On Sat, Aug 20, 2011 at 7:02 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi <use...@rudnyi.ru> wrote:
> Trying to remember where I have seen the statement about Dennett, I have
> made search on Google.
> Two findings (both are not my source though):
> 1) Is Daniel Dennett a zombie?
> Discussion on ephilosopher.com where the question, I believe is close to
> the statement that I have seen.
> "This is not completely serious, but is the crux of my question. It bothers
> me that his and other reductionist theories of consciousness are completely
> denying any phenomenology. It doesn't sit well with me because I am pretty
> convinced that I have one. Now, Dennett would be the first to say that it
> just 'seems' to me that I have a phenomenology but that is the point isn't
> it? If it seems to me then I have it. How can anyone think otherwise?? Are
> theere real zombies out there and is Dennett one of them?"
> 2) COULD DANIEL DENNETT BE A ZOMBIE? by Mike Kearns
> "Could Daniel Dennett be a zombie?
> The way he tells it, you'd almost have to say yes. For he has been kind to
> zombies in his recent writings."
> Dennett by himself seems to deny this:
> THE UNIMAGINED PREPOSTEROUSNESS OF ZOMBIES
> Daniel C. Dennett
> SYMPOSIUM ON ‘CONVERSATIONS WITH ZOMBIES
> Interestingly enough, Dennett has invented a zimbo:
> "I introduced the category of a zimbo, by definition a zombie equipped for
> higher-order reflective informational states (e.g., beliefs about its other
> beliefs and its other zombic states)."
> Hence he could be not a zombie but a zimbo.
Dennett thinks that the idea of zombies/zimbos is inconsistent and therefore
that neither can exist.
Dennett argues that "when philosophers claim that zombies are conceivable,
they invariably underestimate the task of conception (or imagination), and
end up imagining something that violates their own
coined the term
*zimboes* (p-zombies that have second-order
to argue that the idea of a p-zombie is
Z they are conscious, thinkZ they have qualia, thinkZ they suffer pains –
they are just 'wrong' (according to this lamentable tradition), in ways that
neither they nor we could ever
p-zombies in an observed world would be indistinguishable from the
observer (and therefore non-existent as a class) one must either believe
that anyone, including oneself, might be a zombie or else that no one may be
a zombie. One's own conviction about being (or not being) a zombie is a
product of the physical world and is no different from anyone else's. When a
distinction is made in one's mind between a hypothetical zombie and oneself
(assumed not to be a zombie), this concept of oneself (under reductive
physicalism) can only correspond to physical reality. The hypothetical
zombie, which is only a subset of the concept of oneself, will entail a
deficit in observables (cognitive systems), a "seductive
the original definition of a zombie.
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