On 9/23/2011 10:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Sep 2011, at 21:12, Stephen P. King wrote:On 9/22/2011 11:22 AM, Jason Resch wrote:On Thu, Sep 22, 2011 at 7:55 AM, Stephen P. King<stephe...@charter.net <mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote:On 9/22/2011 1:19 AM, Jason Resch wrote: [SPK] Sure, let us consider this similarity to Leibniz' "per-established harmony" idea. Could you sketch your thoughts on the similarity that you see? I have my own thoughts about pre-established harmony, but I see, in Craig's ideas, other concepts similar to those of Leibniz that do relate to a notion of "harmony" and other somewhat unrelated concepts but not necessarily include the "pre-established" aspect. I haev an argument against the concept of "pre-established" as Leibniz uses it.From what I understand of Craig's theory it describes a differencebetween first person and third person experience/reality. Eachbeing two sides of the same coin, where first person experience isthe interior side of what its like to be the material. The firstperson experience of is indeterminable (and possibly relies on theindeterminism of physics?) and can cause physical changes above andbeyond what can be predicted by any third-person physics. While weare a machine according to this theory, we are a special machine dueto our history as organisms and the special properties of thecarbon, hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, etc. which form the basis of ourbiochemistry. Functional equivalence is either not possible, orwill lead to various brain disorders or zombies.[SPK] Hi Jason!Excellent post!! But can you see how this is really not sodifferent from Bruno's "result"?! Bruno just substitutes (N, +, *) ofmatter and the 1p experience is the 'inside dream" of Arithmetic.I am not sure what you are saying. I just give a deductive argumentthat if my (generalized) brain can be emulated by a material digitaldevice, then physics is a branch of number's psychology, itself abranch of number theory (or combinator theory, etc.).Same basic outline, very different semantics, but a radicallydifferent interpretation...My argument does not depend on interpretation. That is why it is a proof.Craig does make a big deal about "special properties" but theproperties of carbon, etc. do matter when it comes to realfunctionality. While it is true that we can build universal Turingmachine equivalents out of practically anything, explaining andmodeling the physical world is not about computations that do notrequire resources or can run forever or such "ideal" things,It is. Or you have to find the flaw. I am, as always, open to searchit with you, step by step.it is about how all this stuff that has particular propertiesinteracts with each other. We simply cannot dismiss all of thedetails that encompass our reality by just invoking computationaluniversality.We have no choice. Of course, we can, like Craig, just assume thatcomp is false.What is that truism? The Devil is in the Details!My own thesis follows this same outline, except that I proposethat the topological spaces are the "outside" and algebras (whichwould include Bruno's (N, +, *) and minds are the inside. Thisoutline dispenses with the problem of psycho-physical parallelismthat I will make a comment on below. There is no need to explain whyor how matter and mind are harmonized or synchronized when,ultimately, they are jsut two different (behaviorally andstructuraly) aspect of each other, all of this follow from M. Stone'srepresentation theorem.My idea is a bit tricky because we have to treat topologicalspaces (such as the totally disconnected compact Hausdorff spacesdual to Boolean logics)I think you have good intuition here, but you need to develop them.Note that there are semantic of G and S4Grz in term of totallydisconnected Hausdorff spaces, or the Cantor scattered space whichground that intuition, and the Stone duality, in the frame ofself-reference, as I think I have already told you (work of Blok andEsakia).both as the form and content of 1p and as mathematical objects. Thisis not a problem because math is all about representing 1p and more!This makes sense because mathematical representations can bothrepresent themselves and be what they represent. WE see thisexplained in a round about way in Stephen Wolfram's essay onintractability and physics.The basic idea of the essay is that physical systems are,effectively, the best possible computational model of themselves. Wedo not need to postulate computations separate from the physicalprocesses themselves, if we are going to stay int eh semi-classicalrealm. If we wish to go to a fully quantum model, they thewavefunction (and its evolution) of a physical system is thecomputation itself of that system.Vaughan Pratt argued that QM is just a consequence of the waythat the stone duality is implemented. I am just taking this ideasand exploring them for flaws and falsification, but to do so I haveto be able to fully explain them (not an easy job!) but that is whatis necessary to claim that I understand them.This assessment of Craig's idea seems accurate from what I cantell at the start but falls down on the epiphenomena bit AFAIK...Jason said that Craig's theory entails consciousness is anepiphenomenon. I wait Craig's reply, given that he gives a role to thesubjectivity. It "insists", Craig told us. No idea what *that* means,but I think he introduce that idea for escaping the accusation ofmaking consciousness an epiphenomenon. To be sure Stathis hasconvincingly show that Craig is not coherent on this (and so can sayanything).Consciousness to Craig is an epiphenomenon, since he has said thereis no reason to evolve this tehnicolor cartesian theater.I need to get his comment on this statement about the Cartesiantheater.The similarity I see to the pre-established harmony is that Liebnizposits two realities, a physical reality and reality ofexperiences. Each follows their own laws independently of theother, but physics does not affect or could not implement a mind,nor is the mind really affecting physics. Instead, physical law issuch that it coincides with what a mind would do even if there wereno mind, and the mind experiences what physical law would suggesteven if there were no physical world. It is analagous to amatrix-world where we experiencing a pre-recorded life andexperiencing everything of that individual. Liebniz postulated hisidea when it became clear that Newton's laws suggested aconservation of not only energy (as Descartes was aware) but alsomomentum. Therefore an immaterial soul could have no affect onphysics. This led Leibniz to the idea that God setup both tonecessarily agree before