On 09 Oct 2011, at 18:30, John Clark (FOR list) wrote:

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On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > If you are a machine, you are duplicable (in principle)."Yes. And if pure randomness is important to the feeling of self thenyou arenot a machine and can not be duplicated because randomness (which byitsvery nature is non deterministic and is in fact the very definition of random)

`It is a definition of one precise form of randomness. Others exist,`

`but it would distract us from the topic.`

can not be reliably duplicated. But my feeling of self continues from one moment to the next so the only logical conclusion is thatrandomness is not important in generating a feeling of continuity ofself.

`OK. But that is not in the conclusion. That is the starting`

`assumptions. And below you might grasp that the first person`

`indeterminacy plays a key role in the ability to remain conscious in`

`lawful physical reality. But I am anticipating.`

> you cannot predict in advance where you will feel to be."You will feel to be where your sense organs are, the location ofyour brainis irrelevant provided it is not so distant that the speed of lightbecomesimportant, and if recent developments turn out to be true perhapsnot eventhen.

`The speed of light is not relevant. If you are told that you will be`

`reconstituted in a far away galaxy, or even in a different universe,`

`or a different multiverse, you have to take that reconstitution into`

`account to predict your next experience, no matter what. If not, you`

`would introduce a magical ability (that is, a non Turing emulable`

`ability) to persons.`

If your eyes send you an image of the Kremlin then you will feel likeyou're in Moscow, and if your eyes send you an image of the WhiteHouse youwill feel like you are in Washington. Of course in this example thetwoidentical copies of yourself have received non-identical stimulationand asa result are no longer identical and will have diverged, but both ofthemhave an equal right to call themselves Bruno Marchal because both can remember being Bruno Marchal yesterday.

`Yes. And those two Bruno Marchal have to recognize they could not have`

`guessed in advance where they will be reconstituted.`

`Ypu are pleading for comp here (alias computationalism, or DM =`

`digital mechanism).`

> You cannot predict the result of the next self-localization."So what? It would only take you a few minutes to write a computerprogramthat will look at all the even numbers greater than 4 until it findsthesmallest one that is not the sum of two odd primes and then stop,but if thecomputer this program is running on has X amount of memory you cannot ingeneral predict if it will stop before it reaches X.

`That is a third person indeterminacy, which concerns some event in the`

`long run, and is quite different from the first person indeterminacy`

`which concerns the result of an immediate experiment, from the first`

`person point of view.`

`You can see a similar difference between the deterministic chaos (like`

`with weather) and the observation of an electron in the base {up,`

`down} when it is in the state up+down.`

`So what? Well, it is the discovery of the notion of first person`

`indeterminacy in the deterministic frame of digital mechanism.`

> The first person experience, in this case, cannot be > emulated by any deterministic process" I'll bet you feel like your first person experience has continued fromyesterday to today, but I have a secret to tell you. Last night whenyouwere asleep I scanned your body to the atomic precision Mr. Heisenbergallows and recorded the position and momentum of all the atoms inyour body,and then I destroyed your body, and then I used that information toconstruct a new body, and you knew nothing about it until I told youjustnow. And yet you still feel like you because you remember being Bruno yesterday.

`Yes. That's what I call digital mechanism. Tthe assumption that indeed`

`I would still be Bruno Marchal after an experience like that. More`

`precisely DM assumes that there is a level of description of myself`

`such that I survive for a substitution made at that level.`

> Who you? Which you? How to do that?"I honestly don't understand the question, or what the allegedproblem issupposed to be, or what "that" is that I'm supposed to explain. I'msure allthe copies of me will have an opinion on whether they are John KClark ornot, and if you ask them nicely they would be happy to tell you whatthatopinion is.

`This is because I have explained only the key ideas. As I said, the`

`first person cannot be aware of the delays of reconstitution, nor of`

`the virtual or physical nature of those reconstitution.`

`So if we assume that there is a (primary) physical universe, and that`

`it is robust enough to run a universal dovetailer, then you can`

`understand that physics is in principle entirely deducible from`

`computer science (in the mathematical sense of Church, Post, Kleene,`

`Turing, Markov, ...) which makes physics a branch of pure number`

`theory (notably). To predict any experiment you can do, and verify it`

`from a first person view, like looking at the needle of some device,`

`you need to take into account the infinity of reconstitution of`

`yourself in the universal dovetailing, and the laws of physics should`

`be given by a statistics on all computations.`

`At this stage you can still avoid the conclusion by assuming that the`

`physical universe is little (non robust enough to run a signifiant`

`part of the universal dovetailing). But this is a red herring.`

`Indeed, the assumption of the existence of a robust universe can be`

`eliminated by another argument (the movie graph argument) which shows`

`that a digital machine cannot distinguish, not only virtual from`

`physical, but also cannot distinguish virtual from arithmetical. The`

`additive and multiplicative structure of the natural numbers is enough`

`to emulate all computations. We are already in the matrix, to put it`

`shortly, with a matrix existing by virtue of the well known laws of`

`addition and multiplication.`

`There is no problem with that, on the contrary. We found an`

`explanation of where the physical laws come from. It respects Dennett`

`criteria of explanation: that is, it explain physics without assuming`

`the physical, like Dennett ask for an explanation of consciousness`

`(but he does not ask this for an explanation of matter, curiously`

`enough).`

`When you do the math, a pretty nice bonus is offered. Incompleteness`

`provides an explanation of the difference of the communicable`

`knowledge and the non communicable knowledge, that is mainly the`

`quanta and the qualia. The mind body problem has been transformed`

`constructively, in that way, into a problem in arithmetic (a long time`

`ago). The precise logic of the observable has already been extracted,`

`and is confirmed (not refuted) by the quantum data.`

You can see how QM evolved:

`1) the old theory is SWE + unintelligible dualist theory of mind (the`

`collapse)`

2) SWE + DM (Everett, Deutsch) 3) DM (your servitor)

`Of course to use DM to prove or refute the physical existence of the`

`Higgs Boson, would be, at this stage, like to use string theory to`

`prepare coffee. DM will take time to be practical in physics, but`

`conceptually, we can understand, just by assuming the numbers+addition`

`+multiplication, where the coupling observed/observers come from, and`

`we can distinguish the quanta and the qualia. Actually, the quanta`

`appear as particular case of qualia, which makes physics a first`

`person plural (defined by duplication of entire populations), and this`

`fits nicely with the decoherence theory in the Quantum framework of`

`Everett and Deutsch. The theory provides also an explanation of many`

`feature of consciousness, defines simply as the machine state when`

`believing in a reality. And the theory (DM) is shown to be refutable,`

`making it into science, when it is considered usually as philosophy.`

-- Bruno Marchal http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.