OK, well I think this and the other responses (notably Jason's) have
brought me a lot closer to grasping the essence of this argument. I
can see that the set of integers is also the set of all possible
information states, and that the difference between that and the UD is
the element of sequential computation. I can also see that my
objection to infinite computational resources and state memory comes
from the 1-p perspective. For me, in the "physical" universe, any
computation is restricted by the laws of matter and must be embedded
in that matter. Now one of the fascinating revelations of the
computational approach to physics is the fact that a quantity such as
position can only be defined to a certain level of precision by the
universe itself because the universe has finite informational
resources at its disposal. This was my objection to the UD. But I can
see that this restriction need not necessarily apply at the 'higher' 3-
p level of the UD's computations. What interests me is the question:
does UDA predict that the 1-p observer will see a universe with such
restrictions? If it explains why the 1-p observer seems to exist in a
world where there is only a finite number of bits available, despite
existing in a machine with an infinite level of bit resolution, then
that would be a most interesting result. Otherwise, it seems to me to
remain a problem for the theory, or at least a question in need of an
answer, like dark matter in cosmology.

I am going to have to meditate further on arithmetical realism. I
don't believe in objective matter either (it seems refuted by Bell's
Theorem anyway), but a chasm seems to lie between the statement  "17
is prime" and "the UDA (Robinson arithmetic) executes all possible
programs". The problem is one of instantiation. I can conceive of a
universe - a singularity perhaps, with only one bit of information -
in which the statement "17 is prime" can never be made. To formulate,
ie instantiate, 17, requires a certain amount of information. To say
that a program executes, as opposed to saying it merely is implied by
a set of theoretical axioms, requires the instantiation of that
algorithm. I suppose this is a restatement of the problem above.
Arithemetical realism then would be the postulate that everything
implied in arithmetic is actually instantiated. It seems to me I can
grant 17 is prime, without granting this instantiation of everything.

I'm also troubled by the statement that you have proved in the AUDA
that any Lobian machine can apprehend the UDA. Is not a three-year-old
child and a cat a Lobian machine? Or indeed my senile father. How can
you assert they could comprehend such an abstraction? Either they
aren't Lobian machines, or there's hole in the proof somewhere,
surely!

Jason mentions the anthropic principle (which of course I'm well
acquainted with) and the idea of the computations which contain
observers. I have read, without following, some of your propositions
involving the Beweisbar predicate and self-referential relations and
what have you. Is that the formalism that is supposed to define which
computations are conscious? Is there a summary somewhere? I am
wondering how consciousness can possibly be an attribute of some
computations and not others, and why, if it's a matter of some certain
mathematical properties of the computations, we could not fairly
easily write a conscious algorithm? Surely complexity can't be the
defining feature (at what arbitrary level of complexity does the light
come on?), so it should be a simple matter. (Though the proof of
having created consciousness in the program would be a problem!) Don't
we have to define consciousness (not necessarily self-awareness, or
the awareness of being aware) as a property of numbers per se?

Sadly when you start to talk about the difficulty of proving that our
histories in the UD are more random than the actual histories we
observe, I can't follow you any more - too much theory I'm unfamiliar
with. I can see however that many (nearly all) of the infinite
computations passing through our aware states will destroy us, as it
were, so we can never exist in those computations (sort of anthropic
principle). This also suggests a kind of immortality, the same kind as
I propose in a blog post I wrote called the 'cryogenic paradox' in
which I argue that there can only be a single observer, a single locus
of consciousness underlying all apparently separate consciousnesses,
which would really be just different perspectives of this one
observer. It seems irresistible as a conclusion (from philosophical
arguments quite different to the UDA), and yet also kind of horrific.
Only a sort of state-bound recall barrier prevents us from being aware
that we suffer every fate possible.

