I think most consequentialists, especially utilitarians, consider all
sentient beings to have moral status. Utilitarians say an action is
morally better to the extent that it produces more well-being in the
Anyway I would prefer to focus on whether act consequentialism implies
that all actions as morally equivalent, if the universe might be
On Oct 21, 2:50 am, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 10/20/2011 6:37 PM, nihil0 wrote:
> > However, this class action argument assumes that the value-density
> > approach is an acceptable way to measure the value in a world. There
> > are a few problems with the value-density approach. First of all, it
> > seems to give up aggregationism (total consequentialism) in favor of
> > average consequentialism. Average consequentialism has the
> > counterintuitive implication that we should kill people who have below-
> > average utility and few friends or loved ones, such as some hermits
> > and homeless people. Secondly, the value-density approach "places
> > ethical significance on the spatiotemporal distribution of value."
> > This is at odds with consequentialism's commitment to impartiality
> > (the idea that equal amounts of value are equally good to promote, no
> > matter who or where the beneficiaries are).
> But this kind of consequentialism is already unworkable. Who counts as a
> beneficiary? a
> fetus? someone not yet conceived? chimpanzees? dogs? spiders? In practice we
> value the
> well-being of some people a lot more than others and we do so for the simple
> reason that
> it makes our life better.
> > Third, the value-density
> > approach fails to apply to inhomogeneous infinite worlds . . . because
> > value-density is undefined for such worlds." (16)
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