On Oct 31, 2011, at 8:15 AM, benjayk <benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com> wrote:
> OK, I can see that this a possible perspective on that. Indeed most of the > time immortality is used to refer to personal immortality (especially in the > west). I agree with materialists there is no good reason to suppose that > this exists. > Quantum immortality rests on the premise that the supposed continuations > that exist in the MWs of quantum mechanics are lived as real for the person > that dies, while we have no clue how these possibilities are actually lived. > It is much more plausible - and consistent with our experience and > observation - that the other possibilities are merely dreams, imagination, > or - if more consistent - are lived by other persons (which, for example, > didn't get into the deadly situation in the first place). A common response to the idea of QTI is, Why should I care if I die and someone else in another world who thinks he is me survives? But this objection shows a lack of understanding of consciousness works if there are multiple instantiations. > On the other hand, I don't see why we would ignore immortality of > consciousness, considering that the "I" is just a psychosocial > construct/illusion anyway. We don't find an actual "I" anywhere. It seems > very relevant to know that the actual essence of experience can indeed > survive eternally. Why would I care whether an imagined "I" experiences it > or not? > > How would you call this, if not immortality? Actually eternal youth seems > closer to eternal life to me than eternally growing old, which would be more > properly termed "eternal existing" or "not-quite-mortality". If we are cut > off from experiencing the undeveloped innocent freshness of children - not > knowing who you are - we miss something that is absolutely essential to > life. It is not by chance that children are generally more open and happy, > and learn faster, than adults. > > benjayk > -- > View this message in context: > http://old.nabble.com/QTI%2C-Cul-de-sacs-and-differentiation-tp32721336p32748927.html > Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.