I agree re academia. From all I can observe, it is a viper's pit. The
ground of accepted truth is fought over as hard as any piece of the
Holy Land, and in this as in all struggles, power matters. It is
hardly the free and unbiased exchange between equal and curious minds!
We are not so different today from the cardinals who refused to look
down Galileo's telescope.

Finally, I despise all theory that makes obscurity a virtue. Compare
Lacan's tedious impenetrability with Einstein's almost childish
simplicity and profundity. Obscurity is the darkness which merely
clever minds use to cover their nakedness (to invoke the emperor
again). No insult to you, Bruno, intended, this time.

On Sep 27, 2:08 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 26 Sep 2011, at 04:42, Pierz wrote:
>
> > OK, well first of all let me retract any ad hominem remarks that may
> > have offended you. Call it a rhetorical flourish! I apologise. There
> > are clearly some theories which require a profound amount of dedicated
> > learning to understand - such as QFT. I majored in History and
> > Philosophy of Science and work as a programmer and a writer. I am not
> > a mathematician - the furthest I took it was first year uni, and I
> > couldn't integrate to save myself any more. Therefore if the truth of
> > an argument lies deep within a difficult mathematical proof, chances
> > are I won't be able to reach it.
>
> That is the reason why I separate UDA from AUDA. Normally UDA can be  
> understood without much math, which does not mean that it is simple,  
> especially the step 8. (but the first seven step shows already the big  
> picture).
>
> AUDA, unfortunately, needs a familiarity with logic, which  
> unfortunately is rather rare (only professional logicians seems to  
> have it).
>
> > Then my ignorance would hardly
> > constitute a criticism, and so it may be with UDA and my complaint of
> > obscurity.
>
> When I teach orally UDA. The first seven step are easily understood.  
> This contains most of the key result (indeterminacy, non-locality, non  
> cloning theorem, and the reversal physics/theology (say) in case the  
> universe is robust.
>
> The step 8 is intrinsicaly difficult, and can be done before. A long  
> time ago, I always presented first the "step 8" (the movie graph  
> argument) and then the UDA1-7.
>
> I am still not entirely satisfied myself by the step 8 pedagogy.
>
> > On the other hand, it seems to me that ideas about the core
> > nature of reality can and should be presented in the clearest, most
> > intelligible language possible.
>
> I have 700 pages version, 300 pages version, 120 pages version, up to  
> sane04 which about a 20 pages version. The long version have been  
> ordered to me by french people, and are written in french.
> The interdisciplinary nature of the subject makes it difficult to  
> satisfied everybody. What is simple for a logician is terribly  
> difficult for a physicist. What is obvious for philosphers of mind,  
> can make no sense for a logician or a physicist, what is taken granted  
> by physicists are total enigma for logicians, etc.
>
> > I can't solve QFT equations, but I can
> > grasp the fundamental ideas of the uncertainty principle, non-
> > locality, wave-particle duality, decoherence and so on. I'm not
> > arguing for dumbed-down philosophy, but maximal clarity.
>
> OK. Note that my work has been peer reviewed, and is considered by  
> many as being too much clear, which is a problem in a field (theology)  
> which is still taboo (for some christian, and especially the atheist  
> version of christianism). I can appear clear only to people capable of  
> acknowledging that science has not yet decided between Aristotle and  
> Plato reality view. So when I am clear, I can look too much  
> provocative for some.
>
> > Having said
> > that, I'm prepared to put effort in to learn something new if I have
> > misunderstood something.
>
> OK. Nice attitude.
>
>
>
> > You have misread my tone if you think it indicates bias against your
> > theory. I have read your paper (at least the UDA part, not the machine
> > interview) several times, carefully, and presented it to my (informal)
> > philosophy group, because I certainly find it intriguing.
>
> OK. Nice.
>
> > I'll admit
> > that step 8 is where I struggle
>
> Hmm, from your post, it seemed to me that there remains some problem  
> in UDA1-7.
>
> > - it's not well explained in the paper
> > yet contains the all the really sweeping and startling assertions.
