On Aug 22, 1:30 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 20 Aug 2011, at 23:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > PART I
> > On Aug 20, 12:16 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 20 Aug 2011, at 03:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >>> On Aug 18, 9:43 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >>>> On 17 Aug 2011, at 06:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >>>>> Not sure I understand. Do I hope for this world and therefore it
> >>>>> exists to me in a solipsistic way?
> >>>> I mean you can hope to be true, but you can never know that you are
> >>>> true for sure about anything, except your consciousness.
> >>>> Transcendental realities are transcendental, simply.
> >>> OK. I thought you were saying something else, like 'thoughts create
> >>> reality'.
> >> Only physical realities. But I don't expect anyone to understand what
> >> that means, without grasping it by themselves. The UDA is the
> >> explanation.
> > Whenever you say these kinds of things, I assume that you're just
> > talking about the arithmetic Matrix seeming real to us because we're
> > in it.
> The arithmetic matrix is real, because it is just a collection of true  
> arithmetical facts. It is the physical and theological which seems  
> real (= lived), and are real in higher order senses, epistemological,  
> sensational, etc.

True to who? If I make up a Sims world where donkeys fly, do they
represent factual truth? It all seems context dependent to me. It
makes truth arbitrary. Couldn't I make an arithmetic matrix where the
occupants believe in a different arithmetic than our own? What makes
you think that senses are higher order?

> > Part of us and whatever it is that we experience as physically
> > real are mathematically agreeing to treat the relationship as if it
> > were physically real. If that's what you're saying there, then I
> > completely get that, and I'm not saying that that is not true. My view
> > adds to that two, I think revolutionary ideas.:
> > 1.  The relationships that make up that matrix are comp arithmetic on
> > one side (literally on one side, like a Klein Bottle which is
> > invisible on the interior...sort of like one way matter) and
> > sensorimotive perception on the other (the invisible side is feeling,
> > participation, being). I would call the arithmetic side
> > 'electromagnetism' and 'relativity'.
> Not enough precise. If you want to interpret your theory in  
> "mine" (which I borrow from the LUMs), you have to make your  
> vocabulary far more precise.

I want to interpret reality in whatever terms that my ideas and your
theories can make the most sense out of.

