On 22 Sep 2011, at 08:32, meekerdb wrote:

On 9/21/2011 11:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Thu, Sep 22, 2011 at 12:36 AM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 9/21/2011 9:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Wed, Sep 21, 2011 at 10:59 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 9/21/2011 6:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
When you aren't thinking about what your mother looks like, she could look like anyone, because your moment of awareness at that point in time is consistent with existence in all those possible universes where she is a different person. When the memory makes it into your awareness, it then limits / selects the universes you belong to.

Why is it that even though Tegmark wrote a paper showing it, nobody wants to admit that the brain is a classical system.

The Brain is classical, I agree.

Unless you are taking Craig's dualist view that thought and memory are independent of your brain, your memory as instantiated in your brain already corresponded to who your mother is and to most of the rest of your history

Yes, but which brain are you right now? Are you the Brent in universe X whose mother had green eyes, or the Brent in universe Y whose mother had brown eyes. By the time you remember, you will have resolved which Brent you are (and correspondingly which universe you are in) but then you've opened up new uncertainties, and new universes compatible with your existence: Are you in the universe where Brent's tooth brush is yellow, or the universe where it is red, or some other color? Until you stop and think, and this information enters your awareness (not your brain it is already in each of your brains in each of those universes), your conscious moment is compatible with Brents in various universes where your brush has varying colors. Of course when you make the determination you find a fully coherent and consistent history. Receipts for the tooth brush you bought, a picture of your mom on the wall, etc.

But that assumes a dualism so that in the universe where my tooth brush is yellow (and that is encoded in my brain in that universe), my mind is not associated with that brain - it is some uncertain state.

As I see it, it is no different than duplicating someone to both Washington and Moscow and then when they step outside of the teleporter box the sight of the capital building, or red square determines their position.

Now assume you are duplicated in universe X and universe Y, in both of which which you have an identical mental state. However, in universe X you have a red car, and in universe Y you have a blue car. When this memory surfaces, you identify which universe you are in. Before the memory of the color of your car surfaced, your mental state was identical and it could be said that your consciousness supervened on both of them.

But then when the yellowness or redness of my toothbrush enters my consciousness my mind splits into different universes (the many- minds interpretation of QM?). In that case there are many classical beings who call themselves Brent and have some memories in common. Why not distinguish them by their bodies/brains? Why think if the mind(s) as being indeterminate and flitting about just because they are not instantiating awareness of all that is in the brain?

It follows from the ability to be able to resurrect a person at any time or any location by making an identical copy.

1. Nothing happens to you between now and the next minute (your consciousness continues through that time) 2. 30 seconds from now, you will be blown to pieces, but then nanobots will repair you perfectly such that you don't even notice (your consciousness continues) 3. You will be blown to pieces, but then nanobots repair you perfectly (only this time using different matter) you don't notice and your consciousness continues. 4. You will be blow to pieces but then recreated at another location in the exact configuration that you were before you were blown up (From your perspective your surroundings suddenly and inexplicably changed) 5. You are blown up and then two copies of you are created, one in your present location and another in a second location. You now cannot be sure which one you will be.

This is the kind of statement I'm questioning. Who is "you"? There's an implicit assumption that "you" are conscious thoughts or observer moments, which are disembodied and so the question becomes which brain to they supervene on. But why should be reify "you" as these transient thoughts. Doesn't it make more sense to reify the body/brain. Sure it can be duplicated, but we know where the duplicates are and what's in them.

For some short period of time you can be said to be both of them (until different sensory data is processed and the minds diverge). 6. You are not blown up, but a second duplicate of you is created elsewhere (as before, your mind can be said to inhabit both of them, until the mental state diverges)

These are just the same basic examples from Bruno's UDA. Was there a particular step in the UDA that you disagreed with?

I think what Bruno calls the 323 principle is questionable.

Can I deduce from this that UDA1-7 is understood. This shows already that either the universe is "little" or physics is (already) a branch of computer science (even if there is a physical universe).

It doesn't comport with QM. Bruno gets around this by noting that computationally a classical computer can emulate a quantum system. But I think that assumes an *isolated* quantum system.


All real quantum systems big enough to be quasi-classical systems are impossible to isolate.

But then you have to assume that your brain is some infinite quantum system (but then comp is false).

So I'm afraid this pushes the substitution level all the way down.

Yes, I'm afraid that will be the case.

If it's all the way down, then as Craig notes, there's really no difference between emulation and duplication.

But then you are, like Craig, assuming that mechanism is false. This is my point, if we want primitive matter, comp is false. (or comp implies no primitive matter, or the falsity of physicalism).



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