On Aug 20, 12:16 pm, Bruno Marchal <> wrote:

> > Thanks for explaining. It's interesting but I am more looking at
> > taking the Cartesian approach further, so that rather than reducing
> > experience to gated logics and assuming that it is primitive, the
> > approach that leads to an understanding of awareness is one that seeks
> > to question all forms of patter recognition.
> The theory of knowledge above is not comp dependent. Indeed it has  
> been used by many to refute comp. But then incompleteness makes the  
> Theatetical definition of knowledge working for machine, and refuting  
> those refutations.
> > it seems more truthful to admit that the fundamentals of experience -
> > our own experience of life in fact, tends to begin and end in an
> > irrational twilight rather than 1+2=3 opinions.
> Hmm...
> > Both extremes have
> > significance, but I don't think that one is more primitive.
> At the epistemological level, but for a theory it is better to start  
> from what we understand, or at least agree. If not people stop reading  
> your contribution. Well, even if rational they can stop, in this  
> field. It touches taboo, and if you are not clear, you will attract  
> wishful thinking people only (which can help for money, but nor for  
> genuine progress).

That's the hard part about a massive paradigm shift. It doesn't come
around more than once in many lifetimes. We have no first hand
experience with what it's like so we imagine that it's some far off
thing in the past which we have long outgrown, and that surely our
most settled points of science are beyond questioning.

It would be great to have this theory bridge to our previous
worldview, but I'm not personally qualified to do that. If I can't
find anyone interested in it who would be qualified, then eventually I
might try to do it myself, but really it's better if someone like a
modern day Feynman would translate it themselves.

> > Geometrically ordered molecular relations from amorphous mineral
> > deposits, which in turn are re-informed through air and water to
> > become geometrically ordered transparent crystals.
> >>>>>>> If
> >>>>>>> so, I'm saying that the universe is more than what is true,
> >>>>>> It is more than that what can be smelled, felt, observed, proved,
> >>>>>> inferred, prayed, ... OK. But more than what is true? I am not
> >>>>>> sure I
> >>>>>> can see what that means.
> >>>>> Fiction. Metaphor. The universe is what might be, and it is the  
> >>>>> wish
> >>>>> to be what it is not.
> >>>> That is part of the truth.
> >>> Your position seems to place the particular fiction of materiality
> >>> outside of truth?
> >> Yes. I know that this is curious, but matter is outside truth, even
> >> outside being. This is really a consequence of comp, but it is shared
> >> by Plotinus. In a sense in Plotinus, God and Matter don't exist. They
> >> are outside the realm of the relative beings, which belongs to the
> >> Noùs, the realm of the (divine) intellect. God exists, to be sure,  
> >> and
> >> matter too, but they are transcendent to the intelligible and the
> >> observable. They are invisible, even if it will appears that the
> >> universal soul "has already a foot in that matter", which can
> >> accelerate the fall, and not help the coming back to God.
> > I get that, and I can relate to that, but the idea that the beliefs of
> > a machine should be part of the 'truth' while the physical presence of
> > a block of iron is not part of truth, throws up a yellow flag to me.
> > It seems to make more sense the other way around, at least from a
> > phenomenological perspective rather than a noumenal one. I think that
> > if matter doesn't exist, then the word existence is probably not a
> > word.
> The wholepoint of Plato, seconded by the UMs and LUMs is that  
> "seeming" can be a delusion.

Then it follows that ("seeming" can be a delusion) can also be a
delusion. All we have is seeming and seeming correlations of seeming.
See if this grabs you any more than the SEE diagram.
(based on some discussions I had with Stephen last week).

> >> In Plotinus, and arguably in the Timaeus and Parmenides of Plato,
> >> Matter is where God lose control. It is What God can't determinate.  
> >> It
> >> is God's blindspot. And it has inintelligible properties (the  
> >> sensible
> >> one).
> > I think it's just awareness' blind spot. We feel that matter does not
> > feel us. As opposed to music, which we can believe understands how we
> > feel.
> That is a play with words.

It is more of a metaphorical truth, yes, but we do feel that music can
address us in an interior way that gross material substance does not.
Matter that has been sculpted into significance, refined as
architecture, furniture, automobiles etc - styled with subjective
enthusiasm - that turns matter into a text of cultural anthropology,
as is music and words.

> > If I was going to have a God, it would be matter as well.
> Like Aristotle. I don't not follow you on this, but it is coherent  
> with comp. If you want stuffy (ontologically primary) matter, then you  
> need to abandon comp.