>
> When I presented UDA at the ASSC meeting of 1995 (I think) a "famous"  
> philosopher of mind left the room at step 3 (the duplication step). He  
> pretended that we feel to be at both places at once after a self-
> duplication experience. It was the first time someone told me this. I  
> don't know if he was sincere. It looks some people want to believe UDA  
> wrong, and are able to dismiss any step.
>
> > The
> > argument about passive devices activated by counterfactual changes in
> > the environment is opaque to me and seems devious - probably defeated
> > in the details of implementation like Maxwell's demon - but that is
> > obviously not a rebuttal. I will take a look at the additional
> > information you've linked to.
>
> OK. Maudlin has found a very close argument. Mine is simpler (and  
> older).
>
>
>
> > I can see that you are actually right in asserting that the UDA's
> > computations are not random,
>
> OK.
>
> > but I'm not sure that negates the core of
> > my objection. Actually what the UDA does is produce a bit field
> > containing every possible arrangement of bits. Is this not correct?
>
> It generates old inputs of all programs, including infinite streams.  
> Those can be considered as random. But what the program does with such  
> input is not random.
>
> > I
> > am open to contradiction on this. If it doesn't, then it means it has
> > to be incapable of producing certain patterns of bits, but in
> > principle every possible pattern of bits must be able to be generated.
>
> As inputs, yes. As computation? No.
>
> > Now a machine with infinite processing power and infinite state memory
> > that merely generates random bit sequences would eventually also
> > generate every possible arrangement of bits. So the UDA and the
> > ultimate random generator are indistinguishable AFAICS.
>
> Not really. In fact the random inputs might play a role in making  
> possible to have a measure on the computational histories. It can  
> entail also that the "winning computations" (= those being normal in  
> the Gaussian sense) inherit a random background, which would make  
> other feature of the usual (quantum) physics confirming comp. Everett  
> QM makes such a random background unavoidable in any normal branch of  
> the universe, like when we send a sheaf of electron prepared in the  
> state (1/sqrt(2)(up + down), on a device measuring them in the {up,  
> down} base. This should not be a problem, and if it proved to be an  
> insuperable problem, then comp is refuted. I have no problem with  
> that, given that my goal consists in showing that comp is "scientific"  
> in the popperian sense (refutable).
>
>
>
> > I think what you are saying is that somehow this computation produces
> > more pattern and order than a program which simply generates all
> > possible arrangements of bits. Why? If I were to select at random some
> > algorithm from the set of all possible algorithms, it would be pretty
> > much noise almost all the time. *Proving* it is noise is of course
> > impossible, because meaning is a function of context. You've selected
> > out "the program emulating the Heisenberg matrix of the Milky Way",
> > but among all the other possible procedures will be a zillion more
> > that perform this operation, but also add in various other quantities
> > and computations that render the results useless from a physicist's
> > point of view. There are certainly all kinds of amazing procedures and
> > unfound discoveries lying deep in the UDA's repertoire of algorithms,
> > but only when we intelligently derive an equation by some other means
> > (measurements, theory, revision, testing etc) can we find out which
> > ones are signal and which ones noise.
>
> Suppose that you are currently in state S (which exist by the comp  
> assumption). The UD generates an infinity of computations going  
> through that state. All what I say is that your future is determined  
> by all those computations, and your self-referential abilities. If  
> from this you can prove that your future is more random than the one  
> observed, then you are beginning to refute rigorously comp. But the  
> math part shows that this is not easy to do. In fact the random inputs  
> confer stability for the programs which exploits that randomness, and  
> again, this is the case for some formulation (à-la Feynman) of QM.
>
>
>
> >>> Fine. But then we can simply dispense with the UD altogether and  
> >>> just
> >>> gather up its final results,
>
> >> This does not make any sense. A non stopping program does not output
> >> anything.
