On 9/21/2011 11:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Thu, Sep 22, 2011 at 12:36 AM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

    On 9/21/2011 9:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

    On Wed, Sep 21, 2011 at 10:59 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
    <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

        On 9/21/2011 6:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

            When you aren't thinking about what your mother looks like, she 
could look
            like anyone, because your moment of awareness at that point in time 
            consistent with existence in all those possible universes where she 
is a
            different person.  When the memory makes it into your awareness, it 
            limits / selects the universes you belong to.

        Why is it that even though Tegmark wrote a paper showing it, nobody 
wants to
        admit that the brain is a classical system.

    The Brain is classical, I agree.

         Unless you are taking Craig's dualist view that thought and memory are
        independent of your brain, your memory as instantiated in your brain 
        corresponded to who your mother is and to most of the rest of your 

    Yes, but which brain are you right now?  Are you the Brent in universe X 
    mother had green eyes, or the Brent in universe Y whose mother had brown 
eyes.  By
    the time you remember, you will have resolved which Brent you are (and
    correspondingly which universe you are in) but then you've opened up new
    uncertainties, and new universes compatible with your existence: Are you in 
    universe where Brent's tooth brush is yellow, or the universe where it is 
red, or
    some other color?  Until you stop and think, and this information enters 
    awareness (not your brain it is already in each of your brains in each of 
    universes), your conscious moment is compatible with Brents in various 
    where your brush has varying colors.  Of course when you make the 
determination you
    find a fully coherent and consistent history.  Receipts for the tooth brush 
    bought, a picture of your mom on the wall, etc.

    But that assumes a dualism so that in the universe where my tooth brush is 
    (and that is encoded in my brain in that universe), my mind is not 
associated with
    that brain - it is some uncertain state.

As I see it, it is no different than duplicating someone to both Washington and Moscow and then when they step outside of the teleporter box the sight of the capital building, or red square determines their position.

Now assume you are duplicated in universe X and universe Y, in both of which which you have an identical mental state. However, in universe X you have a red car, and in universe Y you have a blue car. When this memory surfaces, you identify which universe you are in. Before the memory of the color of your car surfaced, your mental state was identical and it could be said that your consciousness supervened on both of them.

      But then when the yellowness or redness of my toothbrush enters my 
    my mind splits into different universes (the many-minds interpretation of 
QM?).  In
    that case there are many classical beings who call themselves Brent and 
have some
    memories in common.  Why not distinguish them by their bodies/brains?  Why 
think if
    the mind(s) as being indeterminate and flitting about just because they are 
    instantiating awareness of all that is in the brain?

It follows from the ability to be able to resurrect a person at any time or any location by making an identical copy.

1. Nothing happens to you between now and the next minute (your consciousness continues through that time) 2. 30 seconds from now, you will be blown to pieces, but then nanobots will repair you perfectly such that you don't even notice (your consciousness continues) 3. You will be blown to pieces, but then nanobots repair you perfectly (only this time using different matter) you don't notice and your consciousness continues. 4. You will be blow to pieces but then recreated at another location in the exact configuration that you were before you were blown up (From your perspective your surroundings suddenly and inexplicably changed) 5. You are blown up and then two copies of you are created, one in your present location and another in a second location. You now cannot be sure which one you will be.

This is the kind of statement I'm questioning. Who is "you"? There's an implicit assumption that "you" are conscious thoughts or observer moments, which are disembodied and so the question becomes which brain to they supervene on. But why should be reify "you" as these transient thoughts. Doesn't it make more sense to reify the body/brain. Sure it can be duplicated, but we know where the duplicates are and what's in them.

For some short period of time you can be said to be both of them (until different sensory data is processed and the minds diverge). 6. You are not blown up, but a second duplicate of you is created elsewhere (as before, your mind can be said to inhabit both of them, until the mental state diverges)

These are just the same basic examples from Bruno's UDA. Was there a particular step in the UDA that you disagreed with?

I think what Bruno calls the 323 principle is questionable. It doesn't comport with QM. Bruno gets around this by noting that computationally a classical computer can emulate a quantum system. But I think that assumes an *isolated* quantum system. All real quantum systems big enough to be quasi-classical systems are impossible to isolate. So I'm afraid this pushes the substitution level all the way down. If it's all the way down, then as Craig notes, there's really no difference between emulation and duplication.



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