On 22 Sep 2011, at 08:32, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/21/2011 11:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Sep 22, 2011 at 12:36 AM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
On 9/21/2011 9:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Wed, Sep 21, 2011 at 10:59 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
On 9/21/2011 6:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
When you aren't thinking about what your mother looks like, she
could look like anyone, because your moment of awareness at that
point in time is consistent with existence in all those possible
universes where she is a different person. When the memory makes
it into your awareness, it then limits / selects the universes you
Why is it that even though Tegmark wrote a paper showing it,
nobody wants to admit that the brain is a classical system.
The Brain is classical, I agree.
Unless you are taking Craig's dualist view that thought and
memory are independent of your brain, your memory as instantiated
in your brain already corresponded to who your mother is and to
most of the rest of your history
Yes, but which brain are you right now? Are you the Brent in
universe X whose mother had green eyes, or the Brent in universe Y
whose mother had brown eyes. By the time you remember, you will
have resolved which Brent you are (and correspondingly which
universe you are in) but then you've opened up new uncertainties,
and new universes compatible with your existence: Are you in the
universe where Brent's tooth brush is yellow, or the universe
where it is red, or some other color? Until you stop and think,
and this information enters your awareness (not your brain it is
already in each of your brains in each of those universes), your
conscious moment is compatible with Brents in various universes
where your brush has varying colors. Of course when you make the
determination you find a fully coherent and consistent history.
Receipts for the tooth brush you bought, a picture of your mom on
the wall, etc.
But that assumes a dualism so that in the universe where my tooth
brush is yellow (and that is encoded in my brain in that universe),
my mind is not associated with that brain - it is some uncertain
As I see it, it is no different than duplicating someone to both
Washington and Moscow and then when they step outside of the
teleporter box the sight of the capital building, or red square
determines their position.
Now assume you are duplicated in universe X and universe Y, in both
of which which you have an identical mental state. However, in
universe X you have a red car, and in universe Y you have a blue
car. When this memory surfaces, you identify which
universe you are in. Before the memory of the color of your car
surfaced, your mental state was identical and it could be said that
your consciousness supervened on both of them.
But then when the yellowness or redness of my toothbrush enters
my consciousness my mind splits into different universes (the many-
minds interpretation of QM?). In that case there are many
classical beings who call themselves Brent and have some memories
in common. Why not distinguish them by their bodies/brains? Why
think if the mind(s) as being indeterminate and flitting about just
because they are not instantiating awareness of all that is in the
It follows from the ability to be able to resurrect a person at any
time or any location by making an identical copy.
1. Nothing happens to you between now and the next minute (your
consciousness continues through that time)
2. 30 seconds from now, you will be blown to pieces, but then
nanobots will repair you perfectly such that you don't even notice
(your consciousness continues)
3. You will be blown to pieces, but then nanobots repair you
perfectly (only this time using different matter) you don't notice
and your consciousness continues.
4. You will be blow to pieces but then recreated at another
location in the exact configuration that you were before you were
blown up (From your perspective your surroundings suddenly and
5. You are blown up and then two copies of you are created, one in
your present location and another in a second location. You now
cannot be sure which one you will be.
This is the kind of statement I'm questioning. Who is "you"?
There's an implicit assumption that "you" are conscious thoughts or
observer moments, which are disembodied and so the question becomes
which brain to they supervene on. But why should be reify "you" as
these transient thoughts. Doesn't it make more sense to reify the
body/brain. Sure it can be duplicated, but we know where the
duplicates are and what's in them.
For some short period of time you can be said to be both of them
(until different sensory data is processed and the minds diverge).
6. You are not blown up, but a second duplicate of you is created
elsewhere (as before, your mind can be said to inhabit both of
them, until the mental state diverges)
These are just the same basic examples from Bruno's UDA. Was there
a particular step in the UDA that you disagreed with?
I think what Bruno calls the 323 principle is questionable.
Can I deduce from this that UDA1-7 is understood. This shows already
that either the universe is "little" or physics is (already) a branch
of computer science (even if there is a physical universe).
It doesn't comport with QM. Bruno gets around this by noting that
computationally a classical computer can emulate a quantum system.
But I think that assumes an *isolated* quantum system.
All real quantum systems big enough to be quasi-classical systems
are impossible to isolate.
But then you have to assume that your brain is some infinite quantum
system (but then comp is false).
So I'm afraid this pushes the substitution level all the way down.
Yes, I'm afraid that will be the case.
If it's all the way down, then as Craig notes, there's really no
difference between emulation and duplication.
But then you are, like Craig, assuming that mechanism is false. This
is my point, if we want primitive matter, comp is false. (or comp
implies no primitive matter, or the falsity of physicalism).
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at