> > 2. The arithmetic side runs on agreement between numbers -
> > synchronization. The sensorimotive side runs on gaps between
> > agreements. It is already synchronized because is is the vector of
> > orientation (local singularity/monad) for time (change), so it runs on
> > induction. Jumping gaps. Pulling wholes through holes. It's non-comp
> > guesswork, interpretation, and pantomime that changes and evolves. The
> > importance of imitation in learning should strike a chord here.
> >> Then, if you identify your little ego with your higher self (which is
> >> not usually done in science), you can identify the whole reality as
> >> the (internal) thought of God (Arithmetical truth).
> > That's pretty basic, but sure. I think that 'thought' is pretty narrow
> > though. I like 'sense' better because I see thought as a rather recent
> > human development that took off symbiotically with the invention of
> > language and writing. Writing makes one kind of sense, thought another
> > similar one, hearing and seeing, feeling and tasting, knowing and
> > sensing, emotions, etc, all different embodied experiences of order or
> > pattern. I would not limit it to any one of those or even all of those
> > channels. I would not underestimate the power of order to transcend
> > any previous definition of it.
> >>>>> That may be what physicists believe that they do, but probably in
> >>>>> reality they use an intuitive feel from numbers and experience  
> >>>>> which
> >>>>> they describe and communicate as an identity thesis, numbers, etc.
> >>>>> The
> >>>>> actual understanding is an artifact of cognition and feeling.
> >>>> Hmm... I can be OK. But here by identity thesis I mean the brain-
> >>>> mind
> >>>> identity thesis? Except the Everettian, most believe that "seeing a
> >>>> needle" is due to one needle and one brain, and one experience,  
> >>>> when
> >>>> comp implies that for one experience there is an infinity of brain,
> >>>> and needle. Comp extends Everett on arithmetic.
> >>> I would say that seeing the image of a needle may indicate one  
> >>> needle,
> >>> one eye, one set of visual processing related areas of one brain,  
> >>> and
> >>> an indeterminate number of potential experiences, depending on how  
> >>> the
> >>> person feels about the needle, what associations they have, how long
> >>> they look at the needle, what else is competing for their attention,
> >>> etc. The same can be true if there is no needle, but just a memory  
> >>> or
> >>> visualization of a needle.
> >> That is the relative needle, and is one 1-p construct. But the "real
> >> needle" emerges from an infinity of 1-p view of an infinity of such
> >> relative 3-p views. This extends Everett in arithmetic.
> > To me those are special infinities arising from the exclusion of the
> > input/output of Sense. You don't need to spin off every possible 1p
> > and 3p universe just to be able to perceive a needle. It's very
> > straight forward; in a universe of nothing but two things (physical or
> > ideal), they each can tell that the other exists. It's a primitive of
> > existence. When you scale that up, you get triangulation, where each
> > 1p is informed by the exterior of the other 2p's and is then able to
> > infer it's own existence as the dynamically modulating gap between the
> > other two.
> > When you have that kind of an exponential explosion of information
> > within the social network, you also get a rapid decompensation of
> > sense outside of the network. As the nodes become enmeshed in their
> > mutual overlap and underlap, the enmeshment itself casts a shadow that
> > attenuates sensitivity and identification outside of the shared
> > privacies.
> > This is the Perceptual Relativity Inertial Frame or PRIF. A de facto
> > frame of localized coherence which itself takes on a second order
> > nested or holarchic 1p coherence. We are members of a very very very
> > specific club that is exclusive to entities
> I don't belong to that club. I didn't sign in.

You are saying that you are better than human?

> > on several different
> > scales (which look to us, from the penthouse view of the clubhouse,
> > like 3p species, genus, family, order, class, order, phylum, kingdom,
> > organism, molecule, atom, physical existence).
> > From the 1p view it's all about us, our friends, families, opinions,
> > careers, health, etc. The 3p frames (ecology-biology-chemistry-
> > physics) are our external frames of Relativity, while the self-others-
> > community-civilization frames are 1p Perception. Of course they are
> > not isolated - your brain chemistry affects your psychology and your
> > sociology affects your ecology, etc so they are all parts of our
> > typically human PRIF.
> >>> Switching the 1p and 3p, An actual titanium-steel needle is not  
> >>> going
> >>> to see a human being but it may have it's own interiority
> >> IF mechanism is true, there is no titanium needle, still less an
> >> interiority. Only person have interiority views, and person lives in
> >> Platonia.
> > Why can't persons live in bodies/houses/cities? All that's missing is
> > to let go of the illusion that 1p is an illusion
> 1p is not an illusion. We agree on that.
> > and take it at face
> > value as a legitimate physical phenomenon
> That is physicalism.

Physcialism yes, but with expanded sensorimotive physics.

