On 11 Oct 2011, at 02:58, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Oct 10, 2011 at 02:13:17PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
here you are summing up well my critics of Schmidhuber and Tegmark
which I have done when entering in this list discussion.
This has given the big debate between ASSA and RSSA (the absolute
and the relative Self-Sampling-Assumption).

DM, or comp, does not work with the ASSA, which indeed would make
the physical as a sort of geographical. In a sense, comp rescues
physics from such approaches, and it introduces a new invariant (the
change of the phi_i, or the change for the initial ontic theory).
But comp also  rescues consciousness and persons from the
materialist tendency to eliminate them.

Anthropic principles are not completely evacuated, some defense of
them and variants are still possible, especially for the
cosmological history and for some explanation of geography. But the
laws of physics are not anthropic. They might be said in a loose
sense to be universal machine-thropic, or Löbian-Thropic, but not in
the Bayesian sense. The probabilities and their rôle are derived
from the first person indeterminacy.


With COMP, I don't see any difference between Anthropic and
Löbian-Thropic.

That is why I prefer to avoid the expression "Löbian-thropic", except for some cosmological or geographical aspect of reality.




With COMP, and via your UDA, our observed universe is selected from
the set of all infinite strings (which I call descriptions in my
book).

My non observed "future"; or computational extensions, is selected, making the comp physics explainable in term of statistics on computations. This leads to general physical laws invariant for all observers. There is no selection of a particular computations, just a relative indeterminacy bearing on all computations going through my state. In particular we cannot use Bayes theorem, for example. Computations are not infinite strings, but can have infinite strings as inputs, and so infinite strings can play a role in the (re)normalization needed to avoid the infinities of abnormal histories.




Without the anthropic principle, ISTM that your theory would suffer
the Occam catastrophe fate. How do you avoid that?

Is that equivalent with the white rabbits? We "avoid" this by having just much more "normal" or lawful local histories than abnormal one. It is the redundancy of the UD* + the non triviality of the self- referential constraints which saves, up to now, the consistency of comp. The anthropic principle might be capable to explain geographical and historical features, but it cannot explain why we remain in those geographico-historical computations, or why they are stable.

Best,

Bruno



Cheers

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Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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