>
> > OK. I realised after I posted that this was wrong, actually hasty
> > shorthand for what I was trying to say - didn't have time for an
> > amendment. By 'results' I mean the machine's state. It seems that for
> > the UDA to work, we have to assume that the simulation has 'finished',
> > even though from a 3p perspective it never can.
>
> I don't think so. The terminating computation are on the contrary rare  
> compared to the non terminating, and so might have a null measure. To  
> "appear" in the UD*, all we need is that some program go through your  
> state, not that a program has to stop on that state, or output that  
> state.
>
> > What I mean is, if the
> > UDA had just started running, it wouldn't have any complex
> > representations in its trace yet. And since the UDA exists purely
> > mathematically, platonically, how can it be subject to time at all?
>
> The UD generate all "times" in relation with its own internal time,  
> which can be defined by the steps of its own computation.
> This gives a block mindscape, no more threatening subjective time or  
> physical time than any physicalist bloc-universe conception of  
> reality, which in physics is already necessary with special relativity.
>
> > It
> > has no processing limitations, so any notion of time as a factor can
> > be disregarded. Otherwise you'd have to say that to process an
> > instruction takes t amount of time, and where would such a constant
> > come from?
>
> Just imagine the trace of the UD.
> You have many notion of time.
> The most basic one is given, as I said, by the number of step of the  
> UD itself.
> Then, for each program generated, you can take the number of steps of  
> that particular program. Those are sub-step of the preceding one. If a  
> self-aware creature appears on that particular computation, he will  
> not be aware of the UD step, but might be aware of the step of "its  
> own" program.
> There many other times notion. The subjective time (à-la Bergson) is  
> recovered by the logic of knowledge of the self-aware entity  
> themselves, and handled by the logic of self-reference.
>
> > The time taken to compute something in the physical world
> > is a function of the fact that all computation we know of is bound to
> > the manipulation of physical substrates that are embedded in the
> > constraints of time, space and energy. Sequentiality in the UDA is
> > purely conceptual.
>
> Perhaps, but it is better to remain neutral about the primary or not  
> nature of the physical time. No physical theories is assumed, beyond  
> the fact that we need some physical reality (but not necessarily a  
> primitive one). If not, you beg the question.
>
> >  And because my 1-p moments could be anywhere in
> > the UD's record of histories, I can't speak about where the UD is up
> > to in its work 'now', but just have to take it as all somehow 'done',
>
> Right. And you next 1p moment, results from the statistical  
> indeterminacy in UD*.
>
> > even though it can 'never' be done. I'm granting this, even though it
> > is itself problematic. 'Results'  was my clumsy shorthand for the UD's
> > infinite record of states.
>
> OK.
>
>
>
> > If this is a misunderstanding, I'm sure you'll point it out!
>
> It is correct, but the states are connected. From the 3p description  
> of each computation, they are connected by the program leading to such  
> computation. From the 1-p views, it is quite different, they are  
> connected by all programs leading to such states. It is a bit like  
> there is a competition among infinities of (universal) programs for  
> defining your private 1p history.
>
>
>
> > Actually I'm not sure why you have to resort to the dovetailing in the
> > first place. Since you grant your machine infinite computational
> > resources, why not grant it parallelism? Just to make it a Turing
> > machine? The Turing machine is just an idea, there's no reason to
> > think the universe (whatever the hell that is) has to be serial in its
> > workings.
>
> The UD is not the universe. To be sure, there is no physical primary  
> universe at all (unless some number conspiracy is at play, which  
> cannot be entirely excluded, but this would mean my brain is the  
> physical universe, which I doubt). Physical reality is defined by the  
> way infinitely many computations define normal and lawful shared  
> "dreams".
> Dovetailing assure that the set of all computations is a well define  
> effective set. Parallelism is defined from this. If I postulate  
> parallelism, this will be difficult, and ambiguous. The work relies on  
> Church thesis, for making "universal" mathematically and precisely  
> definable.
