On Oct 27, 11:52 am, benjayk <benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com> wrote:
> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
> > On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 6:00 PM, Nick Prince
> > <nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com>wrote:
> >> QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
> >> I’m trying to get a picture of how David Deutsch’s idea of
> >> differentiation works – especially in relation to QTI. With a
> >> standard treatment it looks as if there might be cul de sacs for a
> >> dying cat. However I think I can see why this conclusion could be
> >> wrong. Maybe someone could check my reasoning for this and tell me if
> >> there are any flaws.
> > Nick,
> > I think such cul de sacs exist only from third person perspectives. E.g.,
> > the experimenter's view of what happens to the cat. When considering the
> > perspective from the first person (cat) perspective, there are no cul de
> > sacs for a much simpler reason: The cat might be mistaken, dreaming, or
> > even
> > an altogether different being choosing to temporarily experience a cat's
> > point of view.
> > No matter how foolproof a setup an experimenter designs, it is impossible
> > to
> > capture and terminate the cat's continued consciousness as seen from the
> > perspective of the cat.
> > The lower the chance the cat has of surviving through some malfunction of
> > the device, the more likely it becomes that the cat survives via
> > improbable
> > extensions. For the same reasons, I think it is more probable that you
> > will
> > wake up as some trans- or post-human playing a realistic "sim ancestor"
> > game
> > than for you to live to 200 by some QTI accident (not counting medical
> > advances). Eventually, those alternatives just become more probable.
> > Jason
> One thing I wonder about: Do the extensions necessarily become improbable?
> Why is it not possible that the cat just forgets that it is that particular
> cat, and wakes up as new born cat, or dog, or other animal (maybe human?).
> It even seems more plausible that as long as the cat is alive, relatively
> improbable extensions/narrow are required (since there are less futures
> where the cat is alive, than where it is not).
> It seems to me it is one step to far to assume that after its death the cat
> has to continue in a unlikely future in a form very similiar to its current
> That is taking egocentric notions of survival for granted. Maybe it is not
> required that much of memory or personality or physical form survives for
> the experience of survival. For example, during dream states, meditation or
> drug experiences, (almost) all memory and sense of personhood may be lost
> and still consciousness experiences surviving.
> This would be an argument in favor of a modern form of reincarnation. When
> the form is destroyed, consciousness just backtracks (maybe through some
> dream like experience) and is born anew.
> We don't even need much assumptions in terms of QTI or non-physical plane
> for that. All individual memory is lost, and thus consciousness can continue
> in very many probable futures, namely all newborn individuals that share a
> similar collective consciousness (which may just be the environment - or
> "world" - of the dead one, which obviously does not die). For the person,
> this is not really immortality, but this isn't required. Only consciousness
> has to survive in order for basic subjective immortality.
> It is a quite natural notion of immortality, with natural consequences with
> regard to immortality experiments (the subject just dies, and consciousness
> continues from memory loss).
> This would also explain positive near death experiences: As the person dies,
> consciousness feels itself opening up, as more consistent future experiences
> become available.
> View this message in
> Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com.- Hide
> quoted text -
> - Show quoted text -
This is similar to my speculations in an earlier topic post
where I suggest that very old or dying brains might
deterorate in a specific way that allows the transition of 1st person
experiences from an old to
a young mind i.e. the decaying brain becomes in some way homomorphic
to a new young brain which allows an extension of consciousness. It
is re incarnation but, as you suggest might be more a continuation of
consciousness than any remembering of who I am/was.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at