On Oct 3, 11:16 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >>> I don't think that there are any arithmetical beings. > > >> In which theory? > > > In reality. > > That type of assertion is equivalent with "because God say so". > Reality is what we try to figure out. > If you know for sure what reality is, then I can do nothing, except > perhaps invite you to cultivate more the modest doubting attitude.

Ok, let's say that I'm mathgnostic. I doubt the existence of arithmetic beings independent of matter. I am sympathetic to numerological archetypes as coherent themes (or themes of coherence) which run through perception but to say that arithmetic spirits haunt empty space doesn't orient me to anything true or real, it seems like pure fiction. If it were the case then I would expect five milk bottles in a group to have the same basic function as five protons in a nucleus, five boron atoms in a molecule, five cells in a dish, etc. I just don't see any examples of causally efficacious arithmetic as an independent agent. > > > > >>> It's a fantasy, > >>> or really more of a presumption mistaking an narrow category of > >>> understanding with a cosmic primitive. > > >> You miss the incompleteness discoveries. To believe that arithmetic > >> is > >> narrow just tell me something about you, not about arithmetic. It > >> means that you have a pregodelian conception of arithmetic. We know > >> today that arithmetic is beyond any conceivable effective > >> axiomatizations. > > > I don't disagree with arithmetic being exactly what you say it is, > > only that it cannot be realized except through sensorimotive > > experience. Without that actualization - to be computed neurologically > > or digitally in semiconductors, analogously in beer bottles, etc, then > > there is only the idea of the existence of arithmetic, which also is a > > sensorimotive experience or nothing at all. There is no arithmetic > > 'out there', it's only inside of matter. > > This makes sense with the non-comp theory (which you have not yet > presented to us). > In the comp theory, arithmetic is independent of anything, and matter > is only a perception inside arithmetic. > I understand, I just have no reason to consider than anything can be inside arithmetic, whereas I know for a fact that I am inside my body. What form of a non-comp theory are you asking for? I will try to comply. > > > > So yes, arithmetic extends to the inconceivable and nonaxiomatizable > > but the sensorimotive gestalts underlying arithmetic are much more > > inconceivable and nonaxiomatizable. A greater infinity. > > Inside arithmetic *is* a bigger infinity than arithmetic. It is not > even nameable. If it's inside of arithmetic, how can it be bigger than itself? > > > > >>>> So I see a sort of racism against machine or numbers, justified by > >>>> unintelligible sentences. > > >>> I know that's what you see. I think that it is the shadow of your > >>> own > >>> overconfidence in the theoretical-mechanistic perspective that you > >>> project onto me. > > >> You are the one developing a philosophy making human with prosthetic > >> brain less human, if not zombie. > > > I'm not against a prosthetic brain, I just think that it's going to > > have to be made of some kind of cells that live and die, which may > > mean that it has to be organic, which may mean that it has to be based > > on nucleic acids. > > Replace in the quote just above "prothetic brain" by " silicon > prosthetic brain". I think that if we understand that the brain itself is what is feeling and thinking, rather than some disembodied computational function, then we have to consider that the material may not be substitutable, or if it is, the probability of successful substitution would be directly proportional to the isomorphism of the biology. If we knew of a particular computation which did cause life and consciousness to arise in inanimate objects, then that would be convincing, but thus far, we have not seen any suggestion of a computer program plotting against it's programmer or express an unwillingness to be halted. > > > Your theory would conclude that we should see > > naturally evolved brains made out of a variety of materials not based > > on living cells if we look long enough. I don't think that is > > necessarily the case. > > The theory says that it is *possibly* the case, and the advent of > computers show it to be the case right now. The difference between > artificial and natural is ... artificial. > But why, if biology has nothing to do with life, and neurology has nothing to do with consciousness, do we find no non-biological entity having evolved to live or demonstrate human consciousness. Doesn't that seem unlikely to you. I understand your point that comp promises to