>
>
>
> >> The existence of the UD is already a theorem of Peano
> >> Arithmetic.Robinson arithmetic *is* a UD.
>
> > Huh? You've inverted ontological priority completely. Any form of
> > arithmetic is a product of human intelligence.
>
> For a logician, a theory is just a number, relatively to another  
> number. They exist independently of us, like the number 17 exists  
> independently of us. Human wiill use richer alphabet, but  
> axiomatizable theories are really machine or program, or recursively  
> enumerable set (this can been made precise by a theorem of Craig).
> In AUDA I use Robinson arithmetic as defining the basic ontology. It  
> is just a logician rendering of a sigma_1 complete theory/machine,  
> that is a Turing universal machine. Then, the more richer theories  
> (like the infinitely richer Löbian observers) are simulated by  
> Robinson arithmetic. That is a particularity of comp: the ontology is  
> much less rich than the epistemology on the internal observer, like  
> the UD is dumber than an infinity of the programs that it will run.
>
> > Just because someone
> > has mentally constructed a mathematics with the structure of the UD
> > does not instantiate a UD that actually 'runs' and creates the whole
> > universe!
>
> The expression "whole universe" is ambiguous, and far more complex to  
> define than the elementary arithmetical truth needed.
> Also, we should better be agnostic on the primary existence of that  
> universe. Its primary existence is not a scientific fact.
> All you need to "believe", to give sense to the comp hyp. is that  
> elementary arithmetical truth are not dependent of humans.
> In case you believe that, "17 is prime" does depend on humans, then I  
> will ask you to define human, and to explain me the dependence in a  
> theory which does not assume its independence. Actually, logicians  
> have proved that this is not possible. Elementary arithmetic, or  
> equivalent, have to be postulated.
>
> > That is a vast mathematical hubris - akin to the way any
> > person tends to over-apply their dominant metaphors. As a writer it's
> > very easy to see the universe as a vast story.
>
> Comp implies that the phsyical reality will appear to be deep (very  
> long, perhaps infinitely long) from the internal observers point of  
> view. To stabilize sharable computations, we need deep computation (in  
> the Bennett sense of deep), and linearity at the botton, which has  
> already been isolated from self-reference logics (I skip the nuance  
> for not being too much long and technical).
>
> > As a programmer, I see
> > algorithms everywhere. But I'm not so inflated as to think it's more
> > than a metaphor.
>
> The key point here, is that if you say "yes to a doctor", he will put  
> in your skull a computer, and this, in case you survive (the comp  
> case) is not a metaphor.
> If you want, no digital machine can distinguish a mathematical reality  
> from a primary physical one. And the mathematical definition of  
> reality by physicist are also given by particular universal machine.  
> Who run those machine. Comp gives an answer: they are run by the laws  
> of addition or multiplication of numbers, or by the laws of  
> abstraction and application of lambda term. Eventually, physics is  
> shown to not depend on the choice of the initial universal system. In  
> a sense, physics is treachery: it postulate the simplest universal  
> machine that we observe. But comp explain that the physical universe  
> cannot be such a machine, and that if we want to extract both qualia  
> and quanta, we have to derived the physical laws from any universal  
> machine.
>
> > I can invent my own logically consistent set of
> > axioms right here and now, but I wouldn't presume it was anything more
> > than a set of mental relations.
>
> Don't take the mental granted. Don't take the physical granted.
>
>
>
> > Oh, and :
> >> A  proof is only something presented as a proof. You can only say:  
> >> here
> >> is the flaw, (in case you have found one). I guess that is what you
> >> did, or thought you did.
>
> > That's kind of pedantic. You know what I'm doing.
>
> > Unfortunately I don't have time to continue my response/questions now
> > - I'm amazed and impressed you can find the time for such detailed
> > responses to random ignorants such as me!
