On 10/21/2011 4:09 PM, John Mikes wrote:
*Hi Stephen,*
*it seems you are closing to 'my alley'. *
*First: if you don't think of T R U T H (in any absolute sense, meaning it's acceptable 'meaning') how can you abide by a version of it? - What are the "REALS"? *
Hi John,

    I have yet to find fault in any of your posts! ;-)

It boils down to a definition of the word "meaning", which I take to include notions of truth value and other properties. Meaningfulness requires a subject to whom that a meaning occurs, otherwise we are emptily debating about "if a tree falls ...." To this end such things as Reals are what is non-contradictorily experienciable by some collection of mutually communicating entities. This might seem to be just a form of "consensus realism" but I define "entities" as "anything that can have its own QM wave-function", so such things as quarks, leptons, paramecia, mice, tigers and trees, humans, planets, galaxies and super-clusters all have a vote in the consensus. I see a similar idea in Hitoshi Kitada's theory of Local Systems and Andrew Soltau's "Interactive Destiny" idea and they agree with me (another just a few people that I have communicated with), so I take this limited validation as a reason not to abandon it for some unknown alternative.

*I do not consider 'Arithmetic' the one and only ontological primitive: I cannot 'see' ontology at all in a world that changes ceaselessly and the 'being' (ontology) turns into 'becoming' (sort of epistemology?) with changing away at the instant you would realize it "became".

As I see it, arithmetic is just another way of systematic coding 'differences that make a difference". Ontological question are very very tricky because it is very difficult to avoid letting one's tacit assumptions and unconsidered beliefs to obscure problems. From what I have studied of philosophy so far, I would quibble a little bit with your wording here. A ceaselessly changing world can be seen easily, we are looking at an example of one right now. The trick is that the "ceaseless change" cannot be stochastic, there has to be some form of invariance on that change, otherwise there is no possibility of a realistic notion of observer at all. We can consider Boltzman brains that last for an instant, but unless there are a plurality of such brains that can actually somehow communicate with each other, they are no more than instantaneous solipsists. The way I see it, Being is the sum of the homomorphisms within Becoming. Becoming is fundamental. Ian Thompson has written a book <http://www.generativescience.org/books/pnb/pnb.html> that can be viewed online that discusses some other these ideas (if you want more that H. Bergson and Heraclitus references and my own babbling). There is also the writings of Ronald Swan that was taken from us far too soon.... (I'll send you a copy of his paper if you request it.)

Idem per idem is not a workable position. You can explain a 'system' only in terms looking at it from a different (outside?) view. **Platonism is such a system. I try a "common sense" platform.*

Idem per Idem is mere counting at best, so I agree. Counting requires some categorical separation between range and domain of the map and a persistent system to implement the mapping. Platonism does not seem to understand this requirement.

*I asked Bruno several times how he explains as the abstract 'numbers' (not the markers of quantity, mind you) which makes the fundamentals of the world. He explained: arithmetically 2 lines (II) and 3 lines (III) making 5 (IIIII) that is indeed viewable **exactly as quantity-markers (of lines or whatever). Of course a zero (no lines) would introduce the SPACE between lines - yet another quantity, so with the 'abstract' of numbers we got bugged down in measurement techniques (physics?). *

I agree 100%. It is as if the basic fact that communicability is completely taken for granted. There seems to be no consideration as to how separate and individual minds can communicate with each other in ideal monist theories. Material monist theories completely fail to account for minds, other than some kind of causal inefficacious illusion. Thus I am led, kicking and screaming, to consider some form of non-monist ontology to underpin science.

*Logic? a human way of thinking (cf the Zarathustrans in the Cohen-Stewart books Collapse of Chaos and The Figment of Reality) with other (undefinable and unlimited) ways available (maybe) in the 'infinite complexity' of the world *
*- IF our term of a 'logic' is realizable in it at all. *

I see the totality of existence as unlimited and unnameably infinite. We are only ever aware of infinitesimal parts of it, so we agree on this. Logic is just a communicable procedure of relating some set of "something" to some other set of "something". There are even multiple forms of sets and logics, so the plurality of possibility is endless! But there does seem to be a pattern to this madness! It seems as if for every kind of set there is a logic having its own algebra and isomorphic to some topological space. So this 4-ality is just another communicable idea.

*You know a lot more in math-related terms than I do, so I gave only the tips of my icebergs in my thinking. *

I have spent the last 20 years studying philosophy, physics and mathematics on my own and discussing ideas with many people. I have no one to blame for my strange ideas except myself. ;-) If they make some sense to someone other than me, that is wonderful, as sometimes I do not even understand my own mussing! It is I get possessed. It may just be madness. ;-P

*Then there is my agnosticism: the belief in the unknown part of the world that yet influences whatever we think of. We continually learn further parts of it, but only to the extent of the capabilities of our (restricted) mental capacity. So whatever we 'know' is partial and inadequate (adjuste, incomplete) into our 'mini-solipsism' of Colin Hales. *

I have a similar belief, I try not to name it because to do so constrains it to be one thing and nothing else! ;-)



*John M*
On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 7:07 AM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net <mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote:

    Hi John,

        I was not thinking of truth in any absolute sense. I'm not
    even sure what that concept means... I was just considering the
    definiteness of the so-called truth value that one associates with
    Boolean logic, as in it has a range {0,1).  There are logics where
    this can vary over the Reals!
        My question is about "where" does arithmetical truth get coded
    given that it cannot be defined in arithmetic itself? If we
    consider Arithmetic to be the one and only ontological primitive,
    it seems to me that we lose the ability to define the very
    meaningfulness of arithmetic! This is a very different thing than
    coding one arithmetic statement in another, as we have with Goedel
    numbering. What I am pointing out is that if we are beign
    consisstent we have to drop the presumption of an entity to whom a
    problem is defined, i.e. valuated. This is the problem that I have
    with all forms of Platonism, they assume something that they
    disallow: an entity to whom meaning is definite. What
    distinguishes the Forms from each other at the level of the Forms?



    On 10/20/2011 10:18 PM, John Mikes wrote:
    Dear Stephen,
    as long as we are not omniscient (good condition for
    impossibillity) there is no TRUTH. As Bruno formulates his reply:
    there is something like "mathematical truth" - but did you ask
    for such specififc definition?
    Now - about mathematical truth? new funamental inventions in math
    (even maybe in arithmetics Bruno?) may alter the ideas that were
    considered as mathematical truth before those inventions.
    Example: the zero etc.
    It always depends on the context one looks at the problem FROM
    and draws conclusion INTO.
    John M

    On Sun, Oct 16, 2011 at 12:48 AM, Stephen P. King
    <stephe...@charter.net <mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote:


            I ran across the following:


        *"Tarski's undefinability theorem*, stated and proved by
        Alfred Tarski <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_Tarski> in
        1936, is an important limitative result in mathematical logic
        <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_logic>, the
        foundations of mathematics
        and in formal semantics
        <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantics>. Informally, the
        theorem states that /arithmetical truth cannot be defined in

            Where then is it defined?



You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to