It doesn't have to be ontologically primary, but it is an
ontologically primary appearance, so what is really the difference?
Either way matter is on the same level as mind. Even if we can create
matter through the experience of mathematical agreements and/or
dissociations and/or the fluxes of fluxes of fluxed between them, mind
cannot create matter within it's own PRIF. I can't make matter with my
mind - even in my own brain. Not matter that I can choose anyways. My
brain can make matter, and it does so all the time. Neurotransmitters,
etc. My body makes matter too. So if there's no ontological difference
between mind and matter, why can I not produce a single molecule in
the world outside my body through force of will alone?

> >>>>>>> it is also
> >>>>>>> what might be true, and what can be made true through motive
> >>>>>>> action.
> >>>>>> Yes, but arithmetical reality is rich enough to internalize all  
> >>>>>> the
> >>>>>> "might be true". (Assuming comp).
> >>>>> If there is something that arithmetic reality is not rich enough  
> >>>>> to
> >>>>> internalize, then reality cannot be reduced to arithmetic.
> >>>> OK. But with comp we dont need to go outside arithmetic, because
> >>>> arithmetic from inside is already bigger than any outside that we
> >>>> could imagine.
> >>> I feel the same way about sense. Anything can make sense if it is
> >>> experienced. Not everything can be counted.
> >> Here comp introduced a key nuance between what is not countable, even
> >> by God, and why is not countable by the finite creature. And there  
> >> are
> >> many intermediate gods and realities, with corresponding notion of
> >> countability. it is very rich, but the main one are the God and "man"
> >> countability notion.
> >> Almost all non trivial machine's property are God-countable, but not
> >> "Man"-countable.
> >> By God I just mean Arithmetical Truth, and by "man" I means UMs and
> >> LUMs.
> > But if all properties are sensible, whether or not they are countable,
> > then sense is the greater infinity?
> Why would all properties be sensible?

Because if you can't be detected in any way, what is it a property of?

> >>>>> If there is
> >>>>> nothing that cannot be reduced to arithmetic then the label
> >>>>> arithmetic
> >>>>> is a 1004.
> >>>> As a label, perhaps. But it is a precise theory of everything:
> >>>> private
> >>>> and sharable realities included.
> >>> Sense is better. :) Arithmetic may be more practical as far as
> >>> cognitive logics, but cognitive logics are limited. Insanity is an
> >>> important natural resource.
> >> That is about the first things the LUMS told me: If I am consistent
> >> then it is consistent that I say BS.
> >> Well, I would nuance you and use inconsistency instead of insanity.
> >> Insanity leads to asylum only.
> > Insanity doesn't always last forever. It can bring enlightenment in
> > it's wake.
> >> Inconsistency leads to a vast variety
> >> of creative catastrophes, and there are evidence that nature plays
> >> with that. I don't know, about our physical reality, when the first
> >> lie has been made. Perhaps at the big bang, or even much before, I
> >> really have no idea.
> >>>>> That's why I like sense better than arithmetic. It
> >>>>> specifies that the universe is about sense (in every sense), and
> >>>>> what
> >>>>> is beyond it is non-sense.
> >>>> I agree, but the LUMS agree also. That's a first person correct  
> >>>> view.
> >>>> But we search the 3-TOE.
> >>> The 3-TOE is that the 3 and the 1 are different views of the same
> >>> thing. Sense.
> >> No problem with that. In the 3-TOE which can be isolated from comp,
> >> and which can be taken as just elementary arithmetic (RA, a UM which
> >> is not a LUM), the 1-views and the 3-views are different views of
> >> arithmetic. But the computer science constrained enrich the picture,
> >> for there are 8 views: the three primary one 0-view (gods "view"), 1-
> >> view (the usual 3-view, the intelligible one), the 3-view (the  
> >> usual 1-
> >> view, the soul, the person, the subject), and the two material
> >> hypostases (the intelligible matter= the observable view), and the
> >> sensible matter (the feelings and sensations).
> >> All that are ways the internal LUM in arithmetic can view arithmetic
> >> from inside.
> > Hmm. It seems very abstract and hypothetical to me.
> It is not. It is concrete like 0, 1, 2, 3, and it follows from the las  
> of addition and multiplication. The rest are definitions, that you can  
> change, ameliorate, etc.

To me 0, 1, 2, 3 are the height of abstraction. I can't eat a '3'.