>
> If ever you understand AUDA, you will understand that UDA is  
> understandable by any Löbian universal machine.
> The only problem with the "old" humans, is that they are not always  
> aware of their millenary assumption/prejudices, especially when they  
> are experts, curiously enough. I like to share my questioning with  
> people having a personal sincere interest.
>
> > I'm more than prepared to
> > concede my naivete and have my eyes opened to the revelation of UDA.
>
> Lol. You can follow UDA on the entheogen forum. Ah but I see you just  
> send a post there too. Good. Ask there, because I don't want to bore  
> too much the people of the everything list with a nth explanation of  
> UDA. Unless other insist, I prefer to link people to the UDA treads of  
> the entheogen forum.
>
> > On the other hand, the intelligent naive person has some advantages
> > (hence the emperor's clothes reference).
>
> Some universities (not all, not all departments 'course) are often as  
> much rotten than some political government. The diploma sometimes  
> measure only the ability to lick the shoes of bosses, and in the right  
> order, please. Human are still driven by the gene: "the boss is  
> right". Useful in war, and in hard life competition, but a bullet for  
> free exploration.
>
> Layman have often a more genuine interest, and they are less blinded  
> by their expertise, and narrow specialities. We live a sad period for  
> knowledge, education, science, and even art. The "publish or perish"  
> dicto has transformed some researcher into cut and paste machine,  
> searching only funding and nothing else.
>
> > Whether I'm the child in the
> > story or merely ignorant is the question. I remain open the
> > discovering the latter.
>
> It is up to you,
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> > On Sep 26, 3:20 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 25 Sep 2011, at 04:20, Pierz wrote:
>
> >>> OK, so I've read the UDA and I 'get' it,
>
> >> Wow. Nice!
>
> >>> but at the moment I simply
> >>> can't accept that it is anything like a 'proof'.
>
> >> Hmm... (Then you should not say "I get it", but "I don't get it"). A
> >> proof is only something presented as a proof. You can only say: here
> >> is the flaw, (in case you have found one). I guess that is what you
> >> did, or thought you did.
>
> >>> I keep reading Bruno
> >>> making statements like "If we are machine-emulable, then physics is
> >>> necessarily reducible to number psychology", but to me there remain
> >>> serious flaws, not in the logic per se, but in the assumptions.
>
> >>> Bruno says that "no science fiction devices are necessary, other  
> >>> than
> >>> the robust physical universe".
>
> >> To get the step-7. But that robust universe assumption is discharged
> >> in the step 8. Which I have explained with more details (than in
> >> sane04) on this very list:
>
> >>http://www.nabble.com/MGA-1-td20566948.html#a20566948
>
> >>> He also claims that to argue that the
> >>> universe may not be large or robust enough (by robust I assume he
> >>> means stable over time)  to support his Universal Dovetailer is "ad
> >>> hoc and disgraceful". I think it is anything but.
>
> >> By robust I mean expanding enough to run the UD.
>
> >> It is disgraceful with respect to the reasoning. But if for some
> >> reason, you believe that there are evidence that the physical  
> >> universe
> >> does develop the infinite running of a UD, then you can skip the last
> >> (and most difficult) step 8. Physics is already a branch of computer
> >> science/number theory, in that case.
>
> >> This is funny: if we have evidence that the physical universe has a
> >> never ending running UD, then we can from step 7 alone conclude that
> >> physics is a branch of number theory. And by Occam, we don't need to
> >> assume the primitive physical universe.
> >> But we don't, and I doubt we can, have such an evidence. The UD
> >> running is very demanding. Not only the universe must expand
> >> infinitely, but in a way which connect solidly all its parts. Better
> >> to grasp the step 8 (the movie graph argument).
>
> >>> To describe such an
> >>> argument as "disgraceful" is to dismiss with a wave of the hand the
> >>> entirety of modern cosmology and physics, disciplines which after  
> >>> all
> >>> have managed to produce a great deal more results in the way of
> >>> prediction, explanation and tangible benefits than Bruno's theory (I
> >>> insist it is a theory and not a 'result').
