On Sat, Aug 20, 2011 at 7:02 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi <use...@rudnyi.ru> wrote:
> Trying to remember where I have seen the statement about Dennett, I have > made search on Google. > > Two findings (both are not my source though): > > 1) Is Daniel Dennett a zombie? > > Discussion on ephilosopher.com where the question, I believe is close to > the statement that I have seen. > > "This is not completely serious, but is the crux of my question. It bothers > me that his and other reductionist theories of consciousness are completely > denying any phenomenology. It doesn't sit well with me because I am pretty > convinced that I have one. Now, Dennett would be the first to say that it > just 'seems' to me that I have a phenomenology but that is the point isn't > it? If it seems to me then I have it. How can anyone think otherwise?? Are > theere real zombies out there and is Dennett one of them?" > > http://www.ephilosopher.com/**philosophy-forums/metaphysics-** > and-epistemology/is-daniel-**dennett-a-zombie?/<http://www.ephilosopher.com/philosophy-forums/metaphysics-and-epistemology/is-daniel-dennett-a-zombie?/> > > 2) COULD DANIEL DENNETT BE A ZOMBIE? by Mike Kearns > > "Could Daniel Dennett be a zombie? > The way he tells it, you'd almost have to say yes. For he has been kind to > zombies in his recent writings." > > www.kearnsianthoughts.com/**articles/DennettZombie_Mike_**Kearns.pdf<http://www.kearnsianthoughts.com/articles/DennettZombie_Mike_Kearns.pdf> > > > Dennett by himself seems to deny this: > > THE UNIMAGINED PREPOSTEROUSNESS OF ZOMBIES > Daniel C. Dennett > SYMPOSIUM ON ‘CONVERSATIONS WITH ZOMBIES > eripsa.org/files/dennett%**20zombies.pdf<http://eripsa.org/files/dennett%20zombies.pdf> > > Interestingly enough, Dennett has invented a zimbo: > > "I introduced the category of a zimbo, by definition a zombie equipped for > higher-order reflective informational states (e.g., beliefs about its other > beliefs and its other zombic states)." > > Hence he could be not a zombie but a zimbo. > > Dennett thinks that the idea of zombies/zimbos is inconsistent and therefore that neither can exist. From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie Dennett argues that "when philosophers claim that zombies are conceivable, they invariably underestimate the task of conception (or imagination), and end up imagining something that violates their own definition".<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie#cite_note-7> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie#cite_note-Dennett.2C_1995.2C_p._322-8>He coined the term *zimboes* (p-zombies that have second-order beliefs<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second-order_logic>) to argue that the idea of a p-zombie is incoherent;<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie#cite_note-9>"Zimboes think Z they are conscious, thinkZ they have qualia, thinkZ they suffer pains – they are just 'wrong' (according to this lamentable tradition), in ways that neither they nor we could ever discover!".<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie#cite_note-Dennett.2C_1995.2C_p._322-8>As p-zombies in an observed world would be indistinguishable from the observer (and therefore non-existent as a class) one must either believe that anyone, including oneself, might be a zombie or else that no one may be a zombie. One's own conviction about being (or not being) a zombie is a product of the physical world and is no different from anyone else's. When a distinction is made in one's mind between a hypothetical zombie and oneself (assumed not to be a zombie), this concept of oneself (under reductive physicalism) can only correspond to physical reality. The hypothetical zombie, which is only a subset of the concept of oneself, will entail a deficit in observables (cognitive systems), a "seductive error"<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie#cite_note-Dennett.2C_1995.2C_p._322-8>contradicting the original definition of a zombie. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.