they are alive without just defining life
> >>> as a
> >>> kind of mathematically animated death?
> >> Comp does not know that (in your terming). Comp bets on that.
> > That's the problem. Comp has a choice. Life does not. It's like a
> > wealthy person choosing to live a life of poverty versus someone is
> > destitute through no fault of their own. The wealthy person will
> > always know it was their choice, and that knowledge is a kind of
> > wealth. The trail of breadcrumbs back to wealth is always potentially
> > there if they really wanted or needed to get it back. They would know
> > how to try, who to talk to, where to start. They would know what could
> > be sacrificed to accomplish that and would not have the same barrier
> > of fear in doing it.
> I am not sure I follow you.

I'm saying that the reason that there is no substitute for experience
is not just that you can access more sense than you can through
understanding a theory, but also that because you cannot access more
than the the sense available to you. The feeling of reality is one and
the same with the feeling of not being able to truly escape it's
consequences. That cannot be reproduced theoretically or
computationally. You can always reboot or stop the program.
> >>>> On the contrary. It is the discovery of lifes and persons in
> >>>> arithmetic. Consciousness got more than one role (self-speeding
> >>>> up),
> >>>> rather handy in a jungle where compete an infinity of universal
> >>>> entity, not all being machines, BTW.
> >>> Who is a person that has been discovered in arithmetic?
> >> You, all of us. Even if comp is false, in which case there are
> >> zombies.
> > There are zombies already. Catatonic states. Sleepwalking. Sleep
> > eating. Sleep driving.
> Come on. I talk, like Stathis, about philosophical zombie. They behave
> exactly like a human being, but have no private experience at all.

The states I mention have very little private experience, so it's
really not a problem for me to imagine a walking coma induced by brain
replacement. I agree that they wouldn't 'behave exactly like a human
being' in the sense you intend it, but really that doesn't mean much,
since behaving like a catatonic human being is pretty easy for a
machine to accomplish. It's the weapon metaphor. Human consciousness
is just a more powerful and dangerous weapon than computer, which has
the weapon magnitude more along the lines of a pillow. I catatonic
person is one who has been reduced to something more like a pillow.

> >>> But metaphorical and zoological is the antithesis of solid and
> >>> mathematical. That's the point. If you are doing metaphor literally,
> >>> you're doing it wrong. It's like saying Church thesis makes limb
> >>> amputation desirable.
> >> In the long run we light abandon our bodies, just to be able to move
> >> at the speed of light, and better explore the realities.
> > Couldn't we just do that by dying?
> Yes, but it is illegal, and not nice for your friends. Smoke salvia if
> you want explore that kind of shortcuts. It is legal where you are. Be
> careful and start from low dose. Do the contrary of what most people
> do on YouTube!

I preferred nitrous oxide in my day. Salvia looks too sloppy and
awkward to me.

> But with comp, we can extend the samsara by will, and this is what we
> do on this planet since the beginning. No need to jump in the Nirvana
> so quickly.
> >>>>>> OK, but to save your point of view you have to put the
> >>>>>> substitution
> >>>>>> infinitely low, postulate matter, postulate mind, and postulate
> >>>>>> some
> >>>>>> twist, and all this for not baptizing the machine. All this for
> >>>>>> making
> >>>>>> us feeling different if not superior. I don't buy that.
> >>>>> I like 'baptizing the machine'. But no, I don't have a sentimental
> >>>>> attachment to anthropocentric biology. Believe me, I would like
> >>>>> nothing more than to be uploaded into a billion tongued sex
> >>>>> machine
> >>>>> that lives forever, but I don't think that it's as simple as
> >>>>> drawing a
> >>>>> straight line from Turing to Tchaikovsky.
> >>>> The reasoning works just from the truth of the comp hypothesis, not
> >>>> its practical possibility.
> >>> That's the problem. It is impossible to implement practically
> >>> because
> >>> it disqualifies everything besides hypothetical function.
> >> ?
> >> There is nothing hypothetical, except the existence of a substitution
> >> level, which seems the case by looking at biology, physics, etc. It
> >> will be practical soon enough, but that is another topic.
> > I think that by locating arithmetic beneath sense, you are making
> > reality hypothetical.
> That is an advantage. Precise and hypothetical. Refutable.

True, but it has disadvantages as well. Dissociated and clinical.
Meaningless. (cue 'Supertramp - The Logical Song')

> > Sense contingent upon the theoretical existence
> > of numbers (or the concrete existence of what unknowable phenomenon is
> > represented theoretically as numbers)
> Mathematician can study the effect of set of unknowable things. That
> is the beauty of what LUMs discover inside their "head", not just a
> big Ignorance, but that the Ignorance has a topology, a geometry, a
> lot of unexpected feature.

Hopefully it isn't an unfathomably malignant and cunning evil seeking
to evacuate the souls of unsuspecting scientists who are all too
willing to trade their humanity for a chance to peek into an abyss of
empty calculation from which there is no escape. ;)

This is sort of a picture of thatt: 
The dark side of comp - an anti-shaman, conjuring disorder and mayhem
from the a-signifying void. That's what I see anyhow. Curious if you
have a different Rorschach reading of it.

> >>> If there are 1p realities that exist only through the execution of
> >>> the
> >>> machine (like the experience of the color of Gamma Rays), how do you
> >>> know that our phenomena won't encounter the same barrier in being
> >>> translated from our reality to theory as they would be from theory
> >>> to
> >>> machine reality?
> >> Because we bet the doctor has chosen the right level.
> >>> Why can't the machine hack into our reality and give
> >>> us the color of Gamma Rays?
> >> She might be able to do that, although some amount of luck might be
> >> needed. It might be true in practice and theory, yet unprovable in
> >> theory. The theory justifies that you have to pray, here.
> > Is luck arithmetic?
> It is not 3-arithmetic
> It is 1-arithmetic.

I agree with that.


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