> > rather than banished to
> > Platonia. We are right here, right now - a cumulative entanglement of
> > particular teleonomic consequences and teleological sequences which is
> > neither a flickering simulation nor a collection of substantial stuff,
> > but with pretensions toward both.
> The sounds look nice.
> > Matter as the apotheosis of
> > arithmetic pantomime, and psyche as the life of matter (ie division of
> > the singularity, and that whole prospect of killing-to-eat, and the
> > birth-death-decay-birth cycle).
> >>> that is
> >>> either isomorphic to our image; a metallic alloy sense that greets
> >>> centuries like weeks and knows things like temperature and  
> >>> pressure -
> >>> or it could be some crazy 1p reality conjoined with all iron atoms  
> >>> in
> >>> the cosmos as a single resonant alien contelligence for billions of
> >>> years. Or door number three..
> >>>>>> But if the relations are computable the identity thesis break  
> >>>>>> down.
> >>>>>> (That is not obvious, but follows from UDA)
> >>>>>> So IF we are digitalisable at SOME level, Plato is right. The
> >>>>>> measurable numbers of the physicists is only the tip of the  
> >>>>>> reality
> >>>>>> iceberg.
> >>>>> It's not 'we' who are digitizable, it's just some of our more
> >>>>> outward
> >>>>> facing activities.
> >>>> This, for a mechanist just means the level has not been correctly
> >>>> chosen.
> >>> What if it's not a level, but an evanescent wave of diminishing
> >>> returns?
> >> ?
> > I mean I don't like 'levels'. I like fadeouts. I don't see a
> > substitution level, but a range within which isomorphism degenerates
> > and novelty arises as simulacra.
> >>>>> Thanks. LUMs are Lobian Universal Machines?
> >>>> Yes. In honor to Martin Löb, who discovered the placebo phenomena  
> >>>> of
> >>>> the LUMs: called Löb's theorem. At the modal level, it is the main
> >>>> axiom of the logique of self-reference. It says that if you can
> >>>> convince a LUM that if [believes in Santa Klaus implies the  
> >>>> existence
> >>>> of santa Klaus] then, amazingly enough, she will believe in Santa
> >>>> Klaus.
> >>>> If the machine can prove Bp -> p, then she can prove p. or, in the
> >>>> language of the machine: B(Bp-> p) -> Bp.
> >>> Hmm. I don't know enough about it. Why does a LUM have to be
> >>> convinced?
> >> She does not need. But the theorem says that if she convinced (has a
> >> proof) then the theorem of Löb applies.
> >> That theorem is amazing. Usually we think that proof entails truth,
> >> but Löbian machine are so modest that proof (by them) entails truth
> >> only for those proposition that they can prove. (in which case # ->  
> >> p,
> >> by classical logic, so that Bp -> p follows).
> > It sounds like the essence of entropy. Absolute skepticism. The soul
> > of the Cantor Set. Although.. if you start from non-comp proof and
> > derive comp truths after, you are maybe going in the right direction
> > after all. The machine is the soul of matter, but if this machine is
> > the soul of anti-matter, then, hmm.
> hmm...
> >>> 'Sensation' as opposed to 'detection' doesn't necessarily appear at
> >>> any particular level, it's more like a continuum. Think of the
> >>> relation of thought to emotion. Sensation and detection are like  
> >>> that.
> >>> I'm just giving a general guide to the spectrum of qualitative tone
> >>> tied to physical characteristics.
> >> OK, but with comp you cannot tied qualia to physical things. The
> >> contrary happens, as in step seven of the UDA.
> > I don't need to tie qualia to specific physical things. Synesthesia
> > reminds us that color could just as easily be a flavor or a sound.
> > *But* they are all tied to the physical brain and eyes.
> And my glasses.
> But that might be true only locally and contingently.
> And this does not threat the weak form of comp I am interested in, it  
> is just asking for a low subst. level.
> > I have read
> > that people who have gained sight later after being born blind did not
> > experience visual qualia before having sight. Not in dreams or
> > visualization, etc. It appears that vision is not free floating in the
> > comsos to us in Platonia, but must be physically conjured through the
> > nervous system.
> That is not a valid reasoning.

It seems like a start? If vision were Platonic, the loss of eyes
wouldn't result in 100% incidence of blindness.

