On Tue, Oct 11, 2011 at 06:03:42PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >With COMP, and via your UDA, our observed universe is selected from
> >the set of all infinite strings (which I call descriptions in my
> >book).
> My non observed "future"; or computational extensions, is selected,
> making the comp physics explainable in term of statistics on
> computations. This leads to general physical laws invariant for all
> observers. There is no selection of a particular computations, just
> a relative indeterminacy bearing on all computations going through
> my state. In particular we cannot use Bayes theorem, for example.

Like Brent, I don't follow you here.

> Computations are not infinite strings, but can have infinite strings
> as inputs, and so infinite strings can play a role in the
> (re)normalization needed to avoid the infinities of abnormal
> histories.

That wasn't my point. The set of computational extensions is infinite,
uncountable cardinality even.

> >
> >Without the anthropic principle, ISTM that your theory would suffer
> >the Occam catastrophe fate. How do you avoid that?
> Is that equivalent with the white rabbits? 

No, it is quite the opposite problem. As Einstein purportedly said
"Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not
simpler". Occam's razor theorem, which comes from Solomonoff and
Levin's considerations of algorithmic information theory would imply
that we don't see anything interesting at all. That is the Occam
catastrophe. Something prevents the world from being too simple. I
think that something is the Anthropic Principle, but I'm interested if
you have an alternative suggestion.


Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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