# Re: Realism, nominalism and comp

`On 07.09.2011 13:47 Stephen P. King said the following:`
```
> OTOH, it is incoherent to say that the Universals = 'what the
> nominals have in common' since we cannot prevent nominals that can
> entirely contradict each other. A possible solution to this is to
> consider how communication between observers works out.

Universals = what things of one kind have in common.

Evgenii

On 07.09.2011 13:47 Stephen P. King said the following:
```
```On 9/6/2011 3:23 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
```
```Let me try it this way. Could we say that universals exist already
in the 3d person view and they are independent from the 1st person
view?

Evgenii

On 06.09.2011 09:00 Bruno Marchal said the following:
```
```
On 05 Sep 2011, at 21:02, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

```
```Realism and nominalism in philosophy are related to universals
(I guess that numbers could be probably considered as
universals as well). A simple example:

A is a person; B is a person.

Does A is equal to B? The answer is no, A and B are after all
different persons. Yet then the question would be if something
universal and related to a term "person" exists in A and B.

Realism says that universals do exist independent from the mind
(so in this sense it has nothing to do with the physical
realism and materialism), nominalism that they are just
notation and do not exist as such.

says

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_universals

Well, he has not discussed what idealism has to do with
correctly, according to it the universals do exist literally.
```
```

I am not sure. UDA shows that we can take elementary arithmetic
as theory of everything (or equivalent). In that theory only 0,
s(0), s(s(0)), ... exist primitively (literally?).

Then you can derive existence of objects, among the numbers,
which have special property (like the prime numbers, the
universal numbers, the LĂ¶bian Universal numbers). Do they exist
literally? I don't know what that means. Do they exist
primitively? That makes sense: s(s(0)) exists primitively and is
prime.

Then you have the epistemological existence, defined by the
things the numbers, relatively to each other believes in (this
includes the physical universes, the qualia, persons, etc.). They
does not exist primitively, but their properties are still
independent of the mind of any machines. This is epistemological
realism. Pain exists, in that sense, for example.

All what you have, in the 3-pictures, are the numbers and their
relations and properties. This is enough to explain the
"appearances" of mind and matter, which exist from the number's
perspective (which can be defined by relation between machines'
beliefs (defined axiomatically) and truth (which is assumed, and
can be approximated from inside).

Now with comp, the primitive object are conventional. You can
take combinators, Turing "machines" or java programs instead of
the numbers. That will change nothing in the theory of mind and
matter.

Bruno
```
```
```
```Hi,

Does the existence of said universals act as a guarantor of the
definiteness of the properties of the universals? As I see it,
existence per say is neutral, it is merely the necessary possibility
to be. We seem to be stuck with thinking that 3p = not-1p. What if 3p
is the invariant over 1p instead? I.e. the objective world is what
all observers hold as mutually non-contradictory, a sort of
intersection of their 1p's. I worry that in our rush to toss out the
subjective and illusory that we are discarding the essential role
that an observer plays in the universe. Is it any wonder why we have
such a 'hard problem' with consciousness because of this?

OTOH, it is incoherent to say that the Universals = 'what the
nominals have in common' since we cannot prevent nominals that can
entirely contradict each other. A possible solution to this is to
consider how communication between observers works out.

Onward!

Stephen

```
```
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