deliver computers which could be considered as conscious as we are, but I think that's only because science is hopelessly confused about what consciousness is. I agree that there is no literal difference between natural and artificial, but it's still a glaring deficiency of comp in my mind that in the history of the Earth there just so happens to not be any non-organic life at all. Especially if computers, as you seem to suggest, can adopt consciousness just by functioning in the same manner as something conscious, then it seems by now there would be some cave somewhere where the limestone had learned to dance like a beetle or bloom like a flower. > > > >>>>>>>> This is the kind of strong metaphysical and aristotleian > >>>>>>>> assumption > >>>>>>>> which I am not sure to see the need for, beyond extrapolating > >>>>>>>> from > >>>>>>>> our > >>>>>>>> direct experience. > > >>>>>>> Is it better to extrapolate only from indirect experience? > > >>>>>> It is better to derive from clear assumptions. > > >>>>> Clear assumptions can be the most misleading kind. > > >>>> But that is the goal. Celar assumption leads to clear misleading, > >>>> which can then be corrected with respect to facts, or repeatable > >>>> experiments. > >>>> Unclear assumptions lead to arbitrariness, racism, etc. > > >>> To me the goal is to reveal the truth, > > >> That is a personal goal. I don't think that truth can be revealed, > >> only questioned. > > > How can you question it if it is not revealed? > > It can be suggested, like in dreams. So it is better to extrapolate from what our dreams suggest than the 'unclear assumptions' of our ordinary, direct, shared, conscious experience? > > > > >>> regardless of the nature of the > >>> assumptions which are required to get there. If you a priori > >>> prejudice > >>> the cosmos against figurative, multivalent phenomenology then you > >>> just > >>> confirm your own bias. > > >> I don't hide this, and it is part of the scientific (modest) > >> method. I > >> assume comp, and I derive consequences in that frame. Everyone is > >> free > >> to use this for or against some world view. > > > It's a good method for so many things, but not everything, and I'm > > only interested in solving everything. > > You might end up with a theory of everything that you will not been > able to communicate. You might have fans and disciples (and even > money) but not students and researchers correcting and extending your > work. > I can't do anything about that. If the world is not interested in the truth, then I can't change it. > > > >>>>> I don't think there is a microcosmos illusion, unless you are > >>>>> talking > >>>>> about the current assumptions of the Standard Model as particles. > >>>>> That's not an illusion though, just a specialized interpretation > >>>>> that > >>>>> doesn't scale up to the macrocosm. As far as where sensorimotive > >>>>> phenomena comes from, it precedes causality. 'Comes from' is a > >>>>> sensorimotive proposition and not the other way around. The > >>>>> singularity functions inherently as supremacy of orientation, and > >>>>> sense and motive are energetic functions of the difference between > >>>>> it > >>>>> and it's existential annihilation through time and space. > > >>>> That does not help. > > >>> That doesn't help me either. > > >> I mean: I don't understand. To much precise terms in a field where we > >> question the meaning of even simpler terms. > > > I have precise terms because I have a precise understanding of what I > > mean. > > To be franc, I don't thing you do have them. I don't take for granted > most 'familiar' words of natural language, especially bases on > physicalist conception of reality. But you take for granted unfamiliar words of unnatural theories, especially based on anti-physicalist conceptions of simulation as the only reality. > > > I'm saying that causality is an epiphenomena of a feeling of > > succession, which is a specific category of the sensorimotive palette, > > like pain or blue. > > I can understand this ... by interpreting this in the comp theory, > making your terms precise (indeed they become numbers, or numbers > relation, or higher order numbers relations). > That is why sometimes I can appreciate your intuition: you talk like a > universal (Löbian) ... machine. But then you are using what you say as > a critics of mechanism, where the universal machine appears as a > simple counterexample. I'm not against machines, they are definitely a huge part of what is going on, it's just I think I see specifically how arithmetic fits in. Actually if you have a chance see if you get anything out of my post today: http://s33light.org/post/10979679238. I am placing math on another axis opposite art or medium, so that arithmetic