On 09 Oct 2011, at 18:30, John Clark  (FOR list) wrote:

On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> If you are a machine, you are duplicable (in principle)."

Yes. And if pure randomness is important to the feeling of self then you are not a machine and can not be duplicated because randomness (which by its
very nature is non deterministic and is in fact the very definition of

It is a definition of one precise form of randomness. Others exist, but it would distract us from the topic.

can not be reliably duplicated. But my feeling of self continues
from one moment to the next so the only logical conclusion is that
randomness is not important in generating a feeling of continuity of self.

OK. But that is not in the conclusion. That is the starting assumptions. And below you might grasp that the first person indeterminacy plays a key role in the ability to remain conscious in lawful physical reality. But I am anticipating.

> you cannot predict in advance where you will feel to be."

You will feel to be where your sense organs are, the location of your brain is irrelevant provided it is not so distant that the speed of light becomes important, and if recent developments turn out to be true perhaps not even

The speed of light is not relevant. If you are told that you will be reconstituted in a far away galaxy, or even in a different universe, or a different multiverse, you have to take that reconstitution into account to predict your next experience, no matter what. If not, you would introduce a magical ability (that is, a non Turing emulable ability) to persons.

If your eyes send you an image of the Kremlin then you will feel like
you're in Moscow, and if your eyes send you an image of the White House you will feel like you are in Washington. Of course in this example the two identical copies of yourself have received non-identical stimulation and as a result are no longer identical and will have diverged, but both of them
have an equal right to call themselves Bruno Marchal because both can
remember being Bruno Marchal yesterday.

Yes. And those two Bruno Marchal have to recognize they could not have guessed in advance where they will be reconstituted. Ypu are pleading for comp here (alias computationalism, or DM = digital mechanism).

> You cannot predict the result of the next self-localization."

So what? It would only take you a few minutes to write a computer program that will look at all the even numbers greater than 4 until it finds the smallest one that is not the sum of two odd primes and then stop, but if the computer this program is running on has X amount of memory you can not in
general predict if it will stop before it reaches X.

That is a third person indeterminacy, which concerns some event in the long run, and is quite different from the first person indeterminacy which concerns the result of an immediate experiment, from the first person point of view. You can see a similar difference between the deterministic chaos (like with weather) and the observation of an electron in the base {up, down} when it is in the state up+down. So what? Well, it is the discovery of the notion of first person indeterminacy in the deterministic frame of digital mechanism.

> The first person experience, in this case, cannot be
> emulated by any deterministic process"

I'll bet you feel like your first person experience has continued from
yesterday to today, but I have a secret to tell you. Last night when you
were asleep I scanned your body to the atomic precision Mr. Heisenberg
allows and recorded the position and momentum of all the atoms in your body,
and then I destroyed your body, and then I used that information to
construct a new body, and you knew nothing about it until I told you just
now. And yet you still feel like you because you remember being Bruno

Yes. That's what I call digital mechanism. Tthe assumption that indeed I would still be Bruno Marchal after an experience like that. More precisely DM assumes that there is a level of description of myself such that I survive for a substitution made at that level.

> Who you? Which you? How to do that?"

I honestly don't understand the question, or what the alleged problem is supposed to be, or what "that" is that I'm supposed to explain. I'm sure all the copies of me will have an opinion on whether they are John K Clark or not, and if you ask them nicely they would be happy to tell you what that
opinion is.

This is because I have explained only the key ideas. As I said, the first person cannot be aware of the delays of reconstitution, nor of the virtual or physical nature of those reconstitution. So if we assume that there is a (primary) physical universe, and that it is robust enough to run a universal dovetailer, then you can understand that physics is in principle entirely deducible from computer science (in the mathematical sense of Church, Post, Kleene, Turing, Markov, ...) which makes physics a branch of pure number theory (notably). To predict any experiment you can do, and verify it from a first person view, like looking at the needle of some device, you need to take into account the infinity of reconstitution of yourself in the universal dovetailing, and the laws of physics should be given by a statistics on all computations.

At this stage you can still avoid the conclusion by assuming that the physical universe is little (non robust enough to run a signifiant part of the universal dovetailing). But this is a red herring. Indeed, the assumption of the existence of a robust universe can be eliminated by another argument (the movie graph argument) which shows that a digital machine cannot distinguish, not only virtual from physical, but also cannot distinguish virtual from arithmetical. The additive and multiplicative structure of the natural numbers is enough to emulate all computations. We are already in the matrix, to put it shortly, with a matrix existing by virtue of the well known laws of addition and multiplication.

There is no problem with that, on the contrary. We found an explanation of where the physical laws come from. It respects Dennett criteria of explanation: that is, it explain physics without assuming the physical, like Dennett ask for an explanation of consciousness (but he does not ask this for an explanation of matter, curiously enough).

When you do the math, a pretty nice bonus is offered. Incompleteness provides an explanation of the difference of the communicable knowledge and the non communicable knowledge, that is mainly the quanta and the qualia. The mind body problem has been transformed constructively, in that way, into a problem in arithmetic (a long time ago). The precise logic of the observable has already been extracted, and is confirmed (not refuted) by the quantum data.

You can see how QM evolved:
1) the old theory is SWE + unintelligible dualist theory of mind (the collapse)
2) SWE + DM (Everett, Deutsch)
3) DM  (your servitor)

Of course to use DM to prove or refute the physical existence of the Higgs Boson, would be, at this stage, like to use string theory to prepare coffee. DM will take time to be practical in physics, but conceptually, we can understand, just by assuming the numbers+addition +multiplication, where the coupling observed/observers come from, and we can distinguish the quanta and the qualia. Actually, the quanta appear as particular case of qualia, which makes physics a first person plural (defined by duplication of entire populations), and this fits nicely with the decoherence theory in the Quantum framework of Everett and Deutsch. The theory provides also an explanation of many feature of consciousness, defines simply as the machine state when believing in a reality. And the theory (DM) is shown to be refutable, making it into science, when it is considered usually as philosophy.

-- Bruno Marchal


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