On 01 Oct 2011, at 21:05, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Oct 1, 10:13 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 01 Oct 2011, at 03:39, Craig Weinberg wrote:


The singularity is all the matter that there is, was, and will be, but
it has no exterior - no cracks made of space or time, it's all
interiority. It's feelings, images, experiences, expectations, dreams, etc, and whatever countless other forms might exist in the cosmos. You
can use arithmetic to render an impersonation of feeling, as you can
write a song that feels arithmetic - but not all songs feel
arithmetic. You can write a poem about a color or you can write an
equation about visible electromagnetism, but neither completely
describe either color or electromagnetism.

I have no clue what you are taking about.
That your conclusion makes some arithmetical being looking like
impersonal zombie is just racism for me.

I don't think that there are any arithmetical beings.

In which theory?



It's a fantasy,
or really more of a presumption mistaking an narrow category of
understanding with a cosmic primitive.

You miss the incompleteness discoveries. To believe that arithmetic is narrow just tell me something about you, not about arithmetic. It means that you have a pregodelian conception of arithmetic. We know today that arithmetic is beyond any conceivable effective axiomatizations.




So I see a sort of racism against machine or numbers, justified by
unintelligible sentences.

I know that's what you see. I think that it is the shadow of your own
overconfidence in the theoretical-mechanistic perspective that you
project onto me.

You are the one developing a philosophy making human with prosthetic brain less human, if not zombie.







This is the kind of strong metaphysical and aristotleian assumption which I am not sure to see the need for, beyond extrapolating from
our
direct experience.

Is it better to extrapolate only from indirect experience?

It is better to derive from clear assumptions.

Clear assumptions can be the most misleading kind.

But that is the goal. Celar assumption leads to clear misleading,
which can then be corrected with respect to facts, or repeatable
experiments.
Unclear assumptions lead to arbitrariness, racism, etc.

To me the goal is to reveal the truth,

That is a personal goal. I don't think that truth can be revealed, only questioned.



regardless of the nature of the
assumptions which are required to get there. If you a priori prejudice
the cosmos against figurative, multivalent phenomenology then you just
confirm your own bias.

I don't hide this, and it is part of the scientific (modest) method. I assume comp, and I derive consequences in that frame. Everyone is free to use this for or against some world view.





I don't think there is a microcosmos illusion, unless you are talking
about the current assumptions of the Standard Model as particles.
That's not an illusion though, just a specialized interpretation that
doesn't scale up to the macrocosm. As far as where sensorimotive
phenomena comes from, it precedes causality. 'Comes from' is a
sensorimotive proposition and not the other way around. The
singularity functions inherently as supremacy of orientation, and
sense and motive are energetic functions of the difference between it
and it's existential annihilation through time and space.

That does not help.


That doesn't help me either.

I mean: I don't understand. To much precise terms in a field where we question the meaning of even simpler terms.



Specifically, like if you have any two atoms, something must have a
sense of what is supposed to happen when they get close to each other.
Iron atoms have a particular way of relating that's different from
carbon atoms, and that relation can be quantified. That doesn't mean
that the relation is nothing but a quantitative skeleton. There is an
actual experience going on - an attraction, a repulsion, momentum,
acceleration...various states of holding, releasing, or binding a
'charge'. What looks like a charge to us under a microscope is in fact
a proto-feeling with an associated range of proto-motivations.

Why?


Because that's what we are made of.

Why should I take your words for granted.


?
(I let you know that one of my main motivation consists in explaining
the physical, that is explaining it without using physical notions and
assumptions. The same for consciousness).

But what you are explaining it with is no more explainable than
physical notions or assumptions. Why explain what is real in terms
which are not real?

You are just begging the question. You talk like if you knew what is real or not. Now it is the fact that all scientist agree with simple facts like 1+9=10, etc. Actually they are using such facts already in their theories. I just show that IF we are machine, THEN those elementary facts are enough to explain the less elementary one.







The link between the
sensorimotive and electromagnetic is the invariance between the two.

?
Feelings and action potentials have some phenomenological overlap.

What is feeling, what is action, what is potential?

To ask what feeling is can only be sophistry.

Not when addressing issues in fundamental cognitive science. Niether matter nor consciousness should be taken as simple elementary notions.


It is a primitive of
human subjectivity, and possibly universal subjectivity. To experience
directly, qualitatively, significantly. An action potential is an
electromagnetic spike train among neurons. They can be correlated to
instantiation of feelings.

I agree with all this, but that has to be explained, not as taken for granted.




That's the link. They both map to the same changes at the same place
and time, they just face opposite directions. Electromagnetism is
public front end, sensorimotive is private back end, which for us can
focus it's attention toward the front, back, or the link in between.

?

Electromagnetic and sensorimotive phenomena are opposite sides of the
same thing. I don't know how I could make it more clear.

That is your main problem.



Electromagnetism is public, generic, a-signifying, and sensorimotive
experience is private, proprietary and signifying.

That is like saying, in the machine language that electromagnestism if of type Bp, and sensori-motive is of type Bp & p, but I think that electromagnetism is of type Bp & Dt, and sensorimotive is of type of Bp & Dt & p. A part of your intuition might be accessible to computer, making your dismissing the possibility of comp even more premature.



You attribute to me a metaphysical assumption, where I assume only what is taught in high school to everyone, + the idea that at some
level matter (not primitive matter, but the matter we can observe
when
we look at our bodies) obeys deterministic laws, where you make
three
metaphysical assumptions: matter, mind and a link which refer to
notion that you don't succeed to define (like sensorimotive).

Then you derive from this that the third person "I" is not Turing
emulable, but this appears to be non justified too, even if we are
willing to accept some meaning in those nanosensorimotive actions
(which I am not, for I don't have a clue about what they can be).

The "I" is always first person.

I don't think so. When I say that my child is hungry, I refer to a
1-I
in the third person way. That's empathy.

You still don't call your child 'I'. You're right that sensorimotive
1-
p is sharable, as long as you are sufficiently isomorphic to the other
entity.

That makes sense, at least by replacing "sensorimotive" by "subjective".

Subjective is necessary but not sufficient to describe sensorimotive.
Sensorimotive is specific to actual sensory input and motive output.
You feel cold, so you choose to maybe put on a coat or turn the heater
on or just ignore it. Out of the many perceptions which make up your
awareness, the feeling of being cold has risen to the level of
conscious attention, and out of the many responses, impulses and
actions, we are motivated to choose one particular strategy to employ
first - even if it's a passive strategy of doing nothing. This push
and pull, receiving and sending of niche-specific, circumstantial
sensemaking is the essence of subjective content as opposed to a
categorization of the functional role of 'subjectivity'.

Hmm... The difference between subjective and sensorimotive would be captured by the difference between Bp & p, and Bp & Dt & p. That confirms my feeling described above.



I was curious about Hava Siegelmann's theories about analog
computation.

That's material phenomenon, and they can be used to perform some
computations, but with digital mechanism, they can be recovered in the
physical reality. They can't be primitive.

What if material is primitive?

Then comp is false. And you have to make this clear by assuming the relevant infinities. We would also be led to the peculiar situation where machine could correctly prove that they are not machine, making all possible discourses of machine being of the type Bf. You might eventually change my mind on the non provability of comp (as opposed to the non recognizability of the our level of comp). For this you should convince the machine that material is necessarily primitive. I begin to doubt that non-comp can make any sense. Hmm...

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to