>
> >> Yes, it is the theory known as "mechanism". The theory that the brain
> >> is a natural machine.  The result is that physics emerges from
> >> numbers, or combinators, or from any first order specification of a
> >> universal machine, in the sense of theoretical computer science
> >> (branch of math).
>
> >>> As a computer science
> >>> expert, I assume Bruno is aware of modern computational approaches  
> >>> to
> >>> physics. Such approaches explicitly forbid any kind of 'infinite
> >>> informational resolution' as is required by Bruno's theory.
>
> >> Where is this required?
>
> >> Note that as a corollary of UDA we can show that the physical  
> >> universe
> >> is not a computable object, a priori.
> >> The computational approach to physics can have many interesting
> >> application, but it can't tackle the mind body problem. But to get
> >> this, it is better to grasp UDA first.
>
> >>> The
> >>> information content of the universe is seen as being a fundamental
> >>> quantity much like energy, constantly transforming but conserved  
> >>> over
> >>> the whole system in the same way energy is.
>
> >> There is no assumption about the universe in the theory. We assume
> >> only that the brain (or the generalized brain, that is the portion of
> >> observable things needed to be emulated for my consciousness to be
> >> preserved) is Turing emulable.
>
> >> UDA assumes the existence of brains and doctors, and thus on some
> >> physical reality, but not on a primitive physical reality. At the
> >> start of the UDA, we are neutral on the nature of both mind and
> >> universes.
>
> >>> This computational
> >>> approach indeed seems to be the *basis* for much of Bruno talks  
> >>> about
> >>> (computability, emulability and so on are all fundamental ideas),  
> >>> but
> >>> then he flies in the face of it by proposing some kind of automated,
> >>> Platonic computation devoid of any constraints in terms of state
> >>> memory or time.
>
> >> Computation is a mathematical notion, discovered by Post, Turing,  
> >> etc.
> >> It is based on the notion of state memory, time steps, etc. It is not
> >> base on physical implementation of those notion (unlike engineering).
>
> >>> Let's take a look at the UD. Obviously this is not an 'intelligent'
> >>> device,
>
> >> You are right. It is very dumb. It is not even Turing universal, and
> >> it computes in the most complex possible way the empty function (it
> >> has no input, it has no output).
>
> >>> beyond the intelligence implicit in the very simple base
> >>> algorithm. It just runs every possible computer program.
>
> >> Yes.
>
> >>> Random
> >>> computer programs are made of and produce *static*, they are a  
> >>> random
> >>> arrangement of bits.
>
> >> There is no randomness in the work of the UD.
>
> >>> Now clearly, we know that if you look at a large
> >>> enough field of static, you will find pictures in it, assemblies of
> >>> dots that happen to form structured, intelligible images.
>
> >> OK. But they are not related by computations. Neither in the first
> >> person views, nor in the third person views.
>
> >>> Likewise in
> >>> the field of random computed algorithms, very very occasionally one
> >>> will make some kind of 'sense', although the sense will naturally be
> >>> entirely accidental and in the vast, vast majority of cases will  
> >>> give
> >>> way a moment later to nonsense again.
>
> >> The only randomness which might appear comes from the first person
> >> indterminacy, and the fact that we acnnot know in which computation  
> >> we
> >> are. This leads to the "white rabbit" problem, but the computation
> >> themselves are not random at all, and the WR problem is basically the
> >> problem to which physics is reduced too, at the conclusion of the
> >> reasoning.
>
> >>> So when the UD runs through its
> >>> current sequence of programs, what it is really doing is just
> >>> generating a vast random field of bits.
>
> >> I have not the slightest clue why you say that. It is provably false.
> >> No program can generate randomness in this third person way. The
> >> randomness ¨possible* can only appear from the first person (emulated
> >> in the UD) perspective.