> > Likewise people who lost their sight early in life
> > lose their memories of vision - the ability to describe what people
> > look like, etc, as they get older but those who are blinded later on
> > retain the capacity to visualize and dream in visual  images.
> >>> I'm
> >>> open to being wrong, but someone has to show me why.
> >> Then you have to be *much* precise.
> >> I guess you have seen that you are precise enough for being wrong  
> >> with
> >> respect to comp (but then you almost assume non-comp at the start, so
> >> that does not say a lot).
> > I think I'm being as precise as you can be to have a truly universal
> > TOE.
> >>>>> It's only a problem
> >>>>> when the mindbody fails to recognize the relation to bodymind  
> >>>>> and to
> >>>>> honor it's essential unity as well as it's existential polarity  
> >>>>> and
> >>>>> the involuted continuum topology between them.
> >>>> Even if that were true (which I doubt as far as I can put sense on
> >>>> this) that would solve nothing. On the contrary it seems to me,  
> >>>> with
> >>>> all my respect, that you put the problem under the rug of very
> >>>> special
> >>>> infinities in both mind and matter. It does not solve the hard
> >>>> problem
> >>>> of matter (what it is, why does it seem to exist) and the hard
> >>>> problem
> >>>> of mind (mainly its relation with matter).
> >>> I don't understand what the special infinities you are talking about
> >>> are.
> >> It is what you need to be sure that you can't survive with a silicon
> >> machine, or a with a chinese people computer, or with arithmetical
> >> relations.
> > I would call those things more of a common sense intuition. If silicon
> > machines or crowds of people could spontaneously generate a
> > consciousness, I would think that we would see instances of that.
> On the contrary. Computer codes, like genomes, like litterature, like  
> Post number, are deep object in a theoretical computer sense that you  
> can hardly generate them spontaneously. They come from necessary long  
> computations.
> > I'm
> > not ruling it out, because of course we can't tell 1p consciousness
> > from 3p completely, but, the sense of things being more like us and
> > less like us demands more of an explanation.
> Darwin + computer science (abstract biology, psychology, etc.)

So you are saying that there is no legitimate difference between
yourself and a sand dune, other than you have been programmed and
conditioned to perceive the sand dune as irrelevant to your survival
and reproduction? Really the sand dune is quite an interesting chap
with a keen interest in early jazz and architecture.

> > Why the big threshold
> > between what we think is alive and what isn't?
> I don't see any threshold.

So being dead is just as good as being alive for you, your family,
friends, pets. It's all the same.

> > Why do we care so much
> > about not being dead ourselves?
> Eating is more fun than being eaten, in general.

And why should that be the case if there's no menaingful difference?

> >>> How can there be a mind/body problem if we understand that the
> >>> mind and the body are just the anthropological scale manifestation  
> >>> of
> >>> the singularity relating the opposite of itself.
> >> That's too much fuzzy.
> > To me it seems a little verbally cumbersome but not unclear.
> What counts is that it is clear for the others. At least enough so  
> that the reader does not fall asleep before reaching the end of the  
> post.
> > We are a
> > gigantic entangled experience of 1s and 0s becoming each other. Oops.
> > Did I just cross over to the Dark Side? But no - not the 1 and 0, but
> > the feeling behind the motion of 1-0-1. Respiration. Tension and
> > relaxation. Motive and sense. Right? C'mon Bruno, ya gotta be on board
> > with that?
> It is so much unclear, that I ill say, I could, if it does not exclude  
> comp, a priori.

Comp is cool, but it has to share the duplex with non-comp. Except
each family thinks that they are non-comp and the other is comp.

> > Or it means that there is no substitution level and you are the
> > functioning of your neurons (some of them anyhow), but not just as a
> > machine but as an aggregate sense organ (sense in every sense). We are
> > the experiential throughput of our bodies, but it extends beyond that
> > as our bodies are an event in the solar system, galaxy, etc.
> You are lowering the level.

I don't think there is a level? What is the substitution level of red?

> > PART II tomorrow. Or soon.
> I think you do rhetoric, not reasoning. I don't comment rhetoric,  
> especially if it leads to gross a priori against entities (like human  
> with digital prostheses).

I'm not against human with digital prostheses, I'm against the idea of
that being a likely possibility. It's like saying I'm a priori against
invisible dragons. I'm not sure why the category my writing might fit
into is meaningful. It seems like back to nascent ad hominem
disqualification. It doesn't bother me, I'm just saying that's what it
seems like to me.


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