On Oct 31, 2011, at 8:15 AM, benjayk <benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com> wrote:

> OK, I can see that this a possible perspective on that. Indeed most of the
> time immortality is used to refer to personal immortality (especially in the
> west). I agree with materialists there is no good reason to suppose that
> this exists.
> Quantum immortality rests on the premise that the supposed continuations
> that exist in the MWs of quantum mechanics are lived as real for the person
> that dies, while we have no clue how these possibilities are actually lived.
> It is much more plausible - and consistent with our experience and
> observation - that the other possibilities are merely dreams, imagination,
> or - if more consistent - are lived by other persons (which, for example,
> didn't get into the deadly situation in the first place).

A common response to the idea of QTI is, Why should I care if I die and someone 
else in another world who thinks he is me survives? But this objection shows a 
lack of understanding of consciousness works if there are multiple 
instantiations.

> On the other hand, I don't see why we would ignore immortality of
> consciousness, considering that the "I" is just a psychosocial
> construct/illusion anyway. We don't find an actual "I" anywhere. It seems
> very relevant to know that the actual essence of experience can indeed
> survive eternally. Why would I care whether an imagined "I" experiences it
> or not?
> 
> How would you call this, if not immortality? Actually eternal youth seems
> closer to eternal life to me than eternally growing old, which would be more
> properly termed "eternal existing" or "not-quite-mortality". If we are cut
> off from experiencing the undeveloped innocent freshness of children - not
> knowing who you are - we miss something that is absolutely essential to
> life. It is not by chance that children are generally more open and happy,
> and learn faster, than adults.
> 
> benjayk
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