or logos is the generic-universal essence which subject and object share, and techne is the concrete existence that they share. I suspect that this is more of an ephiphenomenal duality which runs perpendicular to the main phenomenal Oriental-Occidental continuum. > > > All of these feelings and experiences are generated > > by the underlying dynamic of the singularity chasing it's tail through > > the relatively fictional expansion of timespace. > > I have no clue what you mean by time, space, relatively fictional, > dynamic, generated, experiences, feelings ... in your "theory". Time is the empty container of change (energy). Space is the empty container of matter. Relatively fictional meaning that time and space are epiphenomenal gaps created by matter dividing itself. They are not an independent phenomena, they are just temporary relational gaps as the singularity creates a fictional subdivision of itself. The singularity cannot truly divide, since it is outside of timespace there is nowhere else to put it and no time for such a division to take place in, so it generates an existential metaphor, which is dynamic, experiential, and feels. > > > > >>>>> Specifically, like if you have any two atoms, something must > >>>>> have a > >>>>> sense of what is supposed to happen when they get close to each > >>>>> other. > >>>>> Iron atoms have a particular way of relating that's different from > >>>>> carbon atoms, and that relation can be quantified. That doesn't > >>>>> mean > >>>>> that the relation is nothing but a quantitative skeleton. There is > >>>>> an > >>>>> actual experience going on - an attraction, a repulsion, momentum, > >>>>> acceleration...various states of holding, releasing, or binding a > >>>>> 'charge'. What looks like a charge to us under a microscope is in > >>>>> fact > >>>>> a proto-feeling with an associated range of proto-motivations. > > >>>> Why? > > >>> Because that's what we are made of. > > >> Why should I take your words for granted. > > > You don't have to. You should check it out for yourself and see if it > > makes sense, and if not, why not? > > My attraction to comp, is that it explains to me why the concept of > primary matter does not make sense. In fact the more general notion of > "being made of" does not make sense to me (even if it makes sense for > some universal machine). We are in agreement there though. Even though the singularity is matter and energy(experience) to us as human beings, that's only because of the necessary contrast with space and time which defines us existentially. Essentially matter is as empty of substance as space and as filled with law and chaos as mind. My only disagreement with you on this is that I think that arithmetic is too narrow a logos to presume to account for subjectivity. You need techne or it's like ungrounded electricity. > > > > >>>> ? > >>>> (I let you know that one of my main motivation consists in > >>>> explaining > >>>> the physical, that is explaining it without using physical notions > >>>> and > >>>> assumptions. The same for consciousness). > > >>> But what you are explaining it with is no more explainable than > >>> physical notions or assumptions. Why explain what is real in terms > >>> which are not real? > > >> You are just begging the question. You talk like if you knew what is > >> real or not. > > > I know that consciousness is real, > > Good. My oldest opponents were disagreeing on this point (a critics > which does not make much sense). Heh, yeah, I can maybe see quibbling with the wording of the cogito, but the spirit of it seems silly to deny. > > > and my consciousness through my > > body tells me that matter is real. > > Matter is real. I do agree with this. But matter, assuming comp, is > not something made of elementary material things. Matter, to be short, > is the border of the universal mind, as seen by the universal mind. It > is a real perception of something which is not primarily material, but > sum up infinities of computations. An instructive image, is the border > of the Mandelbrot set. I do understand what you mean, and I almost agree, again, except that the Mandelbrot set is too literal. It doesn't look like a mind, it looks like a leaf or a feather. Obsessive, repetitive self- similarity... definitely part of it, but you need the orientation of naive sensation and motive to make sense of it. It's the elephant in the Mandelbrot. > > > My consciousness also tells me that > > some of it's own contents do not matter and it's perceptions do not > > faithfully render what is real outside of my awareness. I would say > > that arithmetic truths matter but they are not real, and therefore > > cannot be manifested in a vacuum - only through some material object > > which can accomodate the