Stephen,

thanks for your consideration.
Thanks for offering further education (this was not facetiously said!) but I
have no time. I did not 'study' the oldies, I studied the newbies after 1/2
century getting by in natural sciences and (superficial???) philosophical
information: THEN I started to THINK on my own and find out where did THEY
(the Great Ones) go wrong. I found some points and tried to formulate them
for myself. This was the way I found my agnosticism - we know only a little
part of the knowables (cf Bruno's "believed unknown") of what we GET
teaspoon-wise over the millennia. Now, entering my 9th decade, I have no
time to RETURN to conventional sciences/phiilosophy what I read and
remembered from my youth. Am I wrong in some aspects? so be it. It goes into
my agnosticism. I sleep well.
I don't want to 'convert' or 'persuade', argue only to get arguments for my
further information - what I received from you Thank You.
*
I esteem(!) ontology. but don't find it applicable - tricky or not. I think
is is sort of a static view in a dynamically changing World (again to Bruno:
gimme a better word for 'Everything', please). I am not propagating
stochastic (random?) in a world (again!) we pretend to view as 'ordered' -
at least in the fragment we think to understand by our present poor
observational capabilities. (No free wiil either. It is an invention of
faith-potentates (religion?) to inject fear from punishment into the
faithful by (after-life?) responsibility.)
Change gets effected by relations in an infinite complexity from which "WE"
derive our topical/functional models of knowables. I have no idea how THAT
complexity works, or even is composed, it is beyond us. I derived this and
the awe of knowing just a bit - from the ideas of Robert Rosen (after David
Bohm's philosophy as 'im-/explicate').  Our observation is flimsy. Time and
space are coordinates of OUR universe - working fine for our conventional
views. Physical world IMO is a figment of conventional thinking, so are
(IMO) most 'theories' (monistic, or not, materialistic, or not). The only
REAL I hold is the "I dunno". The "ninth" beatitude: scientific ignorance.
And I am not afraid of being proven as mistaken: I have to acknowledge it
for myself first. Opinions are free.

Stephen, you have an open mind and some of your stances are acceptable FOR
ME (not that it counts).
I have open questions to think about (anticipation, etc.)  and may not be
lucky enough to settle.

Best wishes

John M

On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 6:39 PM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:

>  On 10/21/2011 4:09 PM, John Mikes wrote:
>
> *Hi Stephen,*
> *it seems you are closing to 'my alley'.  *
> *First: if you don't think of  T R U T H  (in any absolute sense, meaning
> it's acceptable 'meaning') how can you abide by a version of it?  - What are
> the "REALS"? *
>
> Hi John,
>
>     I have yet to find fault in any of your posts! ;-)
>
>     It boils down to a definition of the word "meaning", which I take to
> include notions of truth value and other properties. Meaningfulness requires
> a subject to whom that a meaning occurs, otherwise we are emptily debating
> about "if a tree falls ...." To this end such things as Reals are what is
> non-contradictorily experienciable by some collection of mutually
> communicating entities. This might seem to be just a form of "consensus
> realism" but I define "entities" as "anything that can have its own QM
> wave-function", so such things as quarks, leptons, paramecia, mice, tigers
> and trees, humans, planets, galaxies and super-clusters all have a vote in
> the consensus.
>     I see a similar idea in Hitoshi Kitada's theory of Local Systems and
> Andrew Soltau's "Interactive Destiny" idea and they agree with me (another
> just a few people that I have communicated with), so I take this limited
> validation as a reason not to abandon it for some unknown alternative.
>
>
>  *I do not consider 'Arithmetic' the one and only ontological primitive: I
> cannot 'see' ontology at all in a world that changes ceaselessly and the
> 'being' (ontology) turns into 'becoming' (sort of epistemology?) with
> changing away at the instant you would realize it "became".
> *
>
>
>     As I see it, arithmetic is just another way of systematic coding
> 'differences that make a difference". Ontological question are very very
> tricky because it is very difficult to avoid letting one's tacit assumptions
> and unconsidered beliefs to obscure problems. From what I have studied of
> philosophy so far, I would quibble a little bit with your wording here. A
> ceaselessly changing world can be seen easily, we are looking at an example
> of one right now. The trick is that the "ceaseless change" cannot be
> stochastic, there has to be some form of invariance on that change,
> otherwise there is no possibility of a realistic notion of observer at all.
> We can consider Boltzman brains that last for an instant, but unless there
> are a plurality of such brains that can actually somehow communicate with
> each other, they are no more than instantaneous solipsists.
>     The way I see it, Being is the sum of the homomorphisms within
> Becoming. Becoming is fundamental. Ian Thompson has written a 
> book<http://www.generativescience.org/books/pnb/pnb.html>that can be viewed 
> online that discusses some other these ideas (if you want
> more that H. Bergson and Heraclitus references and my own babbling). There
> is also the writings of Ronald Swan that was taken from us far too soon....
> (I'll send you a copy of his paper if you request it.)
>
>
>  *
> Idem per idem is not a workable position.  You can explain a 'system' only
> in terms looking at it from a different (outside?) view. **Platonism is
> such a system. I try a "common sense" platform.*
>
>
>     Idem per Idem is mere counting at best, so I agree. Counting requires
> some categorical separation between range and domain of the map and a
> persistent system to implement the mapping. Platonism does not seem to
> understand this requirement.
>
>
>
>  *I asked Bruno several times how he explains as the abstract 'numbers'
> (not the markers of quantity, mind you) which makes the fundamentals of the
> world. He explained: arithmetically 2 lines (II) and 3 lines (III) making 5
> (IIIII) that is indeed  viewable **exactly as quantity-markers (of lines
> or whatever). Of course a zero (no lines) would introduce the SPACE between
> lines - yet another quantity, so with the 'abstract' of numbers we got
> bugged down in measurement techniques (physics?).  *
>
>
>     I agree 100%. It is as if the basic fact that communicability is
> completely taken for granted. There seems to be no consideration as to how
> separate and individual minds can communicate with each other in ideal
> monist theories. Material monist theories completely fail to account for
> minds, other than some kind of causal inefficacious illusion. Thus I am led,
> kicking and screaming, to consider some form of non-monist ontology to
> underpin science.
>
>
>  *Logic? a human way of thinking (cf the Zarathustrans in the
> Cohen-Stewart books Collapse of Chaos and The Figment of Reality) with other
> (undefinable and unlimited) ways available (maybe) in the 'infinite
> complexity' of the world *
> *- IF our term of a 'logic' is realizable in it at all. *
>
>
>     I see the totality of existence as unlimited and unnameably infinite.
> We are only ever aware of infinitesimal parts of it, so we agree on this.
> Logic is just a communicable procedure of relating some set of "something"
> to some other set of "something". There are even multiple forms of sets and
> logics, so the plurality of possibility is endless! But there does seem to
> be a pattern to this madness! It seems as if for every kind of set there is
> a logic having its own algebra and isomorphic to some topological space. So
> this 4-ality is just another communicable idea.
>
>
>  **
> *You know a lot more in math-related terms than I do, so I gave only the
> tips of my icebergs in my thinking. *
>
>
>     I have spent the last 20 years studying philosophy, physics and
> mathematics on my own and discussing ideas with many people. I have no one
> to blame for my strange ideas except myself. ;-) If they make some sense to
> someone other than me, that is wonderful, as sometimes I do not even
> understand my own mussing! It is I get possessed. It may just be madness.
> ;-P
>
>
>  **
> *Then there is my agnosticism: the belief in the unknown part of the world
> that yet influences whatever we think of. We continually learn further parts
> of it, but only to the extent of the capabilities of our (restricted) mental
> capacity. So whatever we 'know' is partial and inadequate (adjuste,
> incomplete) into our 'mini-solipsism' of Colin Hales. *
>
>
>     I have a similar belief, I try not to name it because to do so
> constrains it to be one thing and nothing else! ;-)
>
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
>
>  **
> *Regards*
> **
> *John M*
> **
> **
> * *
> On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 7:07 AM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:
>
>> Hi John,
>>
>>     I was not thinking of truth in any absolute sense. I'm not even sure
>> what that concept means... I was just considering the definiteness of the
>> so-called truth value that one associates with Boolean logic, as in it has a
>> range {0,1).  There are logics where this can vary over the Reals!
>>     My question is about "where" does arithmetical truth get coded given
>> that it cannot be defined in arithmetic itself? If we consider Arithmetic to
>> be the one and only ontological primitive, it seems to me that we lose the
>> ability to define the very meaningfulness of arithmetic! This is a very
>> different thing than coding one arithmetic statement in another, as we have
>> with Goedel numbering. What I am pointing out is that if we are beign
>> consisstent we have to drop the presumption of an entity to whom a problem
>> is defined, i.e. valuated. This is the problem that I have with all forms of
>> Platonism, they assume something that they disallow: an entity to whom
>> meaning is definite. What distinguishes the Forms from each other at the
>> level of the Forms?
>>
>> Onward!
>>
>> Stephen
>>
>>
>> On 10/20/2011 10:18 PM, John Mikes wrote:
>>
>> Dear Stephen,
>>
>> as long as we are not omniscient (good condition for impossibillity) there
>> is no TRUTH. As Bruno formulates his reply:
>> there is something like "mathematical truth" - but did you ask for such
>> specififc definition?
>> Now - about mathematical truth? new funamental inventions in math (even
>> maybe in arithmetics Bruno?) may alter the ideas that were considered as
>> mathematical truth before those inventions. Example: the zero etc.
>> It always depends on the context one looks at the problem FROM and draws
>> conclusion INTO.
>>
>> John M
>>
>> On Sun, Oct 16, 2011 at 12:48 AM, Stephen P. King 
>> <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:
>>
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>>     I ran across the following:
>>>
>>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tarski%27s_indefinability_theorem
>>>
>>> *"Tarski's undefinability theorem*, stated and proved by Alfred 
>>> Tarski<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_Tarski>in 1936, is an important 
>>> limitative result in mathematical
>>> logic <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_logic>, the foundations
>>> of mathematics <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foundations_of_mathematics>,
>>> and in formal semantics <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantics>.
>>> Informally, the theorem states that *arithmetical truth cannot be
>>> defined in arithmetic*."
>>>
>>>     Where then is it defined?
>>>
>>> Onward!
>>>
>>> Stephen
>>> --
>>>
>>
>>
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