final part

On Sep 23, 3:17 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 23 Sep 2011, at 02:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:


>
>
>
> >>>>> We are machines and we can
> >>>>> feel, therefore machines can feel. Jet engines are machines they
> >>>>> can
> >>>>> fly at 30,000 feet, therefore we can fly at 30,000 feet.
>
> >>>> Indeed.
>
> >>> Without an airplane?
>
> >> 'course not.
>
> >>>>> I'd like to
> >>>>> help you out here and really give you the benefit of the doubt,
> >>>>> but it
> >>>>> just sounds like you're shrugging off a fairly obvious gap between
> >>>>> theory and reality. If functionalism-machinism were true, I would
> >>>>> expect that bacteria, viruses, fungi, parasites, etc could infect
> >>>>> computers, cell phones, or computations themselves.
>
> >>>> But they can be infected by digital viruses. To ask a program to be
> >>>> infected by a carbon based viruses is just a begging of the
> >>>> question,
> >>>> and a confusion of reality levels.
>
> >>> Why is it any different to ask a program to be infected by carbon
> >>> based personalities?
>
> >> Why would that be possible. A virus programmed to feed on plants can
> >> already not feed on animals. There is no virus capable of infecting
> >> all life forms. Why would programs need a carbon based virus for
> >> being
> >> alive. This is a non sequitur.
>
> > It's not a matter of being alive, because you are already saying that
> > one machine is as alive as another (or that it scales with degree of
> > functional complexity).
>
> One you put in parenthesis is the key thing. And it is not really a
> question of scale, but of threshold.

I can see that there is a functional threshold between the life and
death or sleeping and waking of an individual organism, but are you
also saying that there are functional thresholds which define the
aliveness of entire species? It seems to me that death would be a
problem for comp. How does comp simulate irreversible deaths? Couldn't
you always run the tape backwards?

>
> > It's a matter of being alive like we human
> > beings are alive. No virus is capable of infecting all life forms but
> > no life form is immune from all viruses. All life forms are immune to
> > computer viruses though, and all computers are immune to all
> > biological viruses. I'm asking why would a human personality be any
> > more likely to inhabit a computer than a human virus?
>
> ? because a human virus has very limited range of possibilities,
> compared to a human.

That should make it even easier for a virus to inhabit a computer?

>
>
>
> >>>>> By comp, there should be no particular reason why a Turing machine
> >>>>> should no be vulnerable to the countless (presumably Turing
> >>>>> emulable)
> >>>>> pathogens floating around.
>
> >>>> They are no programmed for doing that. They are programmed to
> >>>> infect
> >>>> very particular organism.
>
> >>> If it's close enough to emulate the consciousness of a particular
> >>> organism, why not it's vulnerability to infections?
>
> >> Because it has different clothes, and virus needs the clothes to get
> >> the key for infecting.
>
> > What are the clothes made of? If arithmetic, then it's just a matter
> > of cracking the code to make a computer virus run in humans. Why
> > wouldn't a human brain be our clothes, so that we need it to get the
> > key for consciousness?
>
> That's follows from the UDA. But comp is assumed there (not proved).

(answers in the book...)

>
>
>
> >>>>> But of course that is absurd. We cannot
> >>>>> look forward to reviving the world economy by introducing medicine
> >>>>> and
> >>>>> vaccines for computer hardware. What accounts for this one-way
> >>>>> bubble
> >>>>> which enjoys both total immunity from biological threats but
> >>>>> provides
> >>>>> full access to biological functions? If computation alone were
> >>>>> enough
> >>>>> for life, at what point will the dogs start to smell it?
>
> >>>> Confusion of level.
> >>>> With comp, dogs already smell them, in some sense.
>
> >>> Not confusion of level; clarification of level. In what sense do
> >>> dogs
> >>> smell abstract Turing emulations?
>
> >> In the sense that the Universal Dovetailer generates all possible
> >> dogs
> >> in front of all possible smelling things, but with variate and
> >> relative measure.
>
> > Does it generate all possible smells as well, and if so, what is the
> > point of going through the formality of generating them?
>
> Well, that happens, once you assume that 0, 1, 2, 3, ... obeys
> addition and multiplication laws. Notably.
>
I don't see how addition and mutiplication become olfactory,
especially if they already have all possible olfactory potentials
within them. What would be the point of realizing them in a
simulation? Why does UDA even want to run itself? Is comp curious
about what it already knows?

