On Aug 22, 1:56 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 21 Aug 2011, at 15:28, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >> My point is that, by definition of philosophical zombie, they behave
> >> like normal and sane human being. It is not walking coma, or  
> >> catatonic
> >> behavior. It is full human behavior. A zombie might write a book on
> >> consciousness, or have a diary of his dreams reports.
>
> > A movie can feature an actress writing a book on consciousness or
> > doing anything else that can be demonstrated audiovisually. How is
> > that not a zombie?
>
> The movie lack the counterfactual. If the public shout "don't go the  
> cave!" to the heroine in a thriller, she will not listen.

That can be obscured by making the movie ambiguous. Having the actors
suddenly look in the camera and say something like "Did you say
something? We can't hear you very well in here." When the tension
builds the heroine could say to the camera "I know what you're
thinking, but I'm going in anyways". I think if you give the movie
anywhere near the latitude you are giving to arithmetic, you'll see
that the threshold between a movie and a UM is much less than between
a living organism and a silicon chip. You can make movies interactive
with alternate story lines that an audience can vote on, or just
pseudointeractive:  
http://listverse.com/2011/05/24/top-10-william-castle-film-gimmicks/
(#1)

> Zombie are  
> different, they behave like you and me. By definition of philosophical  
> zombie, you can't distinguish it from a "real human". You can  
> distinguish a human from filmed human, all right?

Not without breaking the frame of reference. I can't distinguish a
live TV broadcast from a recorded broadcast. It's an audiovisual only
frame of reference. To postulate a philosophical zombie, you are
saying that nothing about them can be distinguished from a genuine
person, which is tautological. If nothing can be distinguished by
anyone or any thing at any time, then it is the genuine person, by
definition.

You're just saying 'an apple that is genuine in every possible way,
except that it's an orange' and using that argument to say 'then
apples can be no different than oranges in any meaningful way and
there is no reason why apples cannot be used to make an orange as long
as the substitution level is low enough.' The fallacy is that it uses
semantics of false exclusion to justify false inclusion. By insisting
that my protests that apples and oranges are both fruit but oranges
can never be made of apples is just an appeal to the false assumption
of substitution level, you disregard any possibility of seeing the
simple truth of the relation.

> > If you make it a 3D-hologram of an actress, with
> > odorama and VR touchback tactile interfaces, then is it a zombie? If
> > you connect this thing up to a GPS instead of a cinematically scripted
> > liturgy and put it in an information kiosk, does it become a zombie
> > then? I don't see much of a difference.
>
> Behaviorally they have no difference with human. Conceptually they are  
> quite different, because they lack consciousness and any private  
> experiences.
> With comp, such zombies are non sensical, or trivial. Consciousness is  
> related to the abstract relations involved in the most probable  
> computations leading to your actual 3-states.

Yes, zombies are non sensical or trivial.

> > It's still just a facade which
> > reflects our human sense rather than the sense of an autonomous logic
> > which transcends programming. Even if it's really fancy programming,
> > it's experience has no connection with us. It's a cypher that only
> > intersects our awareness through it's rear end, upon which we have
> > drawn a face.
>
> >>>> That is an advantage. Precise and hypothetical. Refutable.
>
> >>> True, but it has disadvantages as well. Dissociated and clinical.
>
> >> So you say.
>
> >>> Meaningless. (cue 'Supertramp - The Logical Song')
>
> >> So you say.
>
> > Right. These qualities cannot be proved from 3-p. Meaning and feeling
> > are not literal and existential. If they don't insist for you, then
> > you don't feel them.
>
> >>>>> Sense contingent upon the theoretical existence
> >>>>> of numbers (or the concrete existence of what unknowable
> >>>>> phenomenon is
> >>>>> represented theoretically as numbers)
>
> >>>> Mathematician can study the effect of set of unknowable things.  
> >>>> That
> >>>> is the beauty of what LUMs discover inside their "head", not just a
> >>>> big Ignorance, but that the Ignorance has a topology, a geometry, a
> >>>> lot of unexpected feature.
>
> >>> Hopefully it isn't an unfathomably malignant and cunning evil  
> >>> seeking
> >>> to evacuate the souls of unsuspecting scientists who are all too
> >>> willing to trade their humanity for a chance to peek into an abyss  
> >>> of
> >>> empty calculation from which there is no escape. ;)
>
> >> Comp does the contary of evacuating soul. It reinstall soul in
> >> arithmetic, in a precise and testable way.
>
> > I'm ok with that, but I think that it's not a universal soul, it's
> > just the wireframe map of the logic of soul.
>
> So, you are not OK with that.

No, I am ok with numbers having soul, it's just an arithmetic soul,
not a universal soul.

>
> >>> This is sort of a picture of 
> >>> thatt:http://stationlink.com/art/comp_witchdoctor.jpg
>
> >> Don't confuse a theory with the popular human perceptions of that
> >> theory, especially in a context where a form of obscurantism prevails
> >> since a long time.
>
> > That picture is more of an oracle. I discovered it in the mural I did
> > by mirroring the far Occidental side. It was unintentional, but I
> > think it communicates something about the dangers of computational
> > extremism. To me anyways.
>
> That's fear selling.
> Extremism is prevented by the fact that the comp ethic is the right to  
> say "no" to the doctor. There are dangers, but that is a a reason to  
> study it, not to make it schedule 1.

I'm all for studying it and for consenting adults enjoying the
results, but I think there are other options too.

Craig

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