On 22 Aug 2011, at 21:54, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 22, 1:30 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 20 Aug 2011, at 23:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 20, 12:16 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 20 Aug 2011, at 03:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 18, 9:43 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 17 Aug 2011, at 06:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Not sure I understand. Do I hope for this world and therefore it
exists to me in a solipsistic way?
I mean you can hope to be true, but you can never know that you
true for sure about anything, except your consciousness.
Transcendental realities are transcendental, simply.
OK. I thought you were saying something else, like 'thoughts
Only physical realities. But I don't expect anyone to understand
that means, without grasping it by themselves. The UDA is the
Whenever you say these kinds of things, I assume that you're just
talking about the arithmetic Matrix seeming real to us because we're
The arithmetic matrix is real, because it is just a collection of
arithmetical facts. It is the physical and theological which seems
real (= lived), and are real in higher order senses, epistemological,
True to who? If I make up a Sims world where donkeys fly, do they
represent factual truth? It all seems context dependent to me. It
makes truth arbitrary. Couldn't I make an arithmetic matrix where the
occupants believe in a different arithmetic than our own? What makes
you think that senses are higher order?
Because sensible device needs a minimal amount of complexity. There
are evidence of complex processing and interactions in sensible being,
and I have no clue how sense could be made primary without introducing
some kind of non Turing emulable magic.
I don't think you can make a different matrix with occupant believing
in a different arithmetic. I don't think this makes any sense. If they
take different axiom, it means they use a different structure. There
are plenty sorts of number system, but the laws of arithmetic does not
depend of the subject which consider them. 17 is prime or not, for
This is the Perceptual Relativity Inertial Frame or PRIF. A de facto
frame of localized coherence which itself takes on a second order
nested or holarchic 1p coherence. We are members of a very very very
specific club that is exclusive to entities
I don't belong to that club. I didn't sign in.
You are saying that you are better than human?
I was saying that I do no belong to a club that is a priori exclusive
to entities, alluding to your carbon vie of a human being.
IF mechanism is true, there is no titanium needle, still less an
interiority. Only person have interiority views, and person lives
Why can't persons live in bodies/houses/cities? All that's missing
to let go of the illusion that 1p is an illusion
1p is not an illusion. We agree on that.
and take it at face
value as a legitimate physical phenomenon
That is physicalism.
Physcialism yes, but with expanded sensorimotive physics.
That is coherent with your non-comp, view. But then either you have
zombie, or you have to introduce or describe those special non Turing
emulable magic somewhere.
You have not yet succeeded in explaining what is sensorimotive
physics, without alluding explicitly to poetry.
not ruling it out, because of course we can't tell 1p consciousness
from 3p completely, but, the sense of things being more like us and
less like us demands more of an explanation.
Darwin + computer science (abstract biology, psychology, etc.)
So you are saying that there is no legitimate difference between
yourself and a sand dune, other than you have been programmed and
conditioned to perceive the sand dune as irrelevant to your survival
and reproduction? Really the sand dune is quite an interesting chap
with a keen interest in early jazz and architecture.
Sure, but not relevant.
Why the big threshold
between what we think is alive and what isn't?
I don't see any threshold.
So being dead is just as good as being alive for you, your family,
friends, pets. It's all the same.
It is not because there are no threshold or frontier between two
states that there are no clear case.
For example the M set has a fuzzy border, and without arbitrary long
zoom you can't decide if a point on the border is in or out of the
set. But many points are clearly in and clearly out. I would say a
pebble is clearly not alive, and a bird is clearly alive, but the
question makes no sense (other than conventional) for a virus or a box
of cigarette. With my usual definition, they are alive, because they
have a sophisticated reproduction cycle.
Why do we care so much
about not being dead ourselves?
Eating is more fun than being eaten, in general.
And why should that be the case if there's no menaingful difference?
See above. Absence of frontier does not entail absence of meaningful
difference. fuzzy sets have clear crisp subsets.
How can there be a mind/body problem if we understand that the
mind and the body are just the anthropological scale manifestation
the singularity relating the opposite of itself.
That's too much fuzzy.
To me it seems a little verbally cumbersome but not unclear.
What counts is that it is clear for the others. At least enough so
that the reader does not fall asleep before reaching the end of the
We are a
gigantic entangled experience of 1s and 0s becoming each other.
Did I just cross over to the Dark Side? But no - not the 1 and 0,
the feeling behind the motion of 1-0-1. Respiration. Tension and
relaxation. Motive and sense. Right? C'mon Bruno, ya gotta be on
It is so much unclear, that I ill say, I could, if it does not
comp, a priori.
Comp is cool, but it has to share the duplex with non-comp. Except
each family thinks that they are non-comp and the other is comp.
Comp share the duplex with non comp. With comp, things like life and
consciousness develop on the border between comp and non-comp.
Or it means that there is no substitution level and you are the
functioning of your neurons (some of them anyhow), but not just as a
machine but as an aggregate sense organ (sense in every sense). We
the experiential throughput of our bodies, but it extends beyond
as our bodies are an event in the solar system, galaxy, etc.
You are lowering the level.
I don't think there is a level? What is the substitution level of red?
The question is meaningless. "red" is not a body's person.
PART II tomorrow. Or soon.
I think you do rhetoric, not reasoning. I don't comment rhetoric,
especially if it leads to gross a priori against entities (like human
with digital prostheses).
I'm not against human with digital prostheses, I'm against the idea of
that being a likely possibility.
Comp is the idea that it is possible in practice. The reasoning goes
through even if your "generalized brain" is the entire universe at the
level of the Higgs Boson.
It's like saying I'm a priori against
invisible dragons. I'm not sure why the category my writing might fit
into is meaningful. It seems like back to nascent ad hominem
disqualification. It doesn't bother me, I'm just saying that's what it
seems like to me.
It is due to the fact that you have a quite not clear theory, which is
not a problem because you might improve it, but despite its unclarity,
you use it as an argument to pretend some other (much more precise)
theory is wrong. That does not ring serious. Even if you succeed in
defining "sensorimotive", you will still have to diagonalize against
comp to make it provably in the non-comp theories. It is not enough to
say primary matter exist: you will have to define it in a way
preventing it to be explained or recover from comp. That is in
principle possible, but will ask for much more precision.
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