>
> >> The UD generates, to give an example, the program emulating the
> >> Heisenberg matrix of the Milky Way, at the level of string theory,  
> >> and
> >> this with 10^(10^(10^(10^(10^9999999))))) digits. Notably. Actually  
> >> it
> >> does it also with 10^(10^(10^(10^(10^9999999)))))  + 1 digits, and
> >> 10^(10^(10^(10^(10^9999999))))) + 2 digits, etc.
> >> The point here is that all those running are not random structures.  
> >> In
> >> fact, there is no randomness at all.
>
> >>> Nonetheless, each of these
> >>> individual programs needs to have potentially infinite state memory
> >>> available to it (the Turing machine tape). Now the list of of  
> >>> programs
> >>> run by the machine continues to grow with each iteration as it adds
> >>> new algorithms, so it takes longer and longer to return to program 0
> >>> to run the next operation.
>
> >> Right. Note that such delays are not perceptible for the emulated
> >> observers.
>
> >>> As it needs to run *all* programs, a
> >>> necessarily infinite number, it requires infinite time, but for some
> >>> reason Bruno thinks this is not important.
>
> >> It is utterly important.
>
> >> This why the first person indeterminacy bears on a continuum, despite
> >> the digitalness of all present factors.
>
> >> You attribute me things which I never say, here. n the contrary, the
> >> fact that the UD never stops is crucial.
>
> >>> Either it has infinite
> >>> processing speed as well as memory, or it has infinite time on its
> >>> hands.
>
> >> The UD* (the infinite trace or running of the UD) is part of a tiny
> >> part of arithmetical truth (the sigma_1 arithmetical truth).
> >> Step 8 makes the physical running of the UD irrelevant.
> >> UD and UD* are mathematical notion (indeed arithmetical relations).
>
> >>> Fine. But then we can simply dispense with the UD altogether and  
> >>> just
> >>> gather up its final results,
>
> >> This does not make any sense. A non stopping program does not output
> >> anything.
>
> >>> which is an infinite field of static, a
> >>> giant digital manuscript typed by infinite monkeys. Everything  
> >>> capable
> >>> of being represented by information will exist in this field, which
> >>> means it is capable of "explaining" everything. And nothing.
>
> >> I think you miss the step 3: the first person indeterminacy. I think
> >> you miss also the arithmetical non random dynamic of the UD. You are
> >> confusing an infinite set of information, with an infinite non random
> >> and well defined particular computation.
>
> >>> We have to deconstruct the notion of "computation" here. Computation
> >>> is the orderly transformation of information.
>
> >> I can agree, although information is more an emerging notion. It is
> >> not used in the definition of computation.
>
> >>> But the UD's orderliness
> >>> is the orderliness of the typing monkey.
>
> >> Not at all. It is the orderliness of the computations. Or the
> >> orderliness of the sigma_1 sentences and the logic of their
> >> probability/consistency (as it is made completely transparent in the
> >> AUDA: the translation of the UDA in arithmetic, or in the language of
> >> the Löbian machine).
>
> >>> If it is orderly at all, it
> >>> is by mistake.
>
> >> It is 100% orderly.
>
> >>> By talking about it the UD as performing computation
> >>> more intelligence is implicitly imputed than this hypothetical  
> >>> device
> >>> possesses.
>
> >> Where? The existence of the UD is already a theorem of Peano
> >> Arithmetic. Robinson arithmetic *is* a UD. You need only the
> >> intelligence for grasping addition and multiplication. The UD has  
> >> been
> >> implemented:http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume4CC/4%20GEN%20%26%20
> >> ...
>
> >> And besides, the physical and psychological (theological,
> >> biological,..) order are brought by the machines from inside the
> >> running of the UD. The UD's intelligence is not needed.
>
> >>> Yes, it would generate every possible information state,
> >>> and...
>
> >> read more »
>
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