>
> >>>>>>>> In that paragraph you are showing that you seem to persist in
> >>>>>>>> displaying  the reductionist pre-Gödel-Turing conception of
> >>>>>>>> what
> >>>>>>>> machines are and can be.
>
> >>>>>>> Not at all. I think that I may understand more than you
> >>>>>>> assume. I
> >>>>>>> agree that 'machine' can be a spiritual term. A self-redefining
> >>>>>>> process which grows and and evolves - but that's only part of
> >>>>>>> what
> >>>>>>> life and consciousness is. The form (or one form) but not the
> >>>>>>> content.
> >>>>>>> It's like electricity without a ground (this kind of ground:
> >>>>>>>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ground_%28electricity%29). If it's
> >>>>>>> not
> >>>>>>> anchored in the common reference of literal material in the
> >>>>>>> literal
> >>>>>>> universe - with the unique instantiation coordinates drawn from
> >>>>>>> relation to the singularity, then it's a phantom imposter. A 3-p
> >>>>>>> accounting system imposed upon a compliant-but-dumb 1-p of a
> >>>>>>> semiconductor (or collection of inanimate objects, etc).
>
> >>>>>> But then you have to explain us what is not Turing emulable in
> >>>>>> those
> >>>>>> processes.
>
> >>>>> It's the the hole that it makes in the singularity.
>
> >>>> Give me a proof that such an hole (definition please) is not Turing
> >>>> emulable (nor Turing projectable: that is, a result of the comp
> >>>> first
> >>>> person indeterminacy).
>
> >>> The hole is the unique identifier of an event which constitutes it's
> >>> sequestration within the singularity.
>
> >> Define "unique", "event", "sequestration" and "singularity".
>
> > Unique meaning corresponding to a single instantiation.
> > Event meaning any phenomenon which can be experienced directly or
> > indirectly.
> > Sequestration meaning separation from other potential events.
> > Singularity meaning, the universe minus time and space. The
> > indivisible potential from which all divisible realizations emerge.
>
> This does not help a lot.
>
I'm just using the terms in a standard way. Singularity is a little
more specialized, but I think pretty straightforward. It is The
Everything of which we Theorize Of.
>
>
> >>> It is a timespace signature
>
> >> What is a "timespace", what is a "signature".
>
> > Timespace is the container of events. It's the gaps between material
> > objects and the gaps between subjective experiences.
> > Signature is my figurative description of a condensed expression of
> > unique identity.
>
> >>> composed of sensorimotive mass-energy.
>
> >> Yu said "sensorimotive"  = ontological complement to electromagnetic
> >> relativity
>
> >> explain "ontological complement to electromagnetic relativity mass-
> >> energy".
>
> > Electromagnetic relativity is a description of the phenomenology of
> > mass-energy. Mass energy is what it is, electromagnetism is what it
> > does in groups, and relativity is what groups of electromagnetic
> > groups do.
>
> > Sensorimotive perception is the ontological complement - the polar
> > opposite - the involuted pseudo-duality of electromagnetic relativity.
> > Sensorimotive phenomena are the experiencers and experiences which
> > comprise the 1-p interior of electromagnetism. Perceptions are the
> > inertial frames or worlds which group experiences and experiencers
> > together and comprises the 1-p interior of relativity.
>
> ?
Not sure how else to put it.

http://s33light.org/post/9370537190
>
>
> >>> It is the formalization
>
> >> ?
>
> > Realization.
>
> ?

Do you not recognize any difference between something actually
occurring and the idea of the possibility of it occurring?