corresponding sensorimotive experiences. You > > can't write a program that runs on a computer made of only liquid of > > vapor - you need solid structures to accomodate fixed arithmetic > > truths. You need the right kinds of matter to express arithmetic > > truths, but matter does not need arithmetic to experience it's own > > being. > > Not necessarily. You have to give an argument, and there are many > results which can explain to you how such argument have to be very > sophisticated. Apparently, in arithmetic, numbers does dream > coherently (in a first person sharable way) of a stable quantum > reality, with some symmetries at the bottom, and wavy like > interferences. > I think what you are saying is that matter can arise from arithmetic, which is possible, but I don't see the difference. Why is arithmetic easier to explain than matter? I think that my hypothesis rooted in 'sense' (as the relation between matter-space-entropy and energy-time- significance) is an audaciously Promethean notion which grounds our perception in a cosmos which is both authentic and participatory, as well as transcendent and forgiving. From comp I get nothing surprising beyond the initial appreciation of the depth of possibilities of arithmetic, which although impressive, strike me as being merely awe inspiring with no hint at the gravity of the experience of organic life. > > > >> Now it is the fact that all scientist agree with simple facts like > >> 1+9=10, etc. Actually they are using such facts already in their > >> theories. I just show that IF we are machine, THEN those elementary > >> facts are enough to explain the less elementary one. > > > But since we aren't only a machine, then it's a dead end. > > You should say: "but since in my theory I am assuming that we are not > machine, it is a dead end in my theory". Yes. Not trying to be rude, I just assume that everything I say is automatically within the disclaimer of 'in my view'. > > > It's > > circular reasoning because you can say we can't prove we're not > > machines, > > I say the exact opposite. We can prove that we are not machine (in > case we are not machine). If we are (consistent) machine, then we > cannot prove it. So how do we prove that we are not machine? Why can't we be both machine and not machine? > > > but the whole idea of 'proving' is mechanical so you are > > just magnifying the implicit prejudice and getting further from the > > non-mechanistic truths of awareness. > > The human activity of proving is not mechanical(*), but a gentle > polite proof should be mechanically checkable. You can't say to the > peer reviewers that for the proposition 13 they have to pray God or > smoke salvia divinorum. (Or you say it only at the pause cafe, and > this is for private concerns, not for the publication, unless it is > paper on salvia or God, but then the goal is no more to prove but to > suggest a possible empirical discovery). > > (*) assuming P ≠ NP. If peer reviewers demand that a theory which explains subjectivity not examine subjectivity directly, then they have a priori excluded any possibility of understanding subjectivity. The peer reviewers are the problem, not the theory. > > > > >>>>>>> The link between the > >>>>>>> sensorimotive and electromagnetic is the invariance between the > >>>>>>> two. > > >>>>>> ? > >>>>> Feelings and action potentials have some phenomenological overlap. > > >>>> What is feeling, what is action, what is potential? > > >>> To ask what feeling is can only be sophistry. > > >> Not when addressing issues in fundamental cognitive science. Niether > >> matter nor consciousness should be taken as simple elementary > >> notions. > > > But numbers should be taken as elementary notions? > > In the usual mathematical sense. No need of extra metaphysical > assumption. You just need to believe sentences like "prime numbers > exists". They exist in the context of a particular sensorimotive logos, not in any independent sense. Something like the visible spectrum is a much stronger primitive as it appears to us unbidden and unexplained as a shared experience without having to be learned or understood. > All the material science use this. Despite the claims of some > philosophers, we just cannot do science without assuming the > independence of the truth of elementary (first order) arithmetical > relations. They can have truth or refer to truth without themselves being phenomena which exist independently. They aren't a they even, it's just an ephemeral collection of human ideas about quantitative universality. I don't see that they describe quality or techne at all. > > > That's the problem, > > you are trying to explain awareness as an epiphenomenon > > Awareness is not an epiphenomenon at all. It is a real non illusional > epistemological phenomenon which is responsible (in some logico- > arithmetical sense) the rise of physical reality. If it's not an epiphenomenon, then are you saying it is not a consequence of arithmetic? > > It is: NUMBERS ==> CONSCIOUSNESS/DREAMS ==> SHARABLE DREAMS (physical > realities). Isn't that saying consciousness is an epiphenomenon of numbers? What are numbers without consciousness? > > > of cognitive > > science, when of course cognition arises from feeling (otherwise > > babies would come out of the womb solving math equations instead of > > crying, and civilizations should evolve binary codes before > > ideographic alphabets and cave paintings). > > I agree that cognition arise from feelings. > Cool > > > >>> It is a primitive of > >>> human subjectivity, and possibly universal subjectivity. To > >>> experience > >>> directly, qualitatively, significantly. An action potential is an > >>> electromagnetic spike train among neurons. They can be correlated to > >>> instantiation of feelings. > > >> I agree with all this, but that has to be explained, not as taken for > >> granted. > > > How can any primitive be explained? > > It can't, by definition. That is why I don't take matter and > consciousness as primitive, given that we can explain them from > numbers (and their laws). The contrary is false. We cannot explain > numbers by matter or consciousness. I think that we can explain numbers from consciousness. They are sensorimotive teleological gestures refined and polished into an instrumental literalism which closely approximates a particular band of literal sense that we share with many physical, chemical, and primitive biological phenomena. They do not extend beyond a superficial treatment of experiences like pain, pleasure, sensation, humor, poetry, music, etc. > It can be proved that numbers > cannot be explained at all. In that sense, they are provably > necessarily primitive. No more so than colors or words, thoughts, feelings, being, etc. > > > If explanation is to reduce to > > simpler known phenomena, and primitive is to be the simplest knowable > > phenomena, then it's a contradiction to explain it any further. We can > > only place it into a meaningful context, which I think my hypothesis > > does. > > >>>>> That's the link. They both map to the same changes at the same > >>>>> place > >>>>> and time, they just face opposite directions. Electromagnetism is > >>>>> public front end, sensorimotive is private back end, which for us > >>>>> can > >>>>> focus it's attention toward the front, back, or the link in > >>>>> between. > > >>>> ? > > >>> Electromagnetic and sensorimotive phenomena are opposite sides of > >>> the > >>> same thing. I don't know how I could make it more clear. > > >> That is your main problem. > > > Ok, but what isn't clear? Opposite? 'same thing'? Electromagentism? > > Sensorimotive? > > Yes, all that. > If you observe a living brain under an MRI, you can detect certain changes in the equipment which can be correlated meaningfully with the experiences of the subject being examined. So these physical changes in the brain which are contagious to the MRI's antennae are part of the 'same thing' as the experiences of the subject - they have the same rhythmic patterns, instantiation, and duration. The content, however is precisely the opposite: The MRI patterns are topological regions of activity in a 3D space, without any particular meaning or significance, but with great specificity in terms of precise location and public verifiability. The subjective experience is literally the opposite. Not topological in space but perceptual in time. If you shorten the interval too much, you lose the sense of the perception entirely, but the electromagnetic pattern does not vanish. The subjective experience has significance and meaning. Without the experience side of it, the neural correlate would be no more interesting than examining sand dunes. Without taking significance into account, there is no purpose to examine the MRI in the first place. > > > > Electromagnetism is the name we give to the various phenomena of > > matter across space - waving, attracting, repulsing, moving, > > intensifying, discharging, radiating, accumulating density, surfaces, > > depth, consistency, etc. Sensorimotivation is the name I'm giving to > > the various phenomena of experience (energy) through time - detecting, > > sensing, feeling, being, doing, intention, image, emotion, thought, > > meaning, symbol, archetype, metaphor, semiotics, communication, > > arithmetic, etc. > > That's what the numbers can explain, and that what cannot explain the > numbers (without assuming them implicitly). I think that numbers can't explain any of that without the a priori expectation of those