> > I'm saying that the reason that there is no substitute for experience
> > is not just that you can access more sense than you can through
> > understanding a theory, but also that because you cannot access more
> > than the the sense available to you. The feeling of reality is one and
> > the same with the feeling of not being able to truly escape it's
> > consequences.
> I can agree.
> > That cannot be reproduced theoretically or
> > computationally.
> I think there are the best candidates for doing that.

I think that replication and exploration would be better.

> > You can always reboot or stop the program.
> You can't compare a 100 years old program with a billiard years old  
> program (or engram).
> >>>>>> On the contrary. It is the discovery of lifes and persons in
> >>>>>> arithmetic. Consciousness got more than one role (self-speeding
> >>>>>> up),
> >>>>>> rather handy in a jungle where compete an infinity of universal
> >>>>>> entity, not all being machines, BTW.
> >>>>> Who is a person that has been discovered in arithmetic?
> >>>> You, all of us. Even if comp is false, in which case there are
> >>>> zombies.
> >>> There are zombies already. Catatonic states. Sleepwalking. Sleep
> >>> eating. Sleep driving.
> >> Come on. I talk, like Stathis, about philosophical zombie. They  
> >> behave
> >> exactly like a human being, but have no private experience at all.
> > The states I mention have very little private experience, so it's
> > really not a problem for me to imagine a walking coma induced by brain
> > replacement. I agree that they wouldn't 'behave exactly like a human
> > being' in the sense you intend it, but really that doesn't mean much,
> > since behaving like a catatonic human being is pretty easy for a
> > machine to accomplish. It's the weapon metaphor. Human consciousness
> > is just a more powerful and dangerous weapon than computer, which has
> > the weapon magnitude more along the lines of a pillow. I catatonic
> > person is one who has been reduced to something more like a pillow.
> My point is that, by definition of philosophical zombie, they behave  
> like normal and sane human being. It is not walking coma, or catatonic  
> behavior. It is full human behavior. A zombie might write a book on  
> consciousness, or have a diary of his dreams reports.

A movie can feature an actress writing a book on consciousness or
doing anything else that can be demonstrated audiovisually. How is
that not a zombie? If you make it a 3D-hologram of an actress, with
odorama and VR touchback tactile interfaces, then is it a zombie? If
you connect this thing up to a GPS instead of a cinematically scripted
liturgy and put it in an information kiosk, does it become a zombie
then? I don't see much of a difference. It's still just a facade which
reflects our human sense rather than the sense of an autonomous logic
which transcends programming. Even if it's really fancy programming,
it's experience has no connection with us. It's a cypher that only
intersects our awareness through it's rear end, upon which we have
drawn a face.

> >> That is an advantage. Precise and hypothetical. Refutable.
> > True, but it has disadvantages as well. Dissociated and clinical.
> So you say.
> > Meaningless. (cue 'Supertramp - The Logical Song')
> So you say.

Right. These qualities cannot be proved from 3-p. Meaning and feeling
are not literal and existential. If they don't insist for you, then
you don't feel them.

> >>> Sense contingent upon the theoretical existence
> >>> of numbers (or the concrete existence of what unknowable  
> >>> phenomenon is
> >>> represented theoretically as numbers)
> >> Mathematician can study the effect of set of unknowable things. That
> >> is the beauty of what LUMs discover inside their "head", not just a
> >> big Ignorance, but that the Ignorance has a topology, a geometry, a
> >> lot of unexpected feature.
> > Hopefully it isn't an unfathomably malignant and cunning evil seeking
> > to evacuate the souls of unsuspecting scientists who are all too
> > willing to trade their humanity for a chance to peek into an abyss of
> > empty calculation from which there is no escape. ;)
> Comp does the contary of evacuating soul. It reinstall soul in  
> arithmetic, in a precise and testable way.

I'm ok with that, but I think that it's not a universal soul, it's
just the wireframe map of the logic of soul.

> > This is sort of a picture of 
> > thatt:
> Don't confuse a theory with the popular human perceptions of that  
> theory, especially in a context where a form of obscurantism prevails  
> since a long time.

That picture is more of an oracle. I discovered it in the mural I did
by mirroring the far Occidental side. It was unintentional, but I
think it communicates something about the dangers of computational
extremism. To me anyways.

> > The dark side of comp - an anti-shaman, conjuring disorder and mayhem
> > from the a-signifying void. That's what I see anyhow. Curious if you
> > have a different Rorschach reading of it.
> I can see something dark in the picture, but it is not related to  
> comp. Of course some humans can do dark thing with anything, but that  
> is not the fault of comp (or just in the sense that comp allows  
> freewill and freedom)

Yeah, I was just curious to see whether it looked more optimistic and
bright to your mind.


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