>
>
>
> >>> of an
> >>> event as a specific energy event and as such cannot be emulated,
> >>> owing
> >>> to the cohesiveness of the singularity. There isn't any other
> >>> place to
> >>> put the hole and have it not be the hole.
>
> >> ?
>
> > It's what makes one event different from all other events...it's
> > coordinate of orientation to the ultimate.
>
> >>>>> A thing's unique
> >>>>> identity in relation to the rest of the universe.
>
> >>>> Define "universe".
>
> >>> The total coherence and relation of all perceptions.
>
> >>>>> I's a MAC address
> >>>>> than cannot be spoofed. Ultimately, a thing 'is what it is' and
> >>>>> not
> >>>>> what just we believe it to be.
>
> >>>> Which things. You cannot pretend to refute something with statement
> >>>> that vague.
>
> >>> I don't see how it's vague.
>
> >> Then you have even more work to do.
>
> > Call it the Akashic Record if you like.
>
> >>> I'm saying that everything is uniquely
> >>> instantiated from an absolutely objective perspective.
>
> >> Why not. This is can be said in comp to, for the 3-p. For the 1p,
> >> this
> >> beg the question.
>
> > I'm saying that even 3-p supervenes upon the absolute. The absolute
> > would be 0/∞-p.
>
> >>> Spoofing is a
> >>> second order function of interpretation, equating one thing for
> >>> another, but there is always the chance that some other perspective
> >>> will be able to recover the distinction.
>
> >> You lost me.
>
> > Like my example of someone remembering the patient before the surgery
> > and having a videotape of the surgery happening. The absolute would be
> > an absolute witness.
>
> >>>>>>> That's why zombies, prosthetics, blow up dolls, body snatchers,
> >>>>>>> wax
> >>>>>>> museums, taxidermy etc have the same creepy association. We
> >>>>>>> sense
> >>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>> emptiness, and the cognitive dissonance that arises in
> >>>>>>> contrast to
> >>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>> uncanny resemblance to the genuine living creature and the
> >>>>>>> hollow
> >>>>>>> form
> >>>>>>> only highlights the absence of life and awareness. Science
> >>>>>>> Fiction
> >>>>>>> is
> >>>>>>> replete with these metaphorical illustrations: Frankenstein,
> >>>>>>> HAL,
> >>>>>>> Westworld, War of The Worlds,...so many examples of sinister
> >>>>>>> attributions to both the undead and unlive. It would seem
> >>>>>>> unlikely
> >>>>>>> that these kinds of ideas could strike a chord were there not
> >>>>>>> any
> >>>>>>> significant difference between a person and a machine beyond
> >>>>>>> just a
> >>>>>>> prejudice of one relative level of complexity to another.
>
> >>>>>> That is called racism. The foreigners looks to strange, it is
> >>>>>> creepy.
>
> >>>>> It's not racism at all. Cadavers are not members a race.
>
> >>>> Machines are not cadaver.
>
> >>> No, but they are the unliving organizations. When they are presented
> >>> as living organisms, they are equivalent to animated cadavers as far
> >>> as sentience goes.
>
> >> I can do nothing with this.
>
> > Are you saying that the idea of unliving or undead is inconceivable?
>
> I was not saying that. You just fail to convey explanations.

I don't understand what more needs to be explained. Something that is
not alive being taken for something living feels a certain way
(creepy, interesting, exciting, chilling, upsetting, etc) because
there is something specific to sense there that goes beyond mere
unfamiliarity. A new kind of rock is not creepy, but things like the
Heike Crab http://www.blog.speculist.com/archives/heike%20crab.jpg are
a bit unnerving to many people. How does comp account for something
like that feeling other than just dismissing it?

>
>
>
> >>>>> They aren't
> >>>>> just unfamiliar, they are the walking dead and unliving persons.
>
> >>>> Machines are not necessarily zombies.
>
> >>> Okay, we can call them meople or something if you like.
>
> >> This will not help.
>
> >>>>> They
> >>>>> are the antithesis of human life.
>
> >>>> So you say, without any argument. That confirms that it is a sort
> >>>> of
> >>>> racism.
>
> >>> Race has nothing to do with it. That just casts some kind of social
> >>> shaming into it. It's just a functional definition. Human life is
> >>> living organisms. The antithesis of that would be things which act
> >>> like organisms but have either never been alive (machines) or have
> >>> died already but continue to supernaturally perform superficial
> >>> ambulatory-predatory functions (zombies).
>
> >> I will eventually fall asleep.
>
> > But a machine will not.
>
> A patient machine will not!
>
You're making it sound as if the machine has a choice. If I make a
perfectly frictionless impervious engine, I don't think it has any say
in the matter. It's going to keep running as long as I want to keep
feeding fuel into it.

>
> >>>>>> By machine, I just means "turing-emulable" (with or without
> >>>>>> oracle).
> >>>>>> That include us, by mechanism assumption.
> >>>>>> It is a constant that novelist foresee the future(s).
>
> >>>>> What if 'emulation' is a 1-p hallucination?
>
> >>>> Why would it be like that?
>
> >>> Because it's an interpretation that varies from subject to subject.
> >>> You see a program thinking and experiencing, I see an inevitable
> >>> execution of unexperienced instructions.
>
> >> This is what we can see when we look at brain.
>
> > I don't see instructions in the brain.
>
> They are distributed. You can emulate a neuronal net with a computer,
> and when he learn, the information/instruction get distributed in a
> non explicit way in the sensibility of each neurons.

The effect of the instructions, their consequences are distributed,
but the instructions themselves do not exist. If I read Chinese, then
a Chinese book has information for me. If I can't read it, it still
has information for my eyes. If I'm blind, it has no information.
There is no such thing as information or instruction outside of our
perceptual interpretation of it, which is rooted in out existential
identities.

>
>
>
> >>> Even in zoology, phenomena
> >>> like camouflage suggest that emulation is only 'skin deep'. If deep
> >>> emulation were possible, I think you would have organisms which
> >>> evolve
> >>> chameleon powers which fool all predators, not just some. An animal
> >>> that can turn into a stone would be far superior to one which can
> >>> imagine funny stories.
>
> >> It depends of the context.
>
> > Not necessarily.
>
> Well, an octopus can turn into a stone appearance, but is it superior
> to a human comic?
>
Sure it would. Maybe not a stone 'appearance' but to be able to
actually become a stone to all observers I would think would be more
of an advantage than any esoteric fiction. What is going to come after
you if you are a rock?

>
> >>>>> How could it really not
> >>>>> be? If we only can project our perception of a process onto a
> >>>>> machine,
> >>>>> why would the rest of the process that we can't perceive
> >>>>> automatically
> >>>>> arise?
>
> >>>> Why not?
>
> >>> Because we're not putting it in there.
>
> >> We don't need to. The UMs have it at the start, and the LUMs can know
> >> that.
>
> > How do you know they have it? Where does it come from?
>
> Computer science. Arithmetic.

It's circular reasoning to me. You are just defining qualia as
arithmetic from the beginning, and then saying that since computer
science exposes the arithmetic which you imagine has something to do
with private perception, then that proves that the qualia must come
with the arithmetic. It's as if you are saying that life is nothing
but reproduction therefore anything that reproduces (copy machines,
financial transactions, etc) is alive.

We aren't seeing that pan out though, and I think I know exactly why
but you won't seriously consider it. You've just made the theory
unfalsifiable by disqualifying any significant difference between
fantasy and reality, living and non-living, mind and body.

>
>
>
> >>> It's like if you have only a
> >>> way to detect sugar and water, your version of imitation orange
> >>> juice
> >>> would be the same as your imitation grape juice, just sugar water.
>
> >> That is a poor analogy, which again fails to notice the richness of
> >> machine's inner life (the one they can talk about partially, like
> >> us).
>
> > There is no way to tell that a machine's inner life is not just our
> > outer mechanics.
>
> There is no way to tell that a Craig's inner life is not just my
> outer mechanics.

Not for you, no. Yet you claim to know that my inner life can be
reproduced by comp.

>
>
>
> >>>>>>> I think that you are jumping to the conclusion that simulation
> >>>>>>> does
> >>>>>>> not require an interpreter which is anchored in matter.
>
> >>>>>> That follows from the UDA-step-8. If my own emulation requires a
> >>>>>> material digital machine, then it does not require a material
> >>>>>> machine.
>
> >>>>> Not to produce the 3-p simulacra of you, no, but to produce your
> >>>>> genuine 1-p emulation, it would require the same material
> >>>>> machine as
> >>>>> you do.
>
> >>>> Why?
>
> >>> Because the interior of that material is the subject which is
> >>> experiencing the 1-p phenomena.
>
> >> define "interior of material", in a way we can understand (not in a
> >> sequence of complex words we despair to have intelligible
> >> definitions).
>
> > Interior of material is straightforward. You view the world from
> > inside of your head, or body, or house. So does everything else.
>
> That's projective geometry. Interesting, but too poor for the rich 1p
> phenomenon.
>
It's not a sealed container, it's just a vantage point. We see
*through* the inside of our brain and eyes, not just looking at the
inside of our brain but out into the world. The inside of our brain
sees the outsides of our body's world through the inside of our eyes.
It's richer than 3p because it is bringing all of history compressed
as interpretive projections and pattern recognitions specific to that
1p subjective reality tunnel.

>
>
> >>>>> A material digital machine would not suffice because the
> >>>>> material which the machine is being executed digitally on already
> >>>>> has
> >>>>> it's own (servile and somnambulant compared to organic chemistry)
> >>>>> genuine 1-p experience.
>
> >>>> So our consciousness is the consciousness of our basic elements.
>
> >>> No, not at all. It is the conscious synthesis of the consciousness
> >>> of
> >>> our basic elements.
>
> >> This makes only both consciousness and matter mysterious in an ad hoc
> >> way. That is not enough to refute a competing theory.
>
> > It doesn't make anything mysterious to me.
>
> That might be your problem. You might study books on the mind-body
> problem.
> Read papers, and submit solution to problems. Ot make your theory
> precise enough to submit new questions.

That might be possible, yeah, although you have to understand that to
me it's like telling me 'you should read what the alchemists are
saying and submit your solutions to producing lapis philosophorum, or
make your theory precise enough so that they can figure out if it's
any good for turning lead into gold'.

>
>
>
> >>>> This
> >>>> explains nothing. Neither consciousness nor matter. It leads to an
> >>>> open infinite regress, which needs infinities to overcome all
> >>>> possible
> >>>> machines.
>
> >>> I think it explains everything.
>
> >> Explains just one thing, just to see.
>
> >>> I don't see any infinities at all.
>
> >> Then we are Turing emulable.
>
> > There can't be finite non-comps?
>
> That is ambiguous. The word "finite" is as much tricky than
> "infinite". I have aslked for an example, and you gave me "yellow",
> but you did not succeed in showing what is non computable there.
> (Except the qualia itself, but this is already the case for machines,
> and actually, is not a finite things).

Yellow is the qualia itself (what else would it be?) Why isn't the
qualia of yellow finite? It comes between orange and green in the
visible spectrum. It's perceived as a product of red and green light,
etc. It's a primary color in ink. What isn't finite about it?

>
>
>
> >>>>>> Matter is what glue the machine dreams,
>
> >>>>> I think that it is obviously not. If we were machines and that
> >>>>> were
> >>>>> true, then we should come out of the womb filled with intuitions
> >>>>> about
> >>>>> electronics, chemistry, and mathematics, not ghosts and space
> >>>>> monsters. Dreams are not material, they are living subjective
> >>>>> feelings. Matter is what is too boring and repetitive to be
> >>>>> dreamed
> >>>>> of. Too tiny and too vast, too hot and cold, dense and ephemeral
> >>>>> for
> >>>>> dreams. Dream bullets don't make much of an impact.  Dream
> >>>>> injuries
> >>>>> don't have to heal.
>
> >>>> You beg the question.
>
> >>> I don't see how.
>
> >> Because you say that dream bullet does not do injuries, but comp
> >> explains that virtual bullet can injured a virtual observer.
>
> > But that doesn't play out experimentally. In a dream virtual bullets
> > can have ambiguous effects, no effects, instant healing, etc.
>
> Not if the virtual reality operated below my subst level. The virtual
> bullet will injure me as much as in "reality".

That's not true. It only seems like it should be that way in a purely
theoretical Matrix-like way. There is no dream that can deliver any
pain comparable with an actual serious injury, especially not the
reality of the hundreds of hours it takes to heal. You assume from the
start that reality is insubstantial and then prove it to yourself by
saying that substance isn't real. I would call this Strong Simulation,
and the problem with it is that it makes it too hard for the truth to
get through. Were it not imposed programmatically from the outside,
there is no access for sense to take place. There is no common sense
or ground wire to orient the connectivity of things.

>
>
>
> >> So as an
> >> argument, you are just saying -that we are not virtual, without
> >> explanations.
>
> > No, I'm saying that we are not only virtual, we are actual as well.
> > The explanation is that we can conceptualize a difference between
> > dream and reality - regardless of the veracity of that difference.
> > Determinism and comp would have no use for a concept of non-
> > simulation.
>
> I have to go. I might comment later the rest of your post. But it
> might be my last comments to you, given that I am not particularly
> interested in any non comp theory, and a bit bored by your systematic
> way to elude arguments, mainly by referring to personal opinion. I
> respect non-comp believers, but I do have a problem with invalid
> arguments, and/or much too much fuzzy prose, and, especially, your
> unwillingness to ameliorate it. I hope you don't mind my frankness,
>
> Bruno

I'm ok with that. We've probably said about all there is to say on the
subject, and these posts are getting incredibly lengthy.

Thanks,
Craig

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