experiences. Numbers by themselves do not suggest anything but more numbers. They have no capacity to recognize their own patterns, only to be recognized by the computational shadows cast by concretely embodied agents of sense and motive. > > > > >>> Electromagnetism is public, generic, a-signifying, and sensorimotive > >>> experience is private, proprietary and signifying. > > >> That is like saying, in the machine language that electromagnestism > >> if > >> of type Bp, and sensori-motive is of type Bp & p, but I think that > >> electromagnetism is of type Bp & Dt, and sensorimotive is of type of > >> Bp & Dt & p. > >> A part of your intuition might be accessible to computer, making your > >> dismissing the possibility of comp even more premature. > > > What's Dt? > > > I think I know what Bp and p are but maybe define them longhand so I > > can be sure. > > I fix some machine M. > p is for an (arbitrary) arithmetical proposition. > Bp is for "M proves p", written in the language used by the machine > (it can be Peano arithmetic, in which case Bp is the beweisbar ('p') > of Gödel, and 'p' is Gödel's number of p (that is a coding of a > description of p in the language of the machine). > The modality "B" obeys the modal logics G (for what the machine can > proof about its provability) and G* (for what is true about that > provability, but that the machine cannot necessarily prove. G is a > sublogic of G*. > > Dp is for ~B~p (= it is not provable by M that not p), (~ = not). > If Dp is true, the machine cannot prove ~p, and this means that p is > consistent for the machine. For example (with t = the constant truth, > or = "1+1=2", and f = 1+1= 3, or the constant false): > > Dt = ~B~t = ~Bf = "M is consistent" (written in the language of the > machine). > > Gödel's second incompleteness theorem is > > Dt -> ~BDt (If M is consistent then M cannot prove that M is > consistent). Note that M can prove this. > > Note that ~Bp is equivalent with D~p > Note that ~Dp is equivalent with B~p > ~D~p is equivalent with Bp. > > B and D are dual. In modal logic B is called the Box, and D is called > the diamond. People use also [] and <> for them. > > There are infinitely many different modal logics > > I'm going to have to think about that for a while, but it helps I think. So you are saying that the difference between electromagnetic and sensorimotive is that sensorimotive includes p or the arithmetic itself, the content, while electromagnetism contains only the computational consequences of the arithmetic. Yeah, if that's what you are saying I like it. It gives me something new. I don't think it captures the significance of what the presence of p does as far as making sensorimotive analog through time and electromagnetic being discrete across space. > > >> Hmm... The difference between subjective and sensorimotive would be > >> captured by the difference between Bp & p, and Bp & Dt & p. That > >> confirms my feeling described above. > > > I'll get back to you if you can explain the variables better. I tried > > Googling them but nothing clear comes up for me. > > I hope that what I wrote above helps a bit. There are good book on the > subject, but you need to follow some course in mathematical logic, to > get familiar with it. I think that there is a cost associated with relying exclusively on mathematical logic in a TOE though. My hypothesis shows how modal agreements magnify the in-language and attenuate the outward sensitivity. Like a gaggle of teenagers hanging around in a pack, talking to each other incessantly and oblivious to the world. > > > > >>>>> I was curious about Hava Siegelmann's theories about analog > >>>>> computation. > > >>>> That's material phenomenon, and they can be used to perform some > >>>> computations, but with digital mechanism, they can be recovered in > >>>> the > >>>> physical reality. They can't be primitive. > > >>> What if material is primitive? > > >> Then comp is false. And you have to make this clear by assuming the > >> relevant infinities. > > > What has to be infinite in order for comp to be false, and isn't comp > > already assuming that arithmetic is non-axiomatizable and therefore > > infinite? > > The fact that arithmetic (in the sense of arithmetical truth, or the > set of all arithmetical true sentences) is not axiomatizable is a > theorem in pure mathematics. It is independent of comp. But that fact > can be used to explain why comp is not a reductionism. > > For comp to be false you need an argument for saying "NO" to the > digital doctor. He can propose you different artificial brains: > The cheaper one: the neuron are artificial device counting spikes and > triggering in response to being trigged according to some theory of > neurons and brains. > More expensive: it simulates by artificial devices each molecule of > your brain. > Much more expensive: it simulates by artificial devices the quantum > sates of each elementary particle;waves playing a role in your brain. > Even more expensive: it simulates by artificial devices the quantum > states of each elementary particles:waves in your brain by keeping the > entanglement of those particles/waves with your neighborhood. > etc. > > To say no to ALL doctor's propositions, you are implicitly telling him > that none of those finite description will work, nor even the quantum > state of the whole multiverse. > > You are asking him for either something magical (non Turing emulable), > or something infinite. Not necessarily. It just may be that consciousness is a spatio- temporal event calibrated to a specific circumstance within the firmament of the singularity which cannot be simulated. It's a fixed MAC address not only of a precise location and time relative to the absolute which cannot be spoofed, but a precise circumstantial pattern of energy and matter, so that the exact circumstance of someone's birth - the thoughts and feelings of the doctor and nurse, the sound of the cars outside, the proximity to the vineyards and the ocean...all of that may need to be reproduced to instantiate a particular identity. > > > > >> We would also be led to the peculiar situation > >> where machine could correctly prove that they are not machine, > > > I don't see how matter as a primitive makes machines able to prove > > that they are not machines. > > I was unclear. What I say is that if a machine convince herself, with > your help perhaps, that some pirimitive matter exists and has a role > for the instantiation of her consciousness, then such a machine will > eventually conclude (by a way similar to UDA) that she is not a > machine. If such machine is ideally correct, she would conclude > correctly that she is not a machine. This comes from the fact that the > UDA reasonning can be done by machines (as AUDA illustrated in some > admittedly abstract way). You might intuit this if you take the time > to follow the UD argument. > Hmm. Not sure I get it. I sort of get that the mathematical proposition of a matter-like topology would give rise to some novelty through computational non-accessibility but I don't know that the novelty would necessarily seem non-mechanical. > > I think a machine machine (or something we > > presume is a machine) proves whether of not it is a machine by how it > > responds to errors or hardware failures. > > A machine can never prove, still less know, that she is a machine. > Even machine have to make a leap of faith to admit mechanism. Most > machines will be 'naturally' against comp, before introspecting > deeper, and reasoning deeper, so that they can infer the possibility > (but nothing more). I'm not against the reasoning of that, I just don't think it's a compelling basis for rich perception. Sure, everyone's reality tunnel looks like reality and not a tunnel, but that doesn't explain why the contents of the tunnel are so interesting and so real. > > > You could maybe say that what > > we are made of is an accumulation of the universe's favorite errors, > > failures, and aberrations. > > Partially, yes. Even partial lies. Perhaps. I'm not sure. Sure, yes. Partial lies are probably the only way to be certain of keeping truth alive. Indra's Net of Bullshit, haha. Seriously though, you need the alchemical base alloys to hide the precious metal within, otherwise it wouldn't be precious. > > > > >> making > >> all possible discourses of machine being of the type Bf. You might > >> eventually change my mind on the non provability of comp (as opposed > >> to the non recognizability of the our level of comp). For this you > >> should convince the machine that material is necessarily primitive. I > >> begin to doubt that non-comp can make any sense. Hmm... > > > If I pull the plug on the machine, then the machine halts. Why should > > that be the case were machine independent of material substrate? > > Because machines can have long and complex computational histories. > If you pull the plug on the machine, you act on her 3-body that she > share the existence with you, and so in the normal histories she will > disfunction with a probability very near 1. From the points of view of > the machine she will survive in the computation which are the closer > with those normal computations (that's explains the comp-immortality, > which can already be explained in the inferred QM of nature). So a computer keeps computing even when you turn it off? That would be hard to swallow if you are saying that. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. 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