hand.Jason --[SPK]About this pre-established harmony: Leibniz proposed it as a wayto select the "best of possible worlds", given all possible, andexplain the synchrony of events (that his hypothesis of Monadsrequired to exist) between monads.Recall that the monads are "windowless" and to not exchangesubstances. (BTW, this effectively makes them totally disconnectedspaces if we consider the topological implication of this property ofwindowlessness!) Monads have both internal aspects (defining 1pcontent) and external aspects (defining physical reality) that , asyou point out "... follow their own laws independently of the other,but physics does not affect or could not implement a mind, nor is themind really affecting physics"; but if we follow my thesis therewould be no minds without physics nor physics without minds per se,as the duality between algebras and topological spaces is a form of"natural transformation" between Categories. Yes, there would bephysics for monads that do not have self-awareness - such aselectrons and quarks, but self-awareness is a higher ordercomputational modeling process that need not be instantiated (paceRussell) but is possible given sufficient topological and, dually,algebraic structure. So this thesis implies a very weak form ofpanpsychism.It can be proven that Leibniz's pre-ordained harmony implies alogical contradiction and thus is flawed: even an omnipotent godcannot perform computations of infinite NP-Complete problems in zerotime - which is exactly what is required to have god establish theharmony of the universe prior to creating it or as you wrote: "Godsetup both to necessarily agree before hand". How can one perform atask that requires an eternity to complete the set up in the firstplace? It cannot ever begin!The alternative to Leibniz' self-contradicting explanation is toconsider that the NP-Complete computation as running for eternity,NP-completeness concerns polynomial tractability. I have neverunderstood why you refer to it.it never begins and it never ends - kinda like Bruno's UD* - and 1pare finite instances or "streams" of this eternal computationalprocess. Each stream instantiates a Monad and the psycho-physicalparallelism is the natural result of the Stone duality between theinsidge (logical algebras) and the outside (topological spaces), noneed to have an explanation of mind and body interactions! All theneat stuff follows from considering how minds interact with eachother. The appearance of a "beginning of time (and space!)" that weseem to have is simply an artifact of the finiteness of our 1p.One interesting and strange twist of this idea is that it impliesthat we never actually observe the outside aspects of monads (Leibnizdoes mention this in his Monadology), we only experience the internalrepresentations of them. This twist is a form of the argument that wefind in the Matrix thought-experiment that since we cannot prove thatwe are not in a matrix we should assume that we are and work out theconsequences. This idea also seems consistent with Russell's thesisthat "the set of all the universes that make up the Multiverse,contains no information at all, and is in fact Nothing; it is justfrom the inside, as mere descriptions – bits of strings – that weare, that there /seems/, from our point of view, to be something."quoting fromhttp://www.scitechexplained.com/2010/06/theory-of-nothing-written-by-russell-k-standish-the-multiverse-quantum-immortality-and-the-meaning-of-life/Consciousness exists, so there is something. It can't be an illusion,given that an illusion requires consciousness. But Russell is right inthe sense that the "everything" philosophy minimize the TOEinformation needed.Recall how Observer moments are finite?Not Bostrom 1-OM, which are infinite in the mechanist theories. 3-OM are just (relative) computational states.Does this not imply that there is an event horizon effect in thehistory of an observer whose 1p is given in terms of OMs? This is aneffective cut-off on information that follows from its ability toonly resolve a finite amount of information, which is just anotherway of saying that OMs are finite. Thus this idea implies that the"singularity" of the Big bang never happened nor necessarily exists,an interesting and counter-intuitive implication! (Penrose andHawking's singularity theorems work only if gravity exists atinfinitesimal size/ infinite energy scale and this is, on its face,merely an idealization.) We would see an event horizon in our mostdistant past, but not because there is an infinite gravitationalgradient behind it. Because of this (and considerations such as thosethat Russell explains in his book), my thesis implies the "perfectcosmological principle" that any average observer would see prettymuch the same thing as any other no matter where in a universe itfound itself. All observers would see an event horizon in theirdistant past and would see a universe that they believe is middle aged.This idea also how the appearence of a Cartesian theater effect,that (pace Dennett) actually explains something without an actualinfinite regress of explanations! Basically, the homunculus of theCartesian Theater model is proposed to be something like a "strangeattractor" on the configuration space or, by the dually, computationspace of the brain. The attractor is a computational model of theglobal behavior of the brain and is capable of computing simulationsof itself since, if we believe in computational universality, a modelof a computation is a computation too. So the experience that we haveof being a "driver in a body" makes sense, given that what weactually experience of the world is the brain's Virtual Realitysimulation of the world *and* this simulation is a computationcapable of simulating itself,A computation does not necessarily simulate itself, although universalmachine can simulate their own computations.albeit at a lower resolution and level of complexity. Since the brainhas access to finite physical resoulces to run the computations therewill be a short truncation of the regress of simulations withinsimulations; maybe only 3 to 4 recursions, I figure, at the most.Kleene's theorem is the tool for cutting the infinite regression incomputer science. AUDA's self-reference, and intensional variants ofit, is 100% based on this theorem, even if it is hidden in thearithmetical soundness and completeness theorem of Solovay.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> -- Hi Bruno,

`I will give you a proper response tomorrow. Meanwhile could you`

`check out this`

`http://standish.stanford.edu/bin/object;jsessionid=7DAFF97794C811E9D29